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Abstract 
This thesis examines the way in which the connection between eros and beauty informs 
the epistemological progression in Platonic philosophy, such that the particular experience of 
beauty works as a trigger for critical inquiry. This analysis focuses on the way eros for beauty is 
able to drive the philosophical movement towards knowledge, so that philosophical education 
becomes available via the experience of eros or love for what is beautiful. As follows, the 
advancement of Platonic epistemology with its ultimate end in the transcendent is brought back 
to the sensible and grounded in exclusive particularity as the basis of this move towards 
universality. This claim is based on the analysis of epistemology and metaphysics expounded in 
Plato’s Symposium, and to a lesser extent in the Phaedrus.  
 In Chapter 2 we begin with an examination of eros as a crucial element for the 
philosophical endeavor. In the Symposium eros is shown to be a powerful aspect of human nature 
that strives for communion with what is transcendent. This inquiry sheds light on aspects of how 
and why individuals seek knowledge to show why eros is the activity of the soul that motivates 
the pursuit of wisdom. This analysis emphasizes that the movement of the lover, from love of 
particular beauty to noesis of the Beautiful, is a philosophical movement at its core, as the lover 
follows the same epistemological progression as the philosopher. Chapter 3 examines why eros 
of beauty works so effectively to provoke critical inquiry through an examination of beauty’s 
cognitive advantage due to its perceptual availability. The appreciation of beauty is shown as 
having the capacity to provoke the aporetic state necessary for the practice of philosophy. The 
final chapter analyzes the possible dangers of using beauty as a pedagogical tool through an 
examination of Socrates and Alcibiades’ relationship; in addition, we examine how beauty can 
aid in healing the limitations of philosophy in terms of reaching its audience.  
  The entire examination shows how the particular experience of beauty is able to ground 
philosophical education through sensible experience that makes accessible the metaphysical 
goal. The aesthetic experience of the lover in his relationship to the object of love provides an 
accessible praxis that allows the individual to become a philosopher of sorts, embarking on the 
same journey as he who desires wisdom. In this fashion, Diotima’s description of the journey of 
the lover provides a philosophical approach to living and learning grounded in the practical and 
in an attainable experience for all: that of eros for what is beautiful and immediate. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction & Overview 
 This thesis examines the way in which the connection between eros and beauty instigates 
the epistemological progression in Platonic philosophy, so that the particular experience of 
beauty works as a trigger for critical inquiry. This analysis focuses on the way eros (romantic 
love and/or erotic desire) for beauty is able to drive the philosophical movement from ignorance 
towards knowledge so that philosophical education becomes available to all individuals via the 
common experience of eros for what is beautiful. In other words, philosophy becomes possible 
through the experience of love. In this manner, the progression of Platonic epistemology with its 
ultimate end in the metaphysical is brought back to the sensible and grounded in particularity as 
the basis of this move towards universality. This claim is based on the analysis of epistemology 
and metaphysics expounded in Plato’s Symposium, and to a lesser extent in the Phaedrus. Both 
dialogues show that the journey towards transcendence is described in terms of love of the 
beautiful, and the relationship between eros and particular beauty is viewed as essential to the 
progression towards greater understanding. 
 There are many misconceptions and prejudices in the philosophical connotation of the 
appreciation of beauty. In many cases, love is condemned as not having a role in education, an 
area where the ‘emotional’ aspect of learning is increasingly censored in favour of a stark 
rational approach. Philosophy suffers, in grand part, from the same censorship and glorification 
of rationality, whereby the rational aspect of our nature is seen as more suited for intellectual 
advancements than are the more ‘embodied’ aspects of our being, such as our eros or physical 
contingencies. In many cases, such as Kant’s deontological account of morality, rationality is 
viewed as endowing human beings with the tools for intellectual equality; insofar as all 
individuals partake in reason, all are able to pursue questions of morality and epistemology, for 
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example, in the same manner. The superiority of reason over other human faculties stems from 
its supposed ability to produce objective laws that do not take into account subjectivity. 
Subjectivity, on the other hand, is strictly associated with eros and the particular desires of the 
individual. As a result, eros is traditionally shunned from educational endeavours, as it is 
regarded as producing distraction rather than focus on the goals of learning. Knowledge thus 
becomes a metaphysical goal that is meant to be pursued away from the physical.  
 An example of the empowerment of intellectual faculties over those of the body is given 
in Plato’s Phaedo. In the Phaedo, Plato presents a dualistic ontological account which sets up the 
body as a detrimental and opposing entity that inhibits the soul’s intellectual pursuits. In the 
Phaedo Socrates depicts philosophy as the practice for death; that is, Socrates emphasizes to his 
interlocutors that philosophy is an activity of the soul and for this reason can only be fully carried 
out once the soul leaves its physical confines, i.e, at the moment the individual dies and the soul 
is released from the body. The dualistic position whereby the body stands in opposition to the 
soul can be traced back to Pythagoras and the ideas he adopted from Orphism; according to 
Arthur Hilary Armstrong, Pythagoreanism adopted the Orphic doctrine that “the soul is divine 
and immortal, that it has fallen and is imprisoned in the body, and that it is doomed to continual 
reincarnation until it can purify itself, escape, and return to the divine world” (7). Scholars such 
as Giovanni Reale and Roxana Carone argue that Plato is influenced by this Pythagorean view 
when he sets up the opposition of soul and body whereby the soul is associated to intellectual 
endeavours, and the body to the physical contingencies that prevent the former from occurring. 
As Reale puts it: “in the conception of the relations between soul and body there is introduced, 
beyond the metaphysical-ontological dimension, the religious dimension of Orphism, which 
transforms the structural distinction between the soul (=supersensible) and body (=sensible) into 
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a structural opposition” (157). Accordingly, the soul and body are given opposing dimensions so 
that the body, belonging to the ‘lower’ sphere, prevents the soul from achieving any 
transcendence.  
In the Phaedo the body is thus largely portrayed as a “kind of prison” (Phaedo 62b) for 
the soul, a confinement that does not allow the soul to explore fully its transcendent potential, but 
rather limits the soul to earthly philosophical exploration which in turn is no exploration at all, as 
true knowledge can only be found away from the physical. The corporeal is deemed as an 
obstruction; the body stands as an obstacle for the soul to achieve transcendental vision. 
Philosophy becomes “the practice for dying and death” (Phaedo 64a) because it teaches the 
individual to disdain the activity of the body in favour of the intellectual activity of the soul. The 
soul-body opposition sets up matter and the physical as evil and inherently unphilosophical, 
whereas the soul belongs to the divine sphere where true philosophy takes place, away from flux 
and change. As Thomas Olshewsky explains, in the Phaedo the soul is equivalent to intellect 
itself: “the soul is so closely identified with intellection that this latter term (dianoia) is 
sometimes substituted for the former” (392). Philosophy, or any sort of quest for understanding, 
can thereby only be pursued in the sphere wherein the soul exists, so that the physical experience 
of the body does not contaminate the soul and obscure its vision. Socrates’ second voyage is thus 
prompted by this problem: knowledge can only be attained in the metaphysical realm, thus the 
philosophical endeavour carried out in this domain. As Reale explains, Plato teaches that “the 
method of the Naturalists based on the senses does not clarify, but obscures knowledge; the new 
kind of method, therefore, will be based on logoi (definitions), and by means of them it must 
attempt to grasp the truth of things” (40). 
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In this manner the body can be prevented from dragging the soul towards that which is in 
flux, intoxicating the soul and making it feel dizzy (Phaedo 79c). The further the soul is away 
from transcendence, the more it suffers; the body forces the soul to participate in that which is in 
constant change, thus rendering the soul unable to learn. When the soul investigates on its own, 
conversely, “it passes into the realm of what is pure, ever existing, immortal and unchanging” 
(Phaedo 80a). Thus, philosophy’s job is described as the turning “away from the body towards 
the soul” (Phaedo 64e), so that the body no longer impedes the attainment of knowledge with its 
physical desires. The body, being affected by earthly contingencies and desires contributes “to 
his own incarceration most of all” (Phaedo 82e), so that the individual is encouraged to leave 
behind desire in favour of intellectual activity. The philosopher is thereby the individual who 
favours spiritual and intellectual activity over physical activity of any kind, as the physical only 
works to get in the way of what the soul can achieve on its own: “the soul of the philosopher 
most disdains the body, flees from it and seeks to be by itself” (Phaedo 65d). The soul thus 
becomes the source of reality; the spiritual realm becomes the domain where true knowledge can 
be found, and for this to occur the educational journey must be approached with intellect alone. 
This rejection of our natural fate, of our embodied existence, and the assumption that the 
physical stands in the way of knowledge is what drives Socrates’ second voyage, taking 
philosophical activity from the physical and into the metaphysical domain.  
However, the conception of reason as the sole aspect of our nature that points toward 
what is ‘real’ foregoes entirely our embodied identity, which is the primary way in which we 
come into contact with anything that surrounds us. If we solely analyze the Phaedo as Plato’s 
position on the body we are left with a negative account that is highly unsatisfying for us as 
primarily embodied beings; the Phaedo’s elevation of philosophy to the purely intellectual 
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domain effectively renders it an unreachable activity for human beings: we cannot practice 
philosophy, we cannot know, until we die. However, dialogues such as the Symposium and the 
Phaedrus offer a complementary position wherein the philosophical journey is rooted in the 
practical, in the world, as a means to achieve any knowledge of what is transcendent. As Roxana 
Carone explains, observation of the late dialogues reveals that the Phaedo does not present 
Plato’s entire position on the soul-body relationship, as the later dialogues “reveal an intriguingly 
close association between the mind and the body” (230). In the Symposium the voyage does not 
have to wait until death; philosophy and the Good can be found in the world as gateways to the 
Forms Themselves. In these accounts, the practice of worldly affairs does not turn the individual 
away from philosophy but is rather a necessary stepping stone for philosophical activity. In the 
Symposium and the Phaedrus this worldly activity is love or eros for the beauty in others, an 
experience which acts as a mediator between two spheres that have been structurally opposed:  
“In the Symposium, Plato attempts to show how there can be a mediation of the division between 
humanity and divinity through Eros" (House 46). 
In this manner one aspect of our nature is not radically opposed to the other. The 
glorification of rationality ignores the fact that just like all human beings have subjective desires 
unlike those of other individuals, all human beings have different levels of cognitive ability and 
therefore reason in different ways and at different levels. In fact, it seems less likely for 
individuals to pursue abstract and intelligible ideas that they cannot really grasp than to 
investigate empirical concepts that are physically manifest. Plato’s Symposium provides an 
account that does exactly this: it presents a philosophical journey that does not begin in abstract 
universality, but rather on the individual as the stepping stone for philosophy, through the idea 
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that all individuals are lovers of the beauty present in the physical world, and via this desire, they 
can access any metaphysical knowledge. 
 The argument of this thesis begins in Chapter 2 with an examination of eros and the 
qualities that make it a crucial element for the philosophical endeavor. Through an analysis of 
the speeches in the Symposium eros is shown to be a powerful aspect of human nature that 
strives for communion with what is transcendent. In the dialogue the definition of eros 
progresses in each encomium until it reaches an all-encompassing definition in Diotima’s 
speech. Eros is presented as the element within us that allows for the bridging of the gap between 
the divine and the mortal, ever so slightly. As a force that begins in the particular experience of 
love between human beings it is a devotion that is at first solely present in the finite realm but 
eventually is geared towards transcendence. Its daimonic qualities allow it to bring human beings 
closer to the transcendence they desire, eventually representing more than just the linear 
relationship of desire between two individuals, but also the relationship between the self and the 
transcendental. The dialogical progression of eros foreshadows the progression that the lover 
goes through in the ladder of love; Diotima’s speech ultimately takes up important elements from 
each speech to sublate them into a Platonic account of eros that longs after the Beautiful. Thus, 
from the immediate particularity of Phaedrus’ account we are taken to an understanding of eros 
as the capacity present in all individuals that allows us to bridge the gap between the physical 
and the metaphysical: eros prompts us to move out of our state of fluctuation and lack of tangible 
knowledge and be able to glimpse somewhat that which transcends our nature. 
In Phaedrus’ eulogy we begin with an understanding that love occurs between particulars. 
This foundational aspect is taken by Diotima as the first step of the journey towards the Forms. 
Phaedrus examines love in relationship to shame and virtue, stating that it is the eros for one’s 
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beloved that prompts the individual to act in a virtuous manner. However, even though Phaedrus 
brings forth the idea of virtue he demonstrates that in his account lovers are allowed to commit 
even unvirtuous acts and display excessive behaviours that can jeopardize the individual and his 
community. The danger of love that is present in this encomium is later acted out by Alcibiades, 
whose speech dwells on the extreme feelings that Socrates makes him feel and the lengths he has 
gone to in order to impress Socrates. In the next panegyric, that of Pausanias, beauty is 
introduced, and now eros is seen as an experience that is associated with the Beautiful. 
Pausanias’ hierarchy of desire matches his insistence for subjecting eros to specific laws, which 
acknowledges beauty’s ability to push reason out of the equation in matters of love. Once again, 
this danger manifests in Alcibiades’ performance and his somewhat irrational fixation on 
Socrates, whom he sees as the starting point and end of his philosophical education. Perhaps this 
is why Eryximachus focuses on the idea of moderation and harmony, but not instituted by the 
city like Pausanias’ biased law, but rather by nature, or by a caretaker of the soul who knows 
how to treat it to achieve proper balance. For Eryximachus, this expert of the body is the 
physician, but for Plato, it will be the philosopher, the image of Socrates as the midwife to the 
soul. 
Balance is needed for eros in order that desire not lead the individual into extreme 
behaviours. This need for balance is a consequence of our ontological status, as delineated by 
Aristophanes. Human beings are incomplete by nature, and it is this completion that they seek 
when they desire other individuals. The awareness of our lack is crucial to remediate our nature; 
this awareness is the state of aporia whereby the recognition of ignorance is achieved, which 
marks the beginning of philosophical inquiry. Aristophanes’ account marks a serious impediment 
for philosophy for Plato, since it limits individual eros to other individuals and away from their 
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previous curiosity concerning the divine. Diotima remedies this horizontal fixation moving the 
object of love from the temporal to the transcendent, but still incorporating our initial desire for a 
particular other. This new ultimate object of desire will be the Beautiful, which incorporates the 
particular account of beauty into its universal nature. The Beautiful is precisely what Agathon 
mistakes to be eros itself, when in reality nothing that belongs to our nature could possess that 
absolute quality that the Beautiful has as a Form, and eros is in reality the principle within us that 
desires this communion with transcendence. In this manner Diotima conveys an epistemological 
account whereby the movement towards knowledge begins in the individual experience of love, 
an experience that at first might appear to be incompatible with education, but that in reality 
appeals to human eros in the most appropriate way. It is precisely the devotion to a particular 
manifestation of beauty that allows the self to move forward, as eros for action becomes 
triggered and through the understanding of particular beauty we are able to be led into 
universalization. From this experience the lover is able to recognize that particular beauty is a 
manifestation of a transcendental Form, which allows her to begin the epistemological 
movement that is also present in the line analogy in the Republic, thus bringing together lover 
and philosopher under the same progression. Once this understanding is achieved, the lover now 
has what is required to create beauty in the world, that is, a noesis of the form of the Beautiful, so 
that now she is able to create beauty that has truth and lures the soul with glimpses of what is 
beautiful, just like Socrates’ silenic statues lured Alcibiades into being ‘bitten’ by philosophy.  
Having understood how this progression works, we are now able to compare the lover in 
Diotima’s story to the Platonic philosopher. Both lover and philosopher embark on the same 
journey, from the sensible to the metaphysical, and both understand that the sensible participates 
in what is transcendent in such a way that we are able to incorporate the sensible experience on 
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our journey upwards. The philosopher in Diotima’s account is seen as the ultimate lover, having 
the noblest object of love in that which never changes but always remains the same, thus 
providing the most stable knowledge. In addition, it is the philosopher who masters the art of ta 
erotika and who knows how to make this progression properly, as we see by the fact that 
Socrates is the one relaying this information in the banquet. The lover is thus a philosopher of 
sorts, as both have the same object of their love ultimately in the metaphysical. Moreover, both 
journeys end not in the metaphysical, but rather in the understanding that achieving knowledge 
acts as the starting place for philosophical action and creation. That is, the end of philosophical 
education is not in the clouds, but rather, in the cave.  
Moreover, the intermediary aspect of eros allows it to act as the remedy to human 
ignorance, that is, our natural position as creatures in a state of becoming that lack knowledge of 
what is transcendent. This treatment of eros demonstrates three foundational aspects of how, and 
why, individuals learn and seek knowledge. First, critical inquiry begins in the discovery of what 
is immediate; for human beings, the most immediate experience is shown in their relationship to 
one another. Second, by virtue of our nature as incarnate creatures, human beings naturally lack 
that which is transcendent, and it is part of our nature to recognize this lack and seek to heal it. 
Third, eros by nature loves beauty, since it desires what it lacks the most, and therefore, 
individuals are naturally attracted to what is beautiful. Eros is thus the element in the soul that 
recognizes that which the soul lacks: in this case, beauty, and via its attraction to particular 
experiences of beauty eros is able to lead the soul forward into an epistemological, and 
ontological, progression to universality. Diotima’s lover becomes Socrates’ philosopher, as they 
both follow the same movement towards the Forms, only the latter via desire for wisdom 
exclusively, and the former via eros for what is kalos, beginning in particularity and eventually 
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being lead to the same revelation as that received by the philosopher. The beginning in the 
particular experience of love is what humanizes the philosophical movement towards knowledge, 
grounding it in a kind of eros that is common to all human beings: that of the beauty of temporal 
objects and beings. 
The discussion on eros segues into the examination of beauty in Chapter 3, which focuses 
on beauty’s power to wake up this strong desire within the individual, especially next to 
traditional ‘philosophical’ forms such as the Good or virtue. Beauty becomes a powerful 
pedagogical tool for philosophical investigation when its power to seduce and command the soul 
becomes clear for philosophical inquiry. As the most poignant sensible manifestation of the 
metaphysical, beauty becomes the most immediate reminder of the transcendent abstract goal 
that are the Forms. Beauty is different from other Forms due to its sensible priority; the way we 
access beauty is non-discursive and immediate, rationalization is not required and the experience 
in itself speaks to our eros in an immediate and demanding manner. Beauty is the Form that has 
more accessible and immediate representations in the empirical realm; unlike virtue or justice, 
for instance, that are abstract concepts with limited physical manifestations, beauty is more 
easily placed in a particular context so that we are able to see it immediately and concretely. 
Beauty’s accessibility is precisely what makes it ideal for philosophy, as is shown in the 
Symposium wherein it stands at the starting point for Platonic epistemology. It is not that the 
other Forms partake in the sensible in a lesser degree than beauty, but rather that the particular 
representations of the Beautiful are of a more immediate nature than those of the other Forms. 
Initially, sensible beauty commands more attention than do examples of wisdom or virtue; it is 
only necessary to assess the impact of Agathon’s beauty and poetry to understand the extent to 
which beauty demands attention.  
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Beauty’s closeness to the human experience, coupled with the fact that eros naturally 
longs after it and is an essential aspect of our nature, renders beauty the most powerful engager 
of the soul, and the best incentive for the individual to gain knowledge. The experience of beauty 
is our gateway to recollection; when the individual experiences beauty she is able to remember 
or come into contact with the Forms, she is able to glimpse the universality of her particular 
experience. Truth, thus, need not be devoid of beauty, and beauty should not be devoid of truth, 
but rather, they should be combined, as both target our rational and erotic capacities in the most 
suitable manner.  
The Beautiful thus becomes that which ignites our eros in the most intense way, more 
than any representation of wisdom could do. The Good, not possessing sensible manifestations 
that are as clear and immediate, and not being as alluring to our eros as beauty is, is not enough 
to ignite this primal aspect of our being into action; in order words, at the sight of goodness alone 
our eros is not immediately activated, it is not dying to step on the ladder to the Good to follow 
it. Arguably, if we could see the Good in its absolute form, we would follow it with more 
intensity than any representation of beauty, and when we do follow beauty we are in fact 
following the Good. For eros to be activated we need beautiful incentives, and in this way, the 
Beautiful is different from the other Forms as the one Form that is able to grant us this sensible 
manifestation of transcendence that we need to embark on the philosophical journey. Since eros 
is naturally attracted to beauty, by using the Beautiful we are uniting the lover and the 
philosopher in the same journey towards transcendence, only using a Form that is much more 
accessible to all individuals via the particular experience of love and beauty. Thus, beauty 
becomes a powerful ally for Platonic philosophical education, that when properly channeled, aids 
the individual to move up the line. 
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Eros is thus portrayed as the element of the soul that via its desire for particular beauty is 
able to embark on an epistemological progression towards greater knowledge, by virtue of 
beauty’s ability to provoke critical inquiry. The ability of sensible beauty to trigger eros towards 
it, combined with beauty’s compelling power to evoke in the observer thoughts of what is 
beyond, thereby leading the mind to thoughts of transcendence, instills in the individual a sense 
of belief in something other than what is perceptually immediate, thus eliciting philosophical 
inquiry.  
In Chapter 4 I analyze the possible dangers of beauty as a pedagogical tool in addition to 
examining how beauty can aid in healing philosophy’s limitations in terms of reaching its 
audience. Precisely because of its power, beauty has a dangerous edge; like Alcibiades, we can 
become fixated on sensible beauty as our telos and stagnate on the lower levels of the ladder. 
This is why beauty must be allied with philosophy, eros with reason, in order to prevent the 
upward blindness we see in Alcibiades. Both beauty and philosophy need each other. 
Philosophy’s limitation in terms of engaging our eros can be surpassed with beauty and its power 
to move the soul, so that philosophy does not stand in utter otherworldliness but becomes more 
accessible for individuals. Beauty must be aided by reason, like the horses in the charioteer 
example in the Phaedrus. An opposing story to that of Alcibiades is the very real philosophical 
movement of Plato and Dante not only via beauty but of an ultimate creation in the Beautiful. 
Both authors undergo a similar movement to the lovers in Diotima’s encomium which further 
elucidates how education can benefit from the appreciation of beauty, especially when this 
appreciation manifests in a love that recognizes the glimpses of transcendence hidden within the 
particular manifestation. 
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Plato provides a philosophical account that humanizes the metaphysical goal through 
human relations, and unites the persuasiveness of beauty with the desire for truth of philosophy 
as one. The Symposium and the Phaedrus both emphasize beauty’s ability to provoke the critical 
inquiry necessary to reach the aporetic disposition necessary for philosophy to begin; in sensible 
beauty, there is the biggest manifestation of the Good that is available for human beings, and it is 
here where the stairway to ideas begins. In this manner the philosophical endeavor becomes 
more than just phantoms or unreachable concepts, but rather a very real experience that speaks to 
all aspects of our being. 
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Chapter 2 Eros 
2.1 Introduction: What is eros? 
The Symposium is the Platonic dialogue devoted to a philosophical exploration of eros. 
With the character of Phaedrus proposing eulogies to eros – or love – as the theme for the night’s 
banquet, Plato sets up a dialogue in which each speaker provides his own particular definition of 
eros one after the other and, mostly, without interruption. The style of this dialogue breaks away 
from the usual set-up given by the Socratic elenchus, whereby Plato has Socrates interrogate a 
particular interlocutor throughout the dialogue with the aim of arriving at the definition of a 
particular concept. Although, more often than not, this definition is not arrived at and instead of 
figuring what the concept is, Socrates and his interlocutors arrive to an understanding of what the 
thing is not. In the case of the Symposium, in providing consecutive speeches, Plato is able to 
unfold a different aspect of eros in each speaker’s encomium, and thus, to build up, partially and 
slowly, an account that culminates in a more comprehensive and coalescing explanation, 
delivered in Diotima’s story. For this reason, in order to understand better what defines eros in 
this dialogue, it is necessary to look at the parts in combination with the whole: that is, to 
examine each speech on its own, as an individual account, and each speech in relationship to the 
other speeches and to the themes of the dialogue as a whole.  
Defining eros is fundamental to answering the question of how the erotic relates to the 
metaphysical in the Platonic account rendered in this dialogue; according to Thomas Cooksey, 
for example, the theme of the dialogue “is eros and the nature of love, how love shapes our 
moral character, informs our ethics, raises questions of being, contemplates the forms (especially 
the beautiful and the good), and drives the philosophical enterprise” (13). In other words, eros 
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permeates all aspects of the philosophical inquiry carried out in the dialogue, and thus, defining 
eros first is essential to understanding how the erotic relates to Platonic epistemology and 
ontology. In addition, this definition is necessary to understand why the philosopher is regarded 
as the quintessential erotician, and why erotic love is such a critical component of Platonic 
philosophical education. 
 I will first examine the progression in the definition of eros in each encomium in order to 
understand Diotima’s all-encompassing definition, which takes up the major aspects of each 
eulogy and incorporates it in her comprehensive account. To do so I have divided my analysis of 
the speeches into two sections; the first, dealing with the speeches of Phaedrus, Pausanias, and 
Eryximachus, which begin in an exclusive relationship to a finite other to move towards 
universalization in Eryximachus’ speech. The second group contains the speeches of 
Aristophanes, Agathon, and Socrates; Diotima takes up major aspects of the two previous 
speeches – Aristophanes’ ontological account and Agathon’s fixation on the Beautiful – as 
fundamental aspects of her own account, in which eros is the remedy to our ontological status 
and the Beautiful is the object of this desire.  After examining this progression I will analyze 
Alcibiades’ entrance as a physical representation of the experience of the beautiful that has been 
discussed throughout the speeches. Alcibiades’ entrance and subsequent encomium of Socrates 
will shed light on the dangerous and beneficial aspects of erotic desire for philosophical inquiry. 
In the next section I will examine how eros works to solve the epistemological problem present 
in Aristophanes’ ontological account of human beings, in order to understand how eros is 
capable of triggering aporia, the first stage for philosophical inquiry. From this examination I 
will move on to the analysis of the lover as the philosopher, and explain why the progression of 
love present in the Symposium is the most accessible form of philosophy, through an experience 
20 
 
that is open to all: love for what is beautiful. This examination will highlight the aspects of eros 
that make it essential for the action needed to embark in this epistemological progression towards 
more stable objects of knowledge, and this analysis will segue into an in-depth examination in 
the next chapter of why the Beautiful is the most powerful tool we can use for philosophical 
education.  
2.2 From the danger of the particular to the harmony of the universal: the speeches of Phaedrus, 
Pausanias, and Eryximachus 
The progression of the speeches in the dialogue shows the movement from a definition of 
eros centered on love between particular individuals, to an appreciation of the form of the 
Beautiful Itself, a progression which is amalgamated in Diotima’s ‘ladder of love’ image in 
Socrates’ speech. Phaedrus begins the discussion on eros and his speech stresses the effects of 
erotic desire, as opposed to providing a description of the nature of erotic love itself. In his 
speech, Phaedrus will unknowingly reveal the positive and dangerous effects of love in the lover, 
in addition to centering his account of love as directed at another individual, which is later 
revealed to be the foundational step of Diotima’s explanation of love. Furthermore, Phaedrus 
will insist on virtue as a positive effect of love’s influence, when in reality he praises the 
excesses that lovers go to when they are in love, which prove to be problematic in the context of 
the city and the lover’s extended community. 
According to Phaedrus love produces “the greatest goods” (Symposium 178c) and acts as 
the ultimate guide to the good life, as it encourages the individual to pursue virtue and avoid 
shameful behaviour, following the assumption that a lover would always desire to appear 
honourable in front of his beloved. In this manner, eros pushes the individual to action, since 
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without the threat of shame or pride, “nothing fine or great can be accomplished, in public or in 
private” (Symposium 178d). To prove his theory Phaedrus concocts the image of a love militia, 
an army composed of erastai (lovers) and their eromenoi (beloveds) fighting alongside one 
another. According to Phaedrus, this kind of formation would prove to be the “best possible 
system of society, for they would hold back from all that is shameful, and seek honour in each 
other’s eyes” (Symposium 178e); this assumption follows Phaedrus’ own foundational idea that 
love curbs shameful actions while encouraging honour-seeking behaviours. As shown, Phaedrus’ 
account focuses on how the lover is affected by his love for another individual, emphasizing the 
relationship between two individuals separated from their relationship to others. Phaedrus 
himself is so enchanted by the power of eros that he does not believe in the existence of a human 
being whom love could not inspire to become courageous or brave; for Phaedrus, at the touch of 
love, everyone becomes a hero, a sort of Achilles that is ready – and equipped by eros – to fight 
for his beloved, even without knowledge of courage.  
Phaedrus, however, seems to be more mesmerized by the beautiful idea of a god of eros 
turning mere mortals into courageous heroes, than in producing a coherent account of the effects 
of love. For example, Phaedrus’ evidence for heroic conduct between lovers comes exclusively 
from poetic accounts: Alcestis sacrificing her life to go down to Hades in place of her husband 
Admetus (Symposium 179b), Orpheus, who Phaedrus explains was not as brave as Alcestis when 
he went down to Hades and was thus punished (Symposium 179d), and Achilles who revenged 
the death of his lover Patroclus (Symposium 180a). As beautiful and convincing as Phaedrus’ 
examples appear to be initially, there is a degree of modification required, or oversight on his 
part in regards to the examples he is using in order to make his account of eros work. Perhaps a 
philosophical understanding of love would seek for harmony, within the soul of the individual 
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and within the individual and the city. In this way, the individual could better himself for his 
beloved in addition to maintaining a healthy relationship to his community. However, in 
Phaedrus’ account, the lover moves into excess rather than moderation, and the desire to look 
good in front of the beloved takes over any sort of rational thinking. 
For instance, Phaedrus paints a very courageous and superficial account of Alcestis’ 
sacrifice for her husband Admetus. When the Fates threaten to cut Admetus’ life thread they 
decide to give him the chance of escaping death if someone dies in lieu of him. Admetus cannot 
find anyone as even his parents refuse to do it and ultimately it is Alcestis, who, motivated by her 
love for her husband, decides to take Admetus’ place (Hamilton 168). The story in itself, 
although emphasizing Alcestis’ devotion for her husband, presents a few problems for Phaedrus’ 
position. It would be much different if Alcestis sacrificed herself without Admetus’ knowledge, 
but the fact that Admetus knows she will do it is disturbing, as it shows he values his own life 
over that of his beloved. Moreover, the fact that he seeks for a replacement, even considering his 
parents or his wife, already demonstrates that Admetus’ love prompts him not to courage, but to 
an even greater self-love as he would rather others die than himself. These are details that 
Phaedrus ignores and that work against his own logic. Phaedrus is ignoring the fact that Admetus 
lets his wife die for him when it is his time to go; according to Phaedrus’ own reasoning, since 
they are both lovers, both should display the same dauntless behaviour.   
Consequently, Phaedrus’ understanding of Alcestis’ sacrifice overlooks his statement that 
a lover would not want to appear shameful in front of his beloved and vice versa. Love, for 
Phaedrus, is supposed to teach us about shame when acting dishonourably; the problem is that 
there are two individuals in a romantic relationship, so according to his own statement, both 
would be prompted by love to be honourable and to avoid shame. Under this structure, Alcestis 
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is indeed prompted by love to be honourable, to sacrifice herself for the life of her beloved. 
However, under the same structure, Admetis should feel shame that he is letting his beloved die 
for him for no particular reason other than he wants to live. Accordingly, under Phaedrus’ theory, 
both Alcestis and her husband should desire their own sacrifice before the sacrifice of the other, 
as neither of them would want to appear dishonourable. This reciprocity might work in the case 
of the love militia, as it would encourage them both to keep fighting, but in this particular case it 
would just leave the couple at a standstill as they could not reach a unanimous decision. As a 
result, this example is not really appropriate for what Phaedrus is trying to convey; that is, that 
love instills in the lover courage and a fear of shame. 
Similarly, Phaedrus is quick to dismiss Orpheus’ journey into Hades because he does not 
choose to die, but rather goes back to the underworld while still alive to persuade Hades and 
Persephone to bring his wife back to life. Phaedrus attributes the failure of the mission to 
Orpheus not wanting to sacrifice his life to bring back Eurydice; however, in doing this he 
overlooks the fact that Orpheus’ mission fails because he impatiently checks to see if Eurydice is 
behind him before they have both left the underworld. Thus, it is not that Orpheus’ journey to the 
underworld is not enough to save Eurydice, – in fact, going to the underworld while still alive in 
order to try to persuade Hades would require enough courage and demonstrates classical heroic 
behaviour – but rather, it is just Orpheus’ desire to see if his beloved was with him that costs him 
his love for the second time. Phaedrus overlooks this detail either because he truly does not 
remember the story correctly or because emphasizing Orpheus’ lack of physical sacrifice fits his 
schema of love better, even when it is not true: “they did not give him the woman herself, 
because they thought he was soft […] and did not dare to die like Alcestis for Love’s sake” 
(Symposium 179e). Thus, his second example is fitting to his argument in the sense that Orpheus’ 
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love for Eurydice propels him to embark on the journey to the underworld. However, Phaedrus 
chooses to criticize Orpheus for not going to excess, that is, for not sacrificing himself in body 
and in soul. Whereas it seems Orpheus did the rational thing, persuading Hades to bring back 
Eurydice so they could both be together, Phaedrus sees this lack of complete sacrifice as 
unacceptable, and in doing so he misses what could have been a good point for his theory, which 
is Orpheus’ actual courage to go down to Hades triggered by love. 
In addition, Phaedrus uses Homer’s representation of Achilles’ heroic behaviour as an 
example of love’s guidance. Phaedrus describes Achilles’ sacrifice to revenge his lover’s death 
as heroic and as a product of the courage that love instills in the lover. However, in doing so, 
Phaedrus disregards the damage that Achilles’ actions inflict on the bigger community. In Book 
1 of the Iliad (lines 357-427) Achilles complains to his mother Thetis that Agamemnon has taken 
his prize Briseis away from him, for which he wants divine retribution. This occurs after he tries 
to kill Agamemnon for taking Briseis away, even though they are fighting for the same side, and 
is actually stopped by Athena. Regardless, he asks his mother to persuade Zeus to go against the 
Achaeans in favour of the Trojans. In this case, Achilles’ loss prompts him not to courage, but to 
vindictiveness and rage, and actually causes human losses for the side for which he is supposed 
to be fighting. Achilles’ desires are so single-minded and strong that they threaten the well-being 
of his own community, which goes against Phaedrus’ point of love leading one to virtue. 
Moreover, Phaedrus ignores Achilles’ debate over whether he should pursue his own eros for a 
life of honour over any kind of relationship, including the lover-beloved relationship that 
Phaedrus is defending. In fact, it is honour and immortal fame that Achilles sought in battle, even 
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when Patroclus’ death acts as the final trigger for his rage.1 Additionally, Phaedrus overlooks the 
fact that this account presents an eros entirely focused on the particular ‘other,’ that is, an eros 
entirely aimed at another individual, which proves to be problematic in a general context, as we 
will examine in the following speeches. 
This problem occurs when the individual becomes entirely bound up with a temporal and 
finite other in a way that clashes with the dictates and rules that ensure the well-being of the 
whole. Phaedrus fails to explain “how erotic attachments could possibly avoid coming into 
conflict with one’s attachment to the community. For it seems human beings treat their loved 
ones differently than they treat others” (Scott & Welton 46), which indicates the broader problem 
of how one’s love for a particular individual can come into conflict with one’s duty to her 
community. For example, how is Phaedrus sure that what the lover desires for his beloved will 
also be in accordance to what is good for the community as a whole? The problem of focusing 
one’s eros entirely on another individual is that one’s attention to the good of the whole can be 
disregarded. In fact, this description of eros, entirely focused on a finite and particular other, 
proves to be problematic, especially in the context of Phaedrus’ love militia, whereby the lovers 
could disregard the safety of the entire army in order to rescue their beloveds, much like Achilles 
causes hundreds of deaths because he is angry that Agamemnon took Briseis away, a detail that 
Phaedrus overlooks. An opposing example to Phaedrus’ love militia would be the image of the 
guardians in the Republic who are trained to think of the well-being of the whole before their 
own well-being, and thus are capable of guarding the city in the most efficient manner, through 
the proper ordering of every faction of the polis. In this case, the communal concerns are directly 
                                                          
1. In fact, Elizabeth Belfiore points out that it is Achilles’ error in judgment which causes Patroclus’ death in 
the first place, an important detail that Phaedrus omits as it does not suit his account (122). 
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juxtaposed with the concerns over a particular individual, demonstrating the extremes that 
Phaedrus deems appropriate in his own account. 
In fact, in Phaedrus’ account eros is viewed purely in terms of chrestos (usefulness), a 
utilitarian approach that presents eros in the most fitting light for Phaedrus’ own description. For 
his own interest, Phaedrus thus changes Achilles’ story “to suit his own erotic tastes and 
purposes” (Hyland 30), to show that eros brings gain if one is a beloved, like Phaedrus himself.2 
In creating an account of eros that focuses on his own self-interest, Phaedrus produces 
“something which looks like virtue” (Strauss 50), in the absence of virtue itself, a process that 
will be repeated in the following speeches. It is not that the love that Phaedrus describes focuses 
solely on the well-being of the lover, but rather that most of the benefits are reaped by the 
beloved. Phaedrus, being a beloved himself, has crafted a speech that would be the most 
beneficial account of love for himself, seeing as the beloved is the one reaping the rewards of 
love’s effects. In this manner, Phaedrus exalts Alcestis’ sacrifice, as the one benefiting from the 
actions is Alcestis’ beloved Admetus, and perhaps this is why he criticizes Orpheus so much, for 
not sacrificing himself entirely in order to bring Eurydice back to life.   
Just like in the Platonic dialogue named after himself, in which he is infatuated by the 
apparent beauty of the form of Lysias’ speech, Phaedrus tailors his eulogy to appear to be 
beautiful to the untrained ear, praising as virtuous actions which in reality lack virtue, but are 
rather entirely subjected to a utilitarian criterion, as pointed out by Leo Strauss (53) and Drew 
Hyland (30). However, Phaedrus’ account does provide two important insights that Diotima later 
picks up on her own exposition on love. First, Phaedrus provides the recognition that “eros is a 
                                                          
2. As a handsome, young man Phaedrus would traditionally be perceived as the beloved courted by the older, 
wise man. 
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double-edged sword” (Hyland 31) that can benefit the lover and beloved as well as put them in 
danger, even if Phaedrus does not recognize this ambivalence himself. Second, his account 
focuses on eros as concerned with the beauty of a particular individual, which is the stepping 
stone on the progression towards the beautiful itself that will later on appear in Diotima’s ‘ladder 
of love’ image. In this manner, Phaedrus presents a eulogy to eros that deals with the first step of 
the Socratic account of love: the love for a particular and finite other.  
The next speech, that of Pausanias, takes Phaedrus’ focus on love for a particular 
individual one step further, as Pausanias proposes two operating modalities for eros: erotic desire 
that is fixated on physical manifestations of beauty, and the eros for the soul and spiritual 
enlightenment. In this manner, Pausanias keeps the focus of his account of love on an individual 
level while simultaneously taking Phaedrus’ emphasis from the physical by elevating the 
attraction to the spiritual. In addition, Pausanias emphasizes eros’ connection to the beautiful 
while further developing the idea of love’s usefulness for the polis in a way that love does not 
present a danger to the whole. Furthermore, Pausanias advocates for the city’s need to regulate 
erotic desire so as to find harmony between the people and the state, and seemingly to protect 
both the lover and beloved who engage in romantic relationships, whereas in reality, his laws are 
meant to protect the lover rather than the beloved. Pausanias’ advocacy for the regulation of 
desire elevates Phaedrus’ account of martial love into the communal and political sphere. 
Pausanias sets out to define love first, something that his predecessor does not do, and he 
divides eros into two kinds: the Heavenly Aphrodite and the Common Aphrodite, which refer to 
the distinction between the spiritual realm that the soul inhabits, and the corporeal, particular 
sphere that the body partakes in, elevating the first one as superior and less vulgar, as its focus is 
on the soul. Pausanias essentially states two things: first, eros is inextricably connected to 
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Aphrodite (Symposium 180d), introducing in an explicit manner the connection between eros and 
beauty which will be central to understanding the ontological and epistemological ways in which 
eros operates. Secondly, Pausanias states that love can focus on the beauty present in the 
empirical world as well as the more ‘noble’ beauty present in the divine world, thereby creating a 
hierarchy of the objects of eros which places empirical beauty at a lower level than that which 
the spiritually beautiful inhabits. In addition, Pausanias proposes that eros in itself is neither 
good nor bad, but rather that this action becomes either good or bad in its performance and 
intent: “considered in itself, no action is either good or bad, honourable or shameful” 
(Symposium 180c).  
Pausanias states that the Common Aphrodite is a “love felt by the vulgar” (Symposium 
181b), as it gives prevalence to the physical connection and not to the soul, an account that 
regards the physical as being preoccupied with sexual activity, in contrast to the soul that cares 
exclusively for the pursuit of wisdom. In stating that this kind of love prefers the body over the 
soul Pausanias also associates it with relationships between men and women, as he states that 
this is “love felt by the vulgar, who are attached to women no less than to boys” (Symposium 
181b). In addition, Pausanias claims that “whether they do it honorably or not is of no concern” 
(Symposium 181b); that is, he explains that this kind of lover pursues the beloved in whichever 
way is possible, without caring for honour or shame. This is Pausanias’ first contradiction, as he 
earlier stated that the love is not itself bad, but it is the mode in which it is performed, which 
means that the object of love could either be the body or the soul, as long as this desire is carried 
out virtuously. On the other hand, the Heavenly Aphrodite eros is “free from the lewdness of 
youth” (Symposium 181c) and thus finds satisfaction not in the corporeal but in contemplation 
and intellectual discussion. Consequently, it desires the soul more than the body, and Pausanias 
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draws a connection between this Aphrodite and all male relationships (Symposium 181c). Both 
kinds of eros have different roles for Pausanias, as he elevates the Heavenly Aphrodite to be the 
one able to move the individual towards virtue and spiritual betterment.  
In this manner, Pausanias exposes two ways in which eros operates: one focused on the 
non-sensible, which he finds to be kalos (beautiful) and beneficial, and the one focused on the 
corporeal, which he finds to be vulgar and ugly. Much like Phaedrus, Pausanias will use his own 
definition of eros to his advantage, thus attempting to demonstrate the ‘beautiful’ way to conduct 
eros for his own purposes, proposing love for beautiful boys - which he identifies as the 
Heavenly Aphrodite in contrast to any other kind of love - as the true conduct to philosophical 
enlightenment, in an excellent demonstration of his sophistic relativism. By defining two kinds 
of love, Pausanias, the lawyer of the group, already begins with an approach that leads to 
relativity, as he will define the better one of the options by his own measure and to fit his own 
ideals. His sophistry is evident in the fact that he becomes the measure of his own account, being 
himself a man who engages in the Heavenly Aphrodite and simultaneously presenting the 
Heavenly Aphrodite as the only conduit to philosophy.3 In addition, as we will examine shortly, 
in his explanation of the laws concerning eros Pausanias will craft an account that protects the 
lover, like himself, of any sort of failure in the romantic conquest. 
For Pausanias, actions are “neither good nor bad, but become so by virtue of the manner 
in which they are performed” (Cobb 56); in this case, actions are good depending on what 
Aphrodite the individual chooses to follow. In making a distinction between the eros for physical 
                                                          
3. Victorino Tejera even suggests that Aristophanes’ hiccups are a reaction to “the dishonest cynicism of 
Pausanas’ self-serving sophistry about sex” (438), as he seems to be elevating his own practices as 
superior. 
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beauty and that for spiritual beauty, Pausanias associates heterosexuality with common eros, that 
is a purely vulgar need to procreate (Symposium 181b), and the kind of classical Greek man-
youth relationships with heavenly eros focused on mental edification. Yet, even in the 
homosexual lover-beloved relationship the physical act remains, but the difference is that it is 
brought under the law in Athens, which is set up in such a way as to promote this kind of 
relationship. For example, Pausanias states that in Elis and Boetia, societies that he regards as 
inarticulate and not to the cultural level of Athens, taking a lover, regardless of the situation, is 
always deemed as good (Symposium 182b). Conversely, in societies reigned by political 
absolutism, like Ionia or the Persian empire, taking a lover is disgraceful, as the nature of the 
polis condemns any sort of eros that is not directed towards it: “it is no good for rulers if the 
people they rule cherish ambitions for themselves or form strong bonds of friendship with one 
another… these are precisely the effects of philosophy, sport, and especially of Love” 
(Symposium 182c). This statement foreshadows the revolt of Aristophanes’ mythical humans, 
who powered by their strong bonds attempt to overthrow their rulers. It thus seems that love 
must neither be prohibited nor freely allowed, but rather the city must find a way to regulate it so 
as to get the highest profit from it. Extremes, then, must be avoided, and harmony, a concept 
which Eryximachus will develop, must be sought: “plain condemnation of Love reveals lust for 
power in the rulers and cowardice in the ruled, while indiscriminate approval testifies to general 
dullness and stupidity” (Symposium 182d). 
After explaining what to avoid, Pausanias moves on to an examination of Athenian law 
concerning love. He explains that in Athens lovers are encouraged in every way to pursue their 
beloveds and their actions are deemed noble or shameful depending on their success or failure. 
Athenian law praises and encourages “lovers for totally extraordinary acts” (Symposium 182e); 
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that is, Athenian customs support extreme acts of love to be performed, to the extent that were 
these acts performed for any other goal they would be deemed as shameful. Therefore, when it 
comes to the lover and the actions performed as a result of his eros, Athenian law grants the 
lover complete freedom. For Pausanias, virtue should be the goal of pursuing love the correct 
way, as he states that “love’s value to the city as a whole and to the citizens is immeasurable, for 
he compels the lover and his loved on alike to make virtue their central concern” (Symposium 
185c). Thus it stands that Pausanias’ proposition is that love works for the betterment of the polis 
because it nurtures virtue in lover and beloved alike. For this reason, Pausanias explains that “the 
freedom given to the lover by both gods and men according to our custom is immense” 
(Symposium 183).  
However, it is important to emphasize that within Pausanias’ complex speech – a 
complexity which he likes as it indicates superiority according to what he said about Boetia in 
relationship to Athens - the freedom that Athenian law gives is fully focused on the lover rather 
than on the beloved. Not only is the lover allowed to perform any action for the sake of his 
romantic conquest, but Pausanias argues for laws that would protect the lover from ‘unfruitful’ 
conquests; that is, from wasting “time and effort” (Symposium 181e) on a beautiful boy whose 
intellectual outcome cannot be predicted. Whereas the lover is allowed to perform any action for 
the sake of his romantic conquest, even those that incur shame, the beloved is advised to play 
coy to the lover’s advances by his family and by society (Symposium 183d), while 
simultaneously encouraged to give in to the lover’s advances out of a desire to become virtuous. 
Pausanias even states that beloveds are “justified in performing any service for a lover who can 
make [them] wise and virtuous” (Symposium 184e), even if this lover turns out to be unable to 
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provide this intellectual edification, and even that in this case only it is “never shameful to be 
deceived; in every other case it is shameful” (Symposium 185a). 
As we can see, Pausanias has set up a system whereby the lover, regardless of his 
intentions, is always in the right, as he is always pursuing the Heavenly Aphrodite that is 
associated with boys and encouraged and regulated by the city. In fact, Pausanias is defending 
the way Athenian custom has set up this interaction, as is demonstrated by the way he 
emphasizes the superiority of Athenian custom in his earlier comparison of how this practice is 
carried out in other cities. In this manner, even if the lover has bad intentions, as long as he does 
not make these evident to the beloved he is fine to pursue him by any means and will most likely 
get his way since the city encourages the beloved to take the lover for the sake of virtue. On the 
other hand, the beloved is not protected from disingenuous lovers and is actually encouraged to 
give in to the lover regardless of the outcome, merely because the reason of his giving in would 
be noble: that is, giving in for the sake of virtue. Pausanias in this manner has set up a system 
that protects lovers, like himself, and that appears to be good for both parts when in fact it is 
beneficial for only one. 
Moreover, Pausanias’ argument encounters further problems due to his advocacy for the 
traditional pederastic relationship of ancient Greece. For instance, in trying to legitimate 
pederasty, Pausanias develops an account that praises and encourages eros for intelligent males, 
whom he associates with the young beautiful boys that are the object of the love of the Heavenly 
Aphrodite. However, by Greek standards these would be older men as opposed to beautiful 
youths, since older men are supposed to provide the wisdom in the relationship and the boys are 
supposed to provide beauty. Moreover, as Hyland points out, Pausanias’ relativistic approach to 
eros is a problem in itself, since by his own relativism his account of male-male relationships 
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over male-female or female-female is flawed, since for all relationships what should matter is the 
manner in which eros is conducted, not the desire for partners of the same or opposite gender 
(32). Because even though he explains the Athenian laws regarding custom and the protection of 
lovers, these laws are specifically designed to protect the kind of male-male relationships. First, 
because a true relationship of virtue, which is what he explains the goal of love is, can only be 
achieved in this kind of relationship, and he states that virtue is the only reason why one person 
should subject himself to another (Symposium 184c). Second, he states that the aim of the 
Athenian customs is to “separate the wheat from the chaff, the proper love from the vile” 
(Symposium 184a). By proper love Pausanias refers to the individual who loves the soul, and by 
vile he refers to “the common, vulgar lover, who loves the body rather than the soul” 
(Symposium 184e), which he already associated with male-female relationships. In fact, 
Pausanias’ own eros for beautiful boys moves his argument, as he praises the lover who succeeds 
in seducing his beloved even if his seduction is conducted through lies, to the extreme of 
“advocating that the beloved trade sex for wisdom” (Hyland 33). Coincidentally, the idea that 
wisdom can be transferred from one individual to the other by physical means is a common 
misconception in the dialogue, as shown in Agathon’s request that Socrates sit next to him order 
to obtain some of his wisdom (Symposium 175d), and as will be evident in Alcibiades’ eulogy to 
Socrates. Thus, for Pausanias, the Heavenly Aphrodite love is the one associated with a 
particular kind of relationship, one in which the lover receives the biggest benefits and therefore 
it is a kind of love that must be regulated by the city so that the lover can have his interests 
protected and the city can ensure harmony, a moderation that was lacking in Phaedrus’ account. 
Even though Pausanias portrays the Heavenly and Common Aphrodite as mutually 
exclusive, the one thing they have in common is that they are in fact both Aphrodite – that is, 
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both are still not only erotic and beautiful, but divine, insofar as they are both associated with the 
goddess. This connection describes, in a way, the relationship and conflict between the images of 
beauty versus beauty itself, as the Common Aphrodite can be associated with images of beauty 
capable of being understood by limited human understanding, and the Heavenly Aphrodite with 
beauty itself in the pursuit of wisdom and the Forms. Furthermore, as we have seen, eros is 
shown as being beneficial for a city when properly regulated, so that it must be promoted with 
some degree of moderation in order for it to work for the advantage of the rulers, and not result 
in excessive behaviours like the ones discussed in Phaedrus’ speech. This idea foreshadows 
Aristophanes’ myth, wherein love is actually used as a solution for individual hubris and the lust 
for the divine realm, and wherein moderation helps the rulers to maintain their power over 
individuals. Pausanias’ speech repeats the notion that love encourages virtuous actions in 
individuals that was present in Phaedrus’ eulogy, with the exception that he states that some of 
these actions are “so extraordinary, in fact, that if [the lovers] performed them for any other 
purpose whatever, they would reap the most profound contempt” (Symposium 183a). In other 
words, the lengths to which an individual goes for love produce actions that, even though 
acceptable for love, are deemed unacceptable in other situations; for example, a lover begging 
his beloved for love is deemed acceptable and virtuous, whereas an individual begging for a job 
is deemed shameful. Through this distinction Pausanias emphasizes the notion, already present in 
Phaedrus’ account, that the acts that love is accused of producing are not virtuous in themselves, 
but deemed to be virtuous merely because of the nature of the object.  
However, with this distinction, Pausanias touches upon a topic that Phaedrus overlooks: 
reason is somewhat pushed out of the equation when it comes to love as a motivator for actions. 
This is the reason why Pausanias is so concerned with law in relation to love, and why he praises 
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a moderate hold on desire to obtain the most useful results for the city. Pausanias is aware that 
either extreme is dangerous as people are rarely satisfied; however, with rules in place 
individuals are shaped by custom to not only follow the rules, but to allow for certain kinds of 
behaviour that the law has already deemed as suitable, such as the extreme actions for the lovers 
and the giving in to the lover for the beloveds. The problem for philosophy that Pausanias as a 
lawyer does not see is that under this law virtue does not become the main goal, but adherence to 
custom is deemed as more important, as we saw in the case of the beloved being encouraged to 
give in to the lover regardless of the outcome. In this manner, for both Phaedrus and Pausanias 
love can still provoke the individual to pursue shameful actions as opposed to avoiding them, and 
also can encourage the individual to sacrifice the common benefit for that of his beloved, only in 
Pausanias’ case these actions are now protected by law.  
Pausanias’ speech thus reveals “a half-understood awareness that love can be both the 
best and the worst thing for the state” (Gould 27), and for the person. From this moment, the 
dangerous element inherent in eros begins to become apparent. Pausanias blames the negative 
and dangerous aspect of eros on the object of love, going back to the Heavenly/Common 
Aphrodite distinction made earlier. Hence, if one chooses to love the body and not the soul, one 
chooses to love what is prone to change and decay, and thus one’s love will be “inconstant, since 
what [one] loves is itself mutable and unstable” (Symposium 183e). According to this train of 
thought, the lover would be fixated on the body, which is bound to change, thus not only would 
move from beloved to beloved constantly, but would engage in deceptive promises, as the 
promise of love will fade as soon as the beauty in the body disappears or changes.  
 The right sort of lover, on the contrary, will love what is permanent and does not change, 
i.e., the soul. The most interesting point that Pausanias makes with this distinction is the idea that 
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one is able to choose the object of her love, and moreover, that a human being is able to separate 
the physical from the spiritual in order to love solely the non-corporeal. Diotima addresses this 
problem by grounding the quest for beauty in the particular eros for physical beauty to later 
move on to less corporeal beauty and more stable objects of knowledge and love. Pausanias’ 
account moves from the particularity of Phaedrus’ object of love to the distinction between 
corporeal and noumenal beauty, while still focusing on the particularity of the human soul and 
propelling the soul to superiority over the body in an absolute manner. The right sort of lover, 
according to this account, will thus strive for virtuous action and self-improvement purely in the 
spiritual realm, and this is the kind of love that Pausanias proposes as valuable to the city “as a 
whole” (Symposium 185b), as it promotes virtue, while keeping eros, like Phaedrus does, “as 
primarily a personal, romantic phenomenon” (Hyland 34). Thus, according to Pausanias love 
must be regulated by the city to as to achieve the moderation that it requires to be utilized 
properly for the benefit of the city. Only under a regime wherein love is both encouraged and 
regulated can lovers achieve a proper harmony between their desires and the common concerns 
of the state. In addition to introducing the subject of harmony, which will be present in the next 
speeches, Pausanias also draws the connection to beauty, which will be particularly important for 
Agathon and Socrates’ encomiums, especially when beauty is seen as the ultimate object of love 
there is. 
Eryximachus’ speech comes next as he takes over from Aristophanes who is suddenly 
afflicted by hiccups. Eryximachus’ speech “moves beyond the realm of the human and social on 
which Pausanias focused” (Cobb 66), and presents eros from the point of view of art, of techne, 
the skill of medicine that views love as bringing health to the body, as the harmony of the parts 
of a particular whole that is produced by moderation, by the proper order. This mention of order, 
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already seen in Pausanias’ account of love under law is taken by Eryximachus and moved into 
the natural world so that this order becomes a natural order that is present in nature when the 
right sort of balance is achieved. For Eryximachus, love is not inherently in the human soul, but 
rather, is a force that directs everything in both the human and the divine domains; it is a force 
that drives human beings, it is desire itself, a desire for harmony. According to Eryximachus, 
medicine has taught him that eros is “a significantly broader phenomenon” (Symposium 186a) 
than mere attraction toward physical beauty, or even divine beauty.  On the contrary, eros 
“directs everything that occurs” (Symposium 186b) as a universal or cosmic principle of 
attraction. This view moves the account of love from the psychological to an account of physics 
that encompasses the whole cosmos. From the love between people to the two different kinds of 
love that exist we are now taken to an explanation of love as a broader phenomenon.  
Eryximachus keeps expanding on Phaedrus’ initial account of eros as centered on the 
other and takes it to a universal plane. In addition, he includes the principle of harmony that was 
lacking from Phaedrus’ account, and that was present in Pausanias’ encomium, transforming it 
into the result of natural force. For Eryximachus, harmony is a natural consequence of love as a 
cosmic force. In addition, this principle of harmony seems to touch on Pausanias’ description of 
the control of eros that is required by the polis; only in this case, harmony is almost divinely 
induced and better seen in relationship to the divine, so that piety and the proper relationship to 
the gods become the consequence of love. Moreover, Eryximachus will argue for the proper 
moderation of eros, regardless of its object of love, rather than its eradication, and will present 
the physician as the proper facilitator for this harmony in the body. Thus, Eryximachus will take 
the discussion of love into the universal plane, taking the power away from the individual and 
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even from the city itself and giving it to the natural forces that he recognizes to be the realm of 
eros. 
Eryximachus explains that love is manifested in the body in two ways: as health and as 
disease. This association between the healthy and diseased states of love echoes Pausanias’ 
distinction between the heavenly and vulgar love, with the distinction that Eryximachus opposes 
health to disease, and Pausanias places heavenly and vulgar love not as opposites, but in a 
hierarchy of desire. Eryximachus keeps the discussion on the physical realm, even though he 
does mention that love is a force that affects the divine domain as well. However, his aim is to 
show how it is the physician’s task to find the harmony between the parts, whether of the body or 
of the universe: “a good practitioner knows how to affect the body and how to transform its 
desires; he can implant the proper species of Love when it is absent and eliminate the other sort 
whenever it occurs” (Symposium 186d). In this manner Eryximachus is referring to the physician 
as the person who knows, who has the proper techne to know not only the state of healthiness 
that the individual should attain, but how to attain it. In Pausanias’ account love was reined in by 
law; as the lawyer of the group, Pausanias proposed a system whereby love was under the 
domain of nomos (law) in order to achieve some sort of balance, whether this balance resulted in 
a greater protection of the lover than the beloved. Eryximachus picks up on this language of 
balance but takes it to the sphere of medicine, to his sphere, in order to argue that it is not the 
lawyer or the politician who is able to balance the desires of love, but rather the physician who 
can find this necessary harmony.  
A good physician knows how to find the harmony between the parts for the benefit of the 
whole, thus, he knows how to transform the body’s desires so that only the good sort of love 
takes place, bringing health and avoiding disease. Eryximachus’ argument is that techne allows 
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human beings to control eros for our physical pleasure, arguing that skill can allow “control of 
the cosmos by human nature” (Hyland 35). Eryximachus describes the physician in the same 
way as the philosopher is described in other Platonic dialogues, as the individual capable of 
reconciling the parts of the soul to create harmony, seen in the image of Socrates as a midwife. 
Love is thus described in this account as a force that must find its proper order, which for 
Eryximachus is a task for the person who knows about bodies, the physician. In this manner he 
not only assigns his own profession with the highest status in relationship to eros, but also 
maintains the discussion of eros on a physical realm, assigning the ability to induce harmony to 
the physician, who now becomes the ultimate sage in regards to the body. In this manner 
Eryximachus argues that love guides every practical skill that human beings have, such as 
farming, medicine, or even poetry (Symposium 187a), while simultaneously explaining that love, 
and the harmony love seeks, is under the control of the good physician. 
Eryximachus also applies this type of harmony and proper order found by the good sort 
of love to the seasons, as the good kind of love can be seen as imposing some sort of cosmic 
power of balance, echoing Empedocles’ account of the cosmos based on the opposing forces of 
love and strife. Furthermore, Eryximachus states that the human goal is to “maintain the proper 
kind of Love and to attempt to cure the kind that is diseased” (Symposium 188c), especially in 
relationship with the gods, since impiety occurs when the good kind of love, i.e. the proper order, 
is rejected. In this manner, maintaining a proper balance of desires, a healthy body and soul, is 
what makes individuals pious, foreshadowing the grip on eros that the gods will impose to curb 
human hubris on Aristophanes’ account, as the gods punish individuals inflicting a radical 
change in their nature to punish them for their hubristic desires. In addition, this argument echoes 
Pausanias’ statement that love was useful for the city because it induced the individual to be 
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virtuous, but in this case virtue is specified as piety and the proper place of the individual not 
only in relationship to the city, but to the entire cosmos. 
Furthermore, Eryximachus touches upon the idea of the dangers of love, brought up in 
Phaedrus’ encomium and present in Pausanias’ need to look at love in subjugation to law. 
Eryximachus states that “we must be careful to enjoy [love’s] pleasures without slipping into 
debauchery” (Symposium 187e). The problem seems to be how to enjoy the pleasures of love but 
in moderation. At this point, the problem does not lie any more with the idea of whether a certain 
kind of eros is sick or not; that is, the problem is not whether our eros is of the heavenly or 
vulgar kind, but rather how either kind can be enjoyed as long as one knows how to moderate 
one’s desires. Thus, from Pausanias’ radical proposition that all love that involves the corporeal 
is vulgar, we are brought to a middle point, where both kinds of eros are accepted as long as one 
does not incur either extreme, either through self-moderation or with assistance from a physician 
who possesses the appropriate techne. Even though at this point Eryximachus argues for a 
physician of the body, the language is evocative of Socratic midwifery, whereby Socrates 
personifies the physician for the soul that aids the individual in the attainment of truth.  
It is interesting to note that Eryximachus mentions the art of divination, of which Diotima 
is a participant, as the “practice that produces loving affection between gods and men; it is 
simply the science of the effects of Love on justice and piety” (Symposium 188d). Even though 
Eryximachus has argued for the physician as the proper vessel to find the harmony in the body, 
through this statement he reveals, perhaps inadvertently, that it is not in his realm of possibility 
to achieve this proper harmony with the divine, which takes up the majority of Aristophanes’ 
following encomium. Furthermore, it is Diotima in fact who practices the art of divination and 
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who trains Socrates in the art of ta erotika, which signifies that her art, which Socrates shares, is 
the solution to the problem that Aristophanes’ myth will pose. 
Eryximachus’ overconfidence in his own craft expands eros beyond the reaches of human 
control, arguing that eros is responsible for the harmony in the seasons and the cosmos, while 
paradoxically assigning a human vessel, the physician, to control eros and shape it in such a way 
as to produce harmony. From Phaedrus’ account centered on the particular other, to Pausanias’ 
division between erotic and spiritual love, Eryximachus proposes the idea of a proper order not 
only within the individual, but in relationship to the gods, which will be a main aspect of 
Aristophanes’ story. In fact, this need for harmony that Eryximachus introduces in his encomium 
will be vital not only for a proper understanding of eros, but so that the individual does not incur 
in extreme behaviours like the ones suggested in Phaedrus’ account. In addition, Diotima’s 
encomium, in which balance is struck between opposites, will rely on the importance of harmony 
within the self, between others, and with the transcendent, missing from Phaedrus’ account and 
suggested in legal and natural ways in Pausanias and Eryximachus’ panegyrics respectively. 
Moreover, through the interruption of Alcibiades, we will be witnesses to how the lover 
can fall into excess if harmony is not properly attained. In addition, and perhaps most 
importantly, Eryximachus’ suggestion that the physician is the ultimate knower of bodies, and 
thus the most capable of achieving this state of bodily and spiritual harmony in others, will be 
picked up indirectly in Diotima’s speech and Alcibiades’ behaviour. Eryximachus’ physician 
foreshadows in a way the image of Socrates as a facilitator of beauty, or rather, of creation in the 
beautiful that Diotima will pick up as a fundamental aspect of her theory. Just like the physician 
helps the individual to rule out excess in order to achieve spiritual and bodily health, Socrates’ 
image of the philosopher as a midwife encompasses these attributes and more, as the midwife 
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aims to move the individual into producing ‘truths.’ Thus, Eryximachus’ insistence on the 
harmony produced by love and the physician as the facilitator of the latter will be important in 
Diotima’s exposition, but most importantly in the relationship between Socrates and Alcibiades 
as I will examine it in Chapter 4, section 2. In this manner, eros has evolved thus far from the 
fixation on the beauty of a particular other present in Phaedrus’ account, which can be both 
dangerous and beneficial, to the necessity of particular eros to coexist in harmony with the 
whole, whether within the polis or in relation to the divine, as explained by both Pausanias and 
Eryximachus. Eros has thus far evolved to point towards the proper relationship with the divine, 
so that it can be enjoyed in moderation if the individual knows how to channel properly his eros. 
2.3 The ladder to completion: the speeches of Aristophanes, Agathon, and Socrates 
Aristophanes’ origin myth deals with the ontological condition of human nature and eros 
as the fundamental desire for human beings to regain the wholeness that they once lost in their 
attempt to overthrow the gods. According to the story, at the beginning there were three kinds of 
human beings: the male kind, offspring of the sun, the female kind, offspring of the earth, and 
the androgynous kind, offspring of the moon who had both female and male parts. In their 
original form, human beings were “terrible” in strength, and thus, “had great ambitions” 
(Symposium 190b). The ambition that Aristophanes refers to is their desire for the power of the 
gods, their hubris, which posed a threat to the divine authorities because of the power that human 
beings enjoyed in their original nature. 
As a result, these beings attempted to overthrow the gods by ascending to heaven, which 
encouraged the gods to get rid of them altogether. However, as much as they posed a threat to the 
divine authorities they were also necessary, as the gods needed them for the worship that they 
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provided as well as for the sacrifices that they offered to them. Thus, the gods are forced to find a 
way to restore the proper order between them and human beings that would allow the former to 
maintain power, much like the rulers in Pausanias’ account and the harmony sought by the 
physicians in Eryximachus’ story. The harmony between human beings and the gods is 
something that Eryximachus leaves to the art of divination, which is capable of producing this 
balance between both realms. However, like Pausanias’ eros under law that benefits the lover 
more than the beloved, the gods bring human eros under control in a way that benefits the gods 
themselves, by redirecting human ambition from the divine to the human, from desiring the 
transcendent to desiring each other. This account will pose problems in Diotima’s ‘ladder of 
love,’ whereby the power of desiring the particular other is sometimes powerful enough to 
prevent the individual from going up the ladder in the first place.4 The divine thus sought to 
moderate human beings so that they could still fulfill their utilitarian telos, and decided to divide 
human beings in half so that they would lose the power they originally had in their union: “as he 
cut each one, [Zeus] commanded Apollo to turn its face and half its neck towards the wound, so 
that each person would see that he’d been cut and keep better order” (Symposium 190e). In the 
myth, control from the gods comes through control of individual eros that is safely redirected 
from the divine towards the self; as human beings long for the union that they once experienced 
and that they cannot possess anymore, their ambitions are completely taken over by this lack and 
rerouted from the divine sphere.  
As described, Aristophanes’ eros is directed exclusively toward particular individuals; in 
fact, in the most immediate sense, it is directed toward the self, since individuals now search for 
the part of their nature that they were forced to relinquish. This account of eros emphasizes the 
                                                          
4. Alcibiades is an example of what happens when this fixation for the temporal other cannot be eliminated, 
and I will examine this problem in chapter 4, in view of his relationship with Socrates. 
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need for nomos to restrain the dangerous aspects of erotic desire within a city, in addition to 
demonstrating the capacity for eros to work for the good of the polis when controlled in a 
particular manner. However, Aristophanes’ account also proves to be problematic for 
philosophy. As Strauss points out, “you cannot understand eros if you do not see it in the 
element of rebellion” (127). That is, only through the depiction of frantic eros can one fully 
understand the power that eros has over individuals, and nowhere is it more obvious than in 
Aristophanes’ story, where ambition is replaced by the authorities through redirection of desire 
to a particular other who is also the self. Eros requires limitation, nomos - which in the story is 
seen in terms of the proper relationship to the divine, subservience - and the physical satisfaction 
that Zeus provides to individuals to keep them content and with their ambitions away from 
Olympus. Now, eros is not only seen in relation to the mandatory subservience to the divine, but 
to the newfound will of desiring an ‘other’ that human beings did not possess before, and who 
grants them, in a way, their first taste of freedom. The understanding of eros is possible only in 
relation to order and the proper relationship with the divine; it transcends the need for a harmony 
of the body. In other words, whereas in Eryximachus’ eulogy the state of harmony desired for the 
individual was independent of and not responsible for the harmony of others or the individual’s 
environment, which as we saw was left for divination and not medicine to take care of, in 
Aristophanes’ account, individual harmony is not enough. For Aristophanes the individual must 
be in conformity with others and the whole. In this case, the whole is the divine, and now eros 
wishes to maintain the status quo of the gods’ hierarchical roles, and for individuals to seek 
harmony with them means to maintain this state, directing their eros somewhere else. It is this 
control of eros that allows the individual to achieve inner harmony as well as the external 
harmony with the gods that is necessary for inner harmony to occur in the first place. When eros 
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is properly controlled and directed, it can prove to be a powerful force for authority to keep 
individuals in order. In that sense, “Aristophanes’ eros, like that of Phaedrus and Pausanias, is a 
civilizing force” (Belfiore 131). 
Because there is a need for order between humans and the gods Aristophanes’ eros is 
horizontally directed – as opposed to Socrates’ vertical eros towards the Forms – and this is the 
reason why this account poses limitations for philosophical inquiry. In directing one’s eros 
exclusively to particular others, one is excluding the divine realm, which Platonically would 
translate to the Forms and proper objects of knowledge. For Aristophanes’ individuals there is an 
epistemological impediment inherent in their ontological condition: since the object of their 
thought is changing and particular, the quality of their thought is changing and particular as well, 
falling in the category of opinion rather than knowledge. Thus, from a Platonic perspective, 
“there is a pettiness, a limitation, involved in this essentially accidental individual, and love in 
the fuller sense has a wider scope” (Strauss 119). That is, eros, in the fullest sense, and as will be 
shown by Diotima, must be able to be directed from the particular to the universal, and not have 
the universal limited because of the particular. The problem arises when the particular engulfs 
the individual to the extent that there is no external eros, as most eros is being directed toward 
the possession of the beautiful as seen in a particular other. Aristophanes’ account poses this 
limitation for philosophy because in a very real way, in his story, human beings were 
reprimanded for searching for something beyond themselves, this something being what is divine 
and a source of knowledge and power. Being chastised for these symbolically philosophical 
attempts, human beings are now left with eros that is solely directed to the restoration of their 
physical and spiritual natures in the form of their human partner. This fixation impedes their eros 
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from being directed back to the divine and to the knowledge that they represent, and thus 
philosophy, in this account, is substituted by love for the other. 
Aristophanes’ account puts forth an ontological status for individuals that is essentially 
bleak and tragic as we understand it, yet comical in the Greek perspective of the restoration of 
order from disruption. This account puts into perspective the entire question of eros and beauty. 
Hyland explains Aristophanes’ erotic account as producing a triadic occurrence: first, he points 
out that because of Zeus’ decision, incompleteness now comes to represent the human 
ontological condition (36), as we are essentially devoid of half of our nature from the moment of 
division. Secondly, eros arises as the recognition of this incompleteness, that is, we, as human 
beings and because of our initial hubris, become erotic individuals, and this eros and the 
recognition of this lack becomes part of our nature. Thirdly, eros now becomes the desire to 
overcome our incompleteness; whereas before eros had divine ambitions, now it is truly focused 
on healing the wound imparted by the gods on our nature. Instead of human beings attempting to 
reach beyond their status and towards that of the divine, which they were able to do when they 
were ‘complete’ creatures, albeit with consequences, now the object of their eros is more fitting 
to their status as mortal and temporal beings, and does not extend beyond their capabilities. 
Diotima will in fact take up this point in her encomium, as she will provide the path of the 
correct ascent towards the divine, one that is not violent in nature and is in fact natural to us, as I 
will explain when I discuss Socrates’ speech. Aristophanes thereby presents love that is not a 
god, but rather, the ontological situation of humanity: “eros is our human nature in our present 
condition” (Hyland 39); a situation that William Cobb explains “prepares” the reader “for the 
view that Socrates will report later” (68).  
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In this manner, not only do all ambitions stay within the sensible realm and directed 
towards corporeal interaction, but the tragic condition of human beings makes it so that after the 
first generation of half-humans, there are no original halves, and therefore “human life is thus 
striving after something at which we are fated by nature to fail” (Hyland 40). This tragic 
condition of humanity is what keeps individuals not only respecting the proper relationship to the 
gods - which is considered a happy ending by the standards of Aristophanes’ comedy - but 
human beings are now constantly striving for a union, a harmony they once had and lost: a 
beautiful condition that they cannot replicate. Thus, in Aristophanes’ account love is natural to 
all human beings, as it is essentially the desire for one’s original nature, in addition to a reminder 
of the importance of piety and the proper relationship of human beings to the gods; since human 
beings are immersed in their physical search for their lost partner, their eros is no longer directed 
at the gods or divine power - or philosophy - but rather towards healing “the wound of human 
nature” (Symposium 191a). Love thereby assures piety and the proper relationship to the divine, 
as it directs eros away from the gods and towards one another, while ensuring that individuals 
respect the divine through the reminder of their ‘original sin.’ 
Aristophanes’ myth shows, in a way, the human fixation on the other, which emphasizes 
the search for beauty in the physical rather than in the spiritual domain. However, Aristophanes 
does emphasize the importance of the search for wisdom and the spiritual beginning in the 
particular, since it was when human beings were whole that they desired what transcended their 
physical world. In fact, in a way, the original unity in Aristophanes’ speech is akin to Plato’s 
recollection, since in their original state human beings were able to get as close to knowledge of 
the Forms as possible, that is, close to the divine. Thus, although Aristophanes’ story provides a 
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dreary ontological and epistemological account, it does provide hope in that it presents the 
foundation for the quest for wisdom that Diotima will take up and complete.  
From Aristophanes’ classically comical ontological account, we move to Agathon’s 
deficient epistemological account - at least, when analyzed according to Plato’s line in the 
Republic, where in the hierarchy of knowledge eikasia (imagination) stands below noesis 
(understanding). Agathon, the poet who is being celebrated in this banquet gives his own praise 
of love, a praise that depicts eros as the Beautiful itself. It is no coincidence that Agathon, whose 
name literally means ‘the good,’ is also the most physically beautiful man in the room and the 
one that delivers the speech that praises love’s goodness through its beautiful, external 
appearance. In fact, at this point, “beauty has taken a place at the center of the discussion of 
eros” (Hyland 27). The connection between agathos (good) and kalos (beauty) present in 
Agathon’s speech highlights the view that external beauty, such as Agathon’s physique, 
translates to internal goodness, which his name implies. This connection between external beauty 
and the good is juxtaposed to Socrates’ internal beauty, the beauty of his soul. Additionally, it is 
juxtaposed to the latter’s relationship to the good which Diotima takes up in her speech when she 
describes eros as the opposite of beautiful, yet always in the lookout for a beauty that is also 
good, as will be examined. Furthermore, Agathon’s speech emphasizes the influential powers of 
beauty to encourage and to deceive the spectator, who can sometimes be prompted to disregard 
rationality in favour of desire for the beautiful object. This image of beauty’s danger in relation 
to eros, present from Phaedrus’ initial speech, is important in regards to philosophy, as fixation 
on physical beauty can stagnate the individual’s intellectual progression, as will be investigated 
in Alcibiades’ relationship to Socrates.  
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Agathon, the poet, delivers a speech that truly lives up to his poetic prowess, the only 
speech able to move the audience to spontaneous and energetic applause (next to that of 
Socrates, of course). Agathon focuses on appearance first and foremost, on form rather than 
content from the opening line: “I wish first to speak of how I ought to speak” (Symposium 195b). 
The portrayal that Agathon gives of eros focuses on the qualities that make love the most 
beautiful of the gods, attempting to prove love’s goodness through a physical description meant 
to correlate directly to love’s virtuous nature. Love is thus described as a beautiful youth, 
delicate and of soft character, with a gentle shape, whose “graceful good looks prove that he is 
balanced and fluid in his nature” (Symposium 196a, my emphasis). Agathon’s insistence on 
equating the description of eros’ form (graceful good looks) with that of his substance and 
temperament (balanced and fluid in nature) emphasizes the problem of equating beauty with 
goodness and truth, and of letting one’s eros be directed towards beautiful forms as opposed to 
beautiful contents. Agathon does not really give proof that eros’ gentleness and beauty in his 
physical form translate to a gentle and balanced nature. Even though Agathon, for example, is 
renowned for his beauty and also appears to be an excellent host and gentle individual, not only 
are his physical attributes not responsible for his temperament and personality, but other 
famously good looking individuals, such as Alcibiades, possess fiery and willful temperaments 
that do not seem to correlate with their kalos physique. Furthermore, Socrates would be the 
perfect example of the exact opposite: an individual whose external attributes are not considered 
as beautiful, but who is renowned for possessing a balanced, almost supra-human nature. 
Agathon’s first statement of a beautiful exterior as the cause for a beautiful interior is not only 
his first fallacious statement, but the first indication that he is molding eros after his own image, 
and effectively setting himself forth as the god of love whom he is praising.   
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Accordingly, Agathon moves on to discuss the moral character of love, describing the 
four cardinal virtues which he claims eros possesses, but slightly changing their definition, or 
overlooking logic in his own words. For example, in stating that love is just, Agathon simply 
equates justice to non-violence, stating that “violence never touches Love” (Symposium 196c) in 
the form of injustice; however, he does not explain exactly why non-violence makes eros just, 
either in judgment or behaviour, or how love partakes in justice in the first place. Agathon also 
states that eros has the “biggest share of moderation” (Symposium 196c), as he is able to control 
one’s desires, yet equates moderation with power, which seems contradictory as Agathon states 
that “moderation, by common agreement, is power over pleasures and passions, and no pleasure 
is more powerful than love!” (Symposium 196c). The contradiction lies in the fact that Agathon 
is stating that eros possesses moderation over eros itself, yet states that moderation is power over 
pleasures and that eros itself is the most powerful pleasure there is; in other words, not only does 
eros possess moderation, which implies a control over desire, but its desire is also the most 
powerful there is, implying that it would be hard to moderate in the first place. Even though 
Agathon is describing love as what is most transcendent, he fails in his explanation, which 
indicates that his words are used more for stylistic effects than as logical pieces of his argument. 
Furthermore, the poet goes on to say that “because Love has power over the bravest of 
the others, he is bravest of them all” (Symposium 196), presenting bravery as a sort of advantage 
over others, very reminiscent of Thrasymachus’ definition of justice in the Republic as the 
advantage of the strong over the weak. Moreover, when stating that eros is wise Agathon talks 
about skill, techne, describing love as being good at “artistic production” (Symposium 196e) and 
emphasizing eros’ techne as a poet. Even though Diotima will elaborate on the idea that eros 
moves the individual to production and creation, which is an important aspect of eros’ 
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connection to the Beautiful, Agathon is mistaken in his terminology, and confuses practical skill 
with wisdom. In addition, in emphasizing eros’ skill as a poet, Agathon emphasizes further the 
beauty of the form of his speech, the image that he is producing of love, which ultimately, like 
poetry, Plato would advise to take as eikasia, an image: Agathon’s description sounds beautiful 
in form, but in a somewhat deceiving manner, as the content is rather empty and plagued with 
logical inconsistencies, as shown.  
In fact, it is only the beautiful image that he delivers of love that moves his audience to 
applause, much like Agathon’s own beauty. The prowess of Agathon’s poetic delivery is shown 
when he is “suddenly struck by a need to say something in poetic meter” (Symposium 197d), just 
as he states that in the presence of love, all individuals become poets, a dramatic effect cleverly 
included to embellish his own poetic account and that in fact, is successful, as the audience is 
wooed by the superficial beauty of his speech: “when Agathon finished, Aristodemus said, 
everyone there burst into applause, so becoming to himself and to the god did they think the 
young man’s speech” (Symposium 198a). Agathon’s speech is the most powerful in emotional 
effect - and by powerful I mean the most effective in inducing an emotional response from the 
audience - because it brings the most influential image or representation of love yet, that of eros 
as that which is the most beautiful, and because of this external beauty, the best of the gods, the 
good itself. The power of beauty to inspire and to mislead is most evident in Agathon’s speech, 
wherein a somewhat superficial image of beauty brings the audience to an emotional outburst.5 
The influential power of beauty can be catastrophic when mixed with the powerful forces of 
love. As we saw in Phaedrus’ encomium, love can lead to a complete disregard of rationality in 
favour of desire, which in turn can have catastrophic consequences for the individual and his 
                                                          
5. The counter image is that of the beauty of the soul enchanting the individual into submission, as will be 
evident in Alcibiades’ description of his love for Socrates nearing the end of the dialogue. 
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community. Beauty, with its power to inspire, can wrap up the individual entirely and arguably 
more powerfully than any other object of love. In addition, Agathon is making the mistake of 
thinking of love itself as the Beautiful itself, which is a statement that Diotima takes up and 
corrects by showing that it is not eros that is beautiful, but rather its object. 
In a sense, Agathon’s beauty and the beauty of his words resemble the beauty of Oscar 
Wilde’s Dorian Gray, a beauty powerful enough to convince individuals of one’s inherent 
goodness and the goodness of one’s logos. Even though Agathon is suggesting that eros is best 
because of his moral virtues in addition to his appearance, thus hinting at a more complete 
account of the beautiful (one that partakes in both soul and body), his speech still emphasizes the 
importance of form over content, external beauty somewhat producing spiritual virtue solely by 
being beautiful. Socrates is quick to point out this contradiction, as he states “in my foolishness, I 
thought you should tell the truth about whatever you praise, that this should be your basis and 
that from this a speaker should select the most beautiful truths and arrange them most suitably” 
(Symposium 198e); that is, Socrates states that the truth must come first when describing a 
subject, and with a true description  beauty will follow, as opposed to praising what is beautiful 
and assuming that, because there is beauty, there will also be truth. This misconception was 
already present in Agathon’s own account of eros that presumes that virtue follows from 
physical beauty, yet he provides no actual evidence for this connection. Socrates thus states that, 
on the contrary, what is beautiful will be beautiful because it is true, as will be seen in the 
examination of Diotima’s speech.  
The discussion has now progressed to the point where eros is seen in relation to what is 
beautiful, and also to what is true. Beauty was first introduced by Pausanias with his distinction 
of the Common and Heavenly Aphrodites, and now it is beauty that becomes the most important 
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attribute of Love. As shown so far, eros is highly attracted to particular individuals in both body 
and soul, although it is mainly attracted to the physical appearance of a person, and the desire 
that eros exerts is felt simultaneously in a corporeal and non-corporeal manner. Furthermore, 
eros is inextricably related to Aphrodite because it is assumed to be beautiful, and most times 
also viewed as being inherently good because of its beauty. It is now Socrates’ turn to give his 
own speech, an account he learned from the priestess Diotima, who he states taught him “the art 
of love” (Symposium 201d). Diotima’s account will introduce eros not as the Beautiful, as it was 
described in Agathon’s account, or as exclusive eros for the other who is also the self, as in 
Aristophanes’ account, but, taking from both, she describes eros as desiring what is truly 
beautiful and starting in the particular beauty present in the empirical world, the beauty of the 
other. This beauty is the beauty capable of moving the individual to the beauty of the form of the 
Beautiful Itself.  
In fact, “Socrates will in a decisive way accept the core of Aristophanes’ position as part 
of the ‘truth’ about eros that he will ‘teach’” (Hyland 41); and I would argue that he does the 
same with Agathon’s account, since both accounts are present in Diotima’s description. Socrates’ 
first statement breaks from the binary position that has been assigned to eros from the opening 
speech, which attempted to place eros on one side of the human-divine matrix. In Phaedrus’ 
speech, eros is seen as a movement from one human being to another, entirely focused on 
particularity, as the effects are felt only on the individual level. This emphasis on particularity, 
whereby human eros is separated from the divine realm, is mentioned in Pausanias’ speech, 
although Pausanias places it in a hierarchy that further highlights the human-divine binary, 
according to which eros aimed at the physical is placed on a lower position than the eros which 
is aimed at what is non-corporeal is placed. Eryximachus, although somewhat encompassing 
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both aspects in his universalization of the forces of love, still maintains it on the human side, as 
he assigns a human vessel to control the effects of eros so as to achieve balance. In 
Aristophanes’ speech eros is even redirected from the divine realm in a very real attempt by the 
divine to keep human eros away from what is transcendent and direct it back into temporality.  
Conversely, Agathon’s speech places eros entirely in the divine realm – there is no unison or 
harmony between both. Now, Socrates will break from this binary position through the 
introduction of a mediatory element, a third realm of sorts that exists to remedy the separation 
between Agathon’s absolutely divine account and Aristophanes’ absolutely human position. 
Socrates therefore states that love is neither part of the divine realm nor the human realm, 
but rather it is a “great spirit” (Symposium 202e), a daimon that exists between both worlds 
acting as a messenger that keeps both worlds separated yet able to somewhat partake in one 
another without mixture, “conveying prayer and sacrifice from men to gods, while to men [it] 
bring commands from the gods and gifts in return for sacrifices” (Symposium 202e). From this 
opening statement Socrates touches upon the concern for piety and the proper relationship to the 
divine that is a focus of Aristophanes’ myth, since the daimon ensures that there is some sort of 
reciprocity between gods and humans. In addition, Socrates’ daimonic eros provides the 
harmony and balance that Eryximachus attributes to love: “they round out the whole and bind 
fast to the all” (Symposium 202e), while simultaneously providing the connection between 
particular beauty to what is beautiful that will be so important for Diotima’s encomium.  
Diotima describes love as the product of Poros and Penia, resource and poverty 
respectively, a less glamorous description than the ones previously provided by Phaedrus and 
Agathon. Eros gets love of wisdom from the paternal side, and toughness from the maternal side, 
but no moderation from either in regards to beauty (Strauss 193); this lack of moderation is no 
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accident, as eros of what is truly beautiful would require no moderation, but rather complete 
devotion.  As a child of resource and poverty, love is “always poor, and he’s far from being 
delicate and beautiful,” but rather, by nature, a lover of what is both beautiful and good, “a lover 
of wisdom” (Symposium 203d). Love thus desires both the Beautiful and the Good in equal 
measure: “he is in love with what is beautiful, and wisdom is extremely beautiful” (Symposium 
204b). This is the first signal that love is a philosopher, since it desires wisdom. In addition, this 
is also the first explicit association between the Beautiful and wisdom, which will later be 
important as Diotima’s ladder describes a progression to the Forms via beauty. Love is thus a 
lover of beautiful things, and Diotima explains that what love wants in desiring beautiful things 
is for them to “become his own” (Symposium 204e); that is, love desires to possess beauty, and 
the reason behind this desire is that the possession of beautiful things will bring happiness to the 
lover. As Diotima explains, this desire is “common to all” (Symposium 205a), which is important 
as it emphasizes the accessibility of philosophy via the beautiful as all human beings are lovers 
of beauty. In the same manner, Diotima explains that any desire we have for good things is in 
fact our desire for what is entirely good, even when we go about it in ways that are not 
appropriate.  
Up to this point then, eros is seen as the opposite of what it was in Agathon’s account: it 
is not beautiful, but rather desires what is beautiful, and like Aristophanes’ humans it is aware of 
its lack and thus desires to fix his position. Eros is in a state of lack yet aware of that lack, and is 
composed in a paradoxical way that echoes the theory of recollection, as it both has desire for the 
object, yet does not possess what it desires, because otherwise it would not desire it, as we can 
only desire what we lack. In this manner, eros’ intermediary position is emphasized, as it is 
somehow able to mediate between opposites to find harmony between both, like in Eryximachus’ 
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speech. Since eros by nature lacks, it is in a state of being aware of what it misses, which is the 
first stage in the search for wisdom and out of aporia; the recognition that one is ignorant and 
lacks knowledge. This same recognition is present in the Meno, wherein Socrates conveys to his 
interlocutor how hard it is to obtain enough knowledge of objects so as to define them and 
consequently teach what things are. As a result of his discussion with Socrates Meno is reduced, 
openly and admittedly, to aporia (Meno 80a-b). It is at this point where Socrates begins the 
philosophical inquiry that culminates in his explanation of the theory of recollection. This 
presence in absence, the integral recognition of ignorance in aporia, is crucial for the 
philosophical endeavor to begin.  
Already at this stage the resemblance of eros to Socrates himself is present, who is also 
an individual who does not possess much physical beauty but who is the biggest lover of wisdom 
and beauty there is. Furthermore, Socrates is more aware than anyone of his ignorance. Love, as 
a lover of wisdom, must be “in between being wise and being ignorant” (Symposium 204b), thus 
not possessing any of the extreme qualities that were attributed to him in the previous speeches; 
eros does not partake in absolutes, but is rather in a process of becoming, like human beings. 
Socrates’ statement that he only knows that he does not know emphasizes both his wisdom and 
lack of wisdom; on one part, he is aware of his ignorance in a way that allows him to search for 
wisdom, to engage in dialectic and philosophical inquiry with others in the hopes of arriving at 
some sort of knowledge. On the other hand, his acknowledgment that he in fact does not have 
knowledge is what constitutes his wisdom, as this recognition is potentially what an individual 
needs in order to begin any philosophical journey.
6
 As such, Socrates resembles eros, an entity 
                                                          
6. See Apology 21d and 23a-b. 
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that lacks but is aware of this lack so that it is able to long for what is missing to remediate this 
absence. 
Diotima then explains the problem when human beings seek to remedy this absence by 
looking in the wrong places. She mentions Aristophanes’ myth, indicating that the problem with 
his account is that individuals should only seek their half if their half is indeed good. As I have 
mentioned, the problem with Aristophanes’ account is its upward blindness; that is, the account 
excludes the transcendent, and thus the realm of the Forms and actual knowledge, as it is only 
focused on the particular other. In this account, philosophy, and the ladder of love, is ultimately 
impossible. Human beings thus must desire the Good as the ultimate end, since eros is “wanting 
to possess the good forever” (Symposium 206a), wherein the good is the desired end, what is 
completely beautiful and good. In addition, Diotima states that the actual goal in wanting to 
possess the good forever is to give “birth in beauty, whether in body or in soul” (Symposium 
206b). As focused as this account is on the movement towards the form of beauty itself, Diotima 
does not forego the physical and undeniable aspect of love’s attraction presented in the previous 
speeches - and that Pausanias, to some extent, tried to make out to be vulgar - but rather 
incorporates both. Diotima explains that human beings can only give birth in what is beautiful, 
since she describes these creations as “godly affair[s]” (Symposium 206c). At this point, Diotima 
will include physical and intellectual offspring in her account of what it means to give birth in 
the Beautiful, and unlike Pausanias’ rejection of the corporeal for the intellectual, she will 
explain that there are many different kinds of ways to give birth in beauty, and all are good 
because they are beautiful.  
Human beings love the good and the beautiful, as we have examined, and indeed desire 
to possess it but the desire to possess the beautiful must begin in the way that is most immediate 
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to our human nature, which is via physical desire first, to then progress to a desire towards what 
is less corporeal. In addition, Diotima mentions harmony, as she states that no birth in the 
beautiful can occur when the individual is not in harmony with the divine, which emphasizes the 
idea that beauty is in harmony with what is divine, and not eros in itself as Eryximachus argues. 
Through giving birth in the beautiful, human beings are released “from their great pain” 
(Symposium 206e), from the pangs of childbirth, and it is love that longs for this release.  
Eros is in fact directed towards immortality itself (Symposium 207a), and immortality is 
precisely what the act of giving birth in beauty is trying to achieve: “pregnancy, reproduction – 
this is an immortal thing for a mortal animal to do” (Symposium 206d). The suggestion that 
human beings desire what goes beyond their mortal limitations is already present in 
Aristophanes’ speech, which mentions that human beings’ long for their more divine and 
complete original nature, a nature that is denied to them and replaced with a self-healing eros. 
However, in Aristophanes’ account the solution is violent: human beings gather forces and 
attempt to overthrow the gods, which has disastrous consequences. In this case, the ascent is not 
only smooth, but accessible, as giving birth in beauty occurs in several ways that suit different 
kinds of individuals. By nature, immortality eludes us, as we are in a constant state of flux. 
Precisely because we are in flux is why giving birth in beauty is a viable option for immortality, 
as it allows us to leave behind something of us for posterity. In addition, Diotima already 
explained that we desire to possess the good because we desire happiness, and the only durable 
happiness we can achieve is that which lies in the transcendent realm, as happiness in this world 
is bound by the same laws of change to which our nature is bound. Diotima thus offers three 
kinds of immortality that human beings can achieve. The first, for those individuals who are 
“pregnant in body” (Symposium 208e) will be to reproduce physically, that is, to have human 
59 
 
offspring. The second, for those individuals who are more pregnant in soul, is to beget “wisdom 
and the rest of virtue” (Symposium 209a), that is, not only philosophy, but poetry and all of the 
creative arts. Diotima includes here the proper running of cities and the proper management of 
the household as ways in which wisdom manifests itself from individuals who experience the 
pregnancy of the soul. This kind of immortality thus has more to do with the fame that can be 
achieved within a community. The last kind of immortality is the cultivation of virtue, the desire 
for knowledge of what can truly be known, and because of its proximity to the transcendent can 
provide the individual with the most lasting form of immortality.  
Diotima thus begins the encomium of eros in the corporeal to then take it into the world 
of Forms, as she describes a progression of love from the initial attraction to particular 
individuals, that moves ‘up’ to the form of beauty itself; from the realm of becoming to the world 
of being qua being. The importance of the physical is present in that the beginning of this 
progression is in the beauty of bodies, the place where the lover is meant to “beget beautiful 
ideas” (Symposium 201a); logos and the physical are already intertwined at this point. The theory 
is that through the love of particular beauty, in the form of one’s beloved, one should progress 
towards love of the Beautiful itself, by first understanding that “the beauty of any one body is 
brother to the beauty of any one” (Symposium 210b), and thus, the beauty found in a particular 
body is shared by all beautiful bodies. Here, Diotima is suggesting that through the love of the 
particular the individual can discover the universal, which is vital for the ladder of love to work 
at all. In loving a particular other, in this case a specific person, the lover is able to recognize that 
the beauty of his beloved is a beauty that is present not just in that person, but that belongs to a 
universal category. Perhaps it should not be viewed as the literal understanding that from the 
love of one body the lover loves all bodies, but that the love of one body allows the lover to 
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recognize that there is a universal and more transcendent beauty which this particular 
manifestation of the beautiful partakes.  For example, an individual who appreciates the beauty 
in breakdancing can at first be led to disregard the beauty in other dance styles, as these styles 
might appear opposed or even contrary to the style that he loves. However, the more he explores 
this love for a particular style the more he finds out the roots of it, and the similarities to other 
dance styles, to the extent that he begins to appreciate similar styles, such as hip hop, and 
ultimately completely dissimilar styles, such as ballet or jazz, because he understands that the 
underlying beauty in all is that they are all dance and that all styles intersect and influence each 
other. The lover, from the love of an exclusively particular activity, begins to appreciate other 
exclusively particular activities because he now recognizes the universal beauty that 
encompasses them all, in addition to recognizing that particular beauty is not entirely exclusive. 
Once the lover is a lover of all beautiful bodies then he is able to realize that “the beauty 
of people’s souls is more valuable than the beauty of their bodies” (Symposium 210b), making a 
decisive leap from the purely corporeal to the non-empirical. However, it is important to note 
that the corporeal is always attached to the empirical; as Strauss states: “we never love merely 
the soul. Eros can never be divorced from body. We cannot love a human being without loving 
his head” (241). Diotima’s account takes up this condition and does not reject it, but uses it as 
part of the movement towards the Beautiful Itself. Furthermore, the revelation of the Beautiful at 
the end of the ladder in fact leads the lover back to the many particularities, leads him or her 
back to the cave. In fact, Alcibiades’ entrance will shed light on both sides of the love of the 
particular, its positive side that leads us on the journey upwards, and the attraction that can 
stagnate us in the beginning steps.  
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Now we are moved to the beauty of souls which begets the “beauty of activities and 
laws” (Symposium 210c). It is here when abstract beauty, such as the beauty of wisdom, becomes 
more explicit and is portrayed as a consequence of the appreciation of physical beauty. From 
corporeal beauty the lover moves up the ladder towards the beauty of logos and philosophy, 
which is more abstract but still beautiful for the lover to be engaged in it. The lover is now 
attracted to a multiplicity of knowledge, the “great sea of beauty” (Symposium 210d) that 
provides inspiration for the production of beautiful ideas, that is, to engage with wisdom until 
eventually he is able to see wisdom for what it is in its complete form that also happens to be 
what is truly beautiful (Symposium 210e). Diotima describes this stage as the “goal of loving” 
(Symposium 210e), the progression from particular beauty to the true beauty of wisdom. In this 
manner, it is the philosopher himself, the original lover of wisdom and master of ta erotika, who 
is described as the ideal lover, the one who understands the proper order and the correct 
progression that love must take in order to achieve the good, just like the physician was 
attributed with this power in regards to the body in Eryximachus’ speech. 
The language of eroticism surrounding the relationship between individuals and 
knowledge is also seen in the Republic, in which the individual is depicted as having an erotic 
relationship with wisdom. Socrates states that as the real lover of wisdom moves up the line, “he 
neither loses nor lessens his erotic love until he grasps the being of each nature itself with the 
part of his soul that is fitted to grasp it” and once he reaches the top he goes on to have 
“intercourse with it [the Form]and having begotten understanding and truth, he knows, truly 
lives, is nourished, and – at that point, but not before – is relieved from the pains of giving birth” 
(Republic 490a-c). The language of the ascent up the line, where the object of eros is wisdom, is 
the same language used in the ascent up the ladder of the lover towards the Beautiful. As 
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Socrates states in this extract from the Republic, the real lover of learning has an erotic 
relationship to wisdom: the true philosopher has intercourse with wisdom, that is, she engages 
with wisdom with all parts of her soul and not just her rational capacity, and thus is able to 
“beget” knowledge, or in the language of the Symposium, give birth in beauty. Erotic love is 
what is necessary to begin the ascent up the ladder or the line in the first place; for the ladder, it 
is necessary for the individual to desire the particular individual, while in the line it is necessary 
to desire the movement up even when it begins in eikasia. In fact, both the ladder and the line 
begin in levels that dwell with particularity, and thus, desire is the faculty of the soul that is the 
most engaged, as it is our strongest element in the empirical realm. Furthermore, since giving 
birth in beauty is the goal, the language evokes the act of reproduction which requires passionate 
love, eros as opposed to philia (affectionate regard or friendship). The idea is for the lover to be 
engaged completely in the progression, and this can only occur with the strongest kind of love.  
However, as much as the attainment of beauty itself is the goal, beauty in the empirical 
world is not disregarded, as it is through beautiful things that the lover learns to love the 
Beautiful itself, “using them like rising stairs” (Symposium 211c) towards the ultimate goal. In 
fact, erotic love should not lessen as the individual moves up the ladder, but rather it should 
increase as it increasingly becomes focused on the universal, on the Beautiful Itself. In addition, 
the point of climbing the ladder is not contemplation of the Beautiful Itself, but to be able to 
move into action; that is, into producing beauty with this knowledge. It is only at this point when 
one is able to “give birth to true beauty” (Symposium 212a), to act in a very human way by the 
dictates of what is truly beautiful. As Diotima tells Socrates, when the lover “looks at Beauty in 
the only way that Beauty can be seen – only then will it become possible for him to give birth not 
to images of virtue (because he’s in touch with no images) but to true virtue (because he is in 
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touch with the true Beauty” (Symposium 212a).The point of beholding beauty, then, is to bring 
this beauty back to the sensible, to the particular, and not to disregard it, but rather to use it as a 
starting place for creation inspired by the Beautiful Itself. With this newfound noesis lovers can 
create particular beauty that allows other individuals and their eros to become engaged in the 
ladder so as to embark on the same journey towards the Beautiful. The lover pregnant in soul 
will come back to give birth in that kind of beauty, creating intellectual offspring, such as books 
or philosophical treatises, or artistic productions, whereas the lover pregnant in body comes back 
to give birth to physical offspring, to children. In either case, the ladder necessitates a return to 
the particular, since once the lover reaches the top, the particular that is used at the beginning is 
now incorporated into the end of the journey.  
Moreover, creation in the beautiful can only occur in the particular. In the world of the 
Forms, there is no creation because there is no flux, everything is in a state of completion and 
absoluteness, where decay and change do not even appear as variables as they do not exist in this 
realm. Creation cannot occur as all Forms are sempiternal, always present and never decaying. 
The lover, therefore, is prompted to come back to the physical, where creation is constantly 
taking place, in order to give birth inspired by what is eternal, so that these creations are no 
longer merely eikasia, but reproductions that have in mind the newfound noesis of the eternal. In 
this manner, beauty generates more beauty, moving individuals to the universal source to then be 
able to create in particularity, so that through particularity they can be lead back to the source, 
and so on. 
Diotima’s account of eros, delivered in the words of Socrates, does not reject the 
previous eulogies to love, but rather amalgamates them under one Platonic explanation of the 
nature of our erotic desire. Diotima incorporates a key aspect of each speech that culminates in 
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her description of the lover as the philosopher, the individual who moves from the mutable 
particular to the immutable universal. From Phaedrus and Aristophanes’ encomiums, Diotima 
takes up the importance of the relationship to a particular beloved, which she turns into the 
foundational step for the attainment of the Beautiful. Instead of making the devotion to the finite 
other an end in itself, as it is in Aristophanes, Diotima makes it part of a system, of the ladder of 
love, so that now the particular beauty of the beloved is representative of the universal beauty of 
the Beautiful, and it is via our particular experience that we are able to access this knowledge. 
Aristophanes’ account, which presents problems for philosophy as it centers on a horizontal 
correspondence of desire, is corrected by incorporating this fixation for the other and making it 
part of the epistemological progression towards the Beautiful. This correction is also present in 
Eryximachus’ account, wherein it is argued that desires must be properly balanced rather than 
eliminated. In this manner, Diotima remedies the flaw of human nature present in Aristophanes’ 
ontological account of humanity, so that the human ontological status is no longer an 
impediment for its epistemological progression. 
Furthermore, Diotima takes Pausanias and Agathon’s mention of Aphrodite to the next 
level explaining that eros in fact lacks beauty and for this reason longs after it constantly. In his 
encomium Pausanias is the first one to make the Beautiful the object of eros, as he states that 
love partakes in either the Common or Heavenly Aphrodite. However, Pausanias hierarchizes 
this distinction in order to elevate the spiritual over the physical, to the extent that the physical is 
regarded as low and thus not conducive to the attainment of virtue. Diotima, on the other hand, 
incorporates the physical requirement of the erotic experience of the beautiful as foundational, 
since that is the place where erotic desire begins on an individual level. Moreover, Diotima 
incorporates Agathon’s insistence on the Beautiful’s association to eros but elevates it to the 
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ultimate object of our desire, so that eros itself is no longer what possesses this metaphysical 
beauty, but rather this beauty is what eros longs to obtain. In this manner, Diotima emphasizes 
that the horizontal nature of Aristophanes’ desire is incomplete, as human beings will not find 
the metaphysical beauty that they long for within the physical realm. Thus, the journey must be 
moved upwards, so that the particular experience of beauty serves as the starting point for this 
vertical progression. 
In addition, Diotima explains that this longing is not merely physical, but also spiritual, 
incorporating Eryximachus’ elevation of eros from the physical to the entire cosmos, without 
disregarding the emphasis on particularity present in Phaedrus, Pausanias, and Aristophanes. The 
desire for harmony present in Eryximachus’ account is developed in Diotima’s encomium, where 
harmony between the self and the divine occurs as the soul progresses up the line towards a 
greater understanding of the place of the Beautiful in the sensible. Ultimately, this understanding 
concludes in the awareness that the individual must go back to the physical to create in beauty 
that is not vacuous, or merely representative, but rather that incorporates the noesis of the 
Beautiful so that it can inspire other individuals to perform the same ascent.  
Eros, in Diotima’s account, ultimately explains the human ontological condition in a way 
that closely resembles that in Aristophanes’ account: human beings lack something, in this case 
beauty, and their eros is the only element available for them to fix it. Socrates’ speech thus 
provides a “proto-Hegelian aufhebung” (Hyland 43) of the speeches, a sublation of the speeches 
that takes in what is necessary and transforms it into a comprehensive Socratic account. Eros is 
neither divine nor human, but rather a daimon that allows connection between both; it is not 
beautiful, but rather longs after beauty because it lacks it, it is the drive that connects human 
beings to the metaphysical. Eros is neither entirely human nor divine; it is precisely an aspect of 
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our soul that partakes in both in order to bridge the gap between both realms. Eros is also not 
entirely spiritual or physical but since it is a fundamental aspect of our ontological status, it longs 
after the soul and the body, so that it does not reject the physical in the way Pausanias does, for 
example. On the contrary, eros is manifested in both physical and spiritual objects of desire, 
most times beginning in a particularized manifestation of beauty, such as another individual, in 
order then to move to a more abstract, less sensible, and thus, less human, object of love. In this 
sense, eros is a philosopher of sorts, as it begins its progression in the physical to then move to 
the metaphysical, from the lesser objects of knowledge to the more complete objects of 
comprehension. Eros is able to be attracted to beauty that transcends the physical, and that can 
produce knowledge, thus allowing the lover to transcend her human nature and be moved 
towards the transcendent realm where rational activity prevails. 
2.4 Eros incarnate: the entrance of Alcibiades 
At this point in the dialogue, when the description of eros has been finalized and solely 
demonstrated in language, is when Alcibiades appears to provide a specific and particular 
description of Socrates as eros, and a particular depiction of the experience of love. Up to this 
point Socrates has already been described as superhuman, and now, Alcibiades will demonstrate 
a human representation of eros in the form of the quintessential philosopher. Alcibiades’ speech 
is different from the previous ones in that his words are influenced by his state of inebriation, as 
he is the only attendee who has been drinking heavily, and yet, he delivers a speech that seems 
more truthful than the ones presented before him. For Strauss, Alcibiades’ praise of Socrates is 
‘poetic’ in the sense that he uses similes, and in this manner his panegyric sheds “a new light on 
poetry” (261) that defends poetry as a source of truth. Alcibiades’ ‘in vino veritas’ eulogy is a 
kind of poetry that does not distort truth through its embellishment, but rather becomes more 
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effective in its portrayal.7 As soon as he comes in, Alcibiades demands to see Agathon, the host 
of the banquet but coincidentally also the most beautiful man present. Agathon’s external beauty 
demands so much attention that Alcibiades for a while does not realize that Socrates is seated 
next to him: “what with the ivy and all, he didn’t see Socrates who had made room for him on 
the couch as soon as he saw him” (Symposium 213a). It is interesting that Socrates and Agathon 
are seated next to each other, since Socrates, while devoid of external beauty, arguably possesses 
beauty of the soul, and is juxtaposed to Agathon who in conjunction with his speech seems to be 
an empty image of what is beautiful and incorrectly, or at least illogically and without argument, 
believed to be good.  
Even though it is the philosopher who is described as the ideal lover in Diotima’s speech, 
Alcibiades’ praise of Socrates depicts Socrates as possessing beauty itself and Alcibiades as the 
real lover of this beauty of the soul that is not immediately apparent to the eyes. For example, 
Alcibiades describes Socrates as possessing hypnotizing powers like those of Marsyas, only his 
abilities are stronger as he requires no instruments: “you do exactly what he does, but with words 
alone” (Symposium 215c). Socrates’ hypnotizing power uses words and ideas, and as Alcibiades 
states, everyone who hears him is “transported” (Symposium 215d) through logos, even when the 
account is second-hand. The effect of Socrates on Alcibiades is intoxicating, as Alcibiades states 
that “if`[he] were to describe for you what an extraordinary effect [Socrates’] words have always 
had on [him]... you might actually suspect [he] is still drunk” (Symposium 215e). Socrates’ 
effect, like that of beauty, is powerful and unable to be explained rationally, but rather appeals 
directly to Alcibiades’ more primal erotic desire.  
                                                          
7. In fact, according to Sarah Kofman, “for Plato wine is not a bad thing in itself, since it has the nature – and 
the ambiguity – of a pharmakon; consumed in moderation it is capable of softening souls and making them 
susceptible, as children are, to the truths embedded in fables” (24). In this case, wine is working to bring 
the truth out of Alcibiades’ fantastic account of his relationship with Socrates. 
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Furthermore, Alcibiades states that Socrates forces him to examine his own life, making 
him believe “that [his] life isn't worth living” (Symposium 216a) and instilling in him a sense of 
shame (Symposium 216b) - like in Phaedrus’ speech where the effects of love produce shame and 
encourage virtue in the lover. In fact, Alcibiades’ sense of shame works in a very similar way to 
the motivations of Phaedrus’ love militia, as it is only in the presence of Socrates when 
Alcibiades experiences this shame and this motivation for virtue, like the lovers in battle who 
would accomplish daring feats in order to impress their beloveds. Alcibiades, however, also 
describes Socrates as beauty itself, as he states that once he caught a “glimpse of the figures he 
keeps hidden within...so godlike- so bright and beautiful, so utterly amazing” (Symposium 217a). 
He no longer had a choice whether to follow him or not, since he was mesmerized and his 
subservience was commanded. This description is similar to that of the lover upon seeing the 
Beautiful. In this manner, both Diotima’s ideal lover and Alcibiades are “struck and bitten by 
philosophy” (Symposium 218a), the former upon glimpsing the Beautiful itself, and the latter 
through his relationship with Socrates. Alcibiades thus is able to appreciate the beauty in 
Socrates that is not evident to the eye but that is more substantial and conducive to virtue, as it 
foments rational activity: “[Soc]: if I really have in me the power to make you a better man, then 
you can see in me a beauty that is really beyond description and makes your own remarkable 
good looks pale in comparison” (Symposium 218e).  
Next to the real beauty of the soul, physical beauty loses its immediate grip; this 
perceptual change is seen in the progression the lover takes from particular beauty of bodies to 
the beauty of the soul. Socrates in Alcibiades’ account is described both as eros and as the 
Beautiful, and Alcibiades, unknowingly, describes himself as the true lover, the one who longs 
for what is truly beautiful and not just physically attractive, thus showing a partial understanding 
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of his lack: he is aware he is missing something but it is only when Socrates is around that this 
lack is manifested and turned into action. On the other hand, Socrates is presented as being in 
complete control of himself, as the lover who has already glimpsed the Beautiful and has gone 
back down the ladder with this noesis of the Forms, to the point that beautiful particulars no 
longer instill in him a licentious desire. However, in his account, Alcibiades demonstrates the 
confusion that Agathon already displayed at the beginning of the dialogue, as he desires to obtain 
Socrates’ wisdom through physical contact when it is in fact through philosophy that this must 
be achieved; indeed, this is the problem with his own understanding of his ignorance, since 
Socrates’ beauty does not ‘shine’ as intensely as physical beauty does, it is easier for him to 
ignore it, a problem with sensible beauty that will be examined in the next chapter.  
2.5 Eros, the remedy for aporia and the human condition 
Eros, described as a daimon and personified as a human being – Socrates – sheds light on 
the human condition. It indicates that individuals, through their erotic nature and the object of 
their love, are able to act in both the mortal and the divine spheres, partaking in both being and 
non-being. Eros, like human beings, is in a constant state of becoming; it is potentiality longing 
to be actualized. As such, it is capable of moving higher up the line toward what is true, going 
back and forth between eikasia and noesis, yet insofar as it is a human condition, it is unable to 
partake fully in either. Love, thus, acts as the remedy to the flaw of human nature pointed out in 
Aristophanes’ encomium, allowing us to heal our innate state of ignorance and lack. The 
ontological condition of man as delineated in Aristophanes’ story and taken up in Diotima’s 
description sets up this flaw in human nature in an accurately Platonic way: “love of the beautiful 
equals lack of beauty; beauty equals good; therefore that which loves beauty is characterized by 
absence of beauty, which equals absence of good” (Strauss 182). For Socrates, “the beauty [of 
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the human situation] will be intimately tied to our eros” (Hyland 41) because it is precisely due 
to this inadequacy that human beings are erotic creatures. Eros is not good in itself, but good in 
what it longs after. The positive thing about eros is that it acts as the remedy for aporia; it is the 
recognition that all we know is that we know nothing, and instead of resting on this truth we seek 
to fix it. Philosophy, indeed, requires a “suffering of aporia, of recognizing that we do not know 
and of striving for knowledge” (Hyland 117) in order to commence at all.  
Reaching aporia is the crucial condition for any philosophical inquiry.
8
 Without it, we 
might fall into dogmatism – such as Pausanias’ sophistic relativism - or dogmatic scepticism. In 
the most philosophical sense, “those who allow their ignorance to propel them to seek wisdom 
are truly the lovers of wisdom” (Scott & Welton 98): awareness of one’s own ignorance is key 
for action. Socrates and the daimon eros, who both know that they lack wisdom and beauty 
respectively, are the true lovers whose awareness of their shortcomings propels them towards 
knowledge. Socratic ignorance, for example, in fact requires a degree of scepticism that allows 
the individual to understand her state of ignorance. Not coincidentally, Socrates begins his erotic 
education in the realization that he in fact knows nothing about love (Symposium 201e). As 
Socrates tells his audience, he reaches this conclusion after Diotima questions him regarding his 
beliefs about love, so that Socrates reaches the conclusion, through dialogue with Diotima, that 
he is in fact mistaken about his assumptions: “I had told her almost the same things that Agathon 
told me just now: that Love is a great god and that he belongs to beautiful things. And she used 
the very same arguments against me that I used against Agathon” (Symposium 201e). Aporia, 
hence, must be induced in order for the individual to achieve the state of ‘positive’ ignorance, a 
                                                          
8. In Seventh Letter section 342a1-d8 Plato explicitly discusses this procedure. 
71 
 
situation that Socrates is seen trying to bring forth through dialectic, an examination that moves 
the individual from awareness of ignorance to a desire to fix it.  
Thus, in between wisdom and ignorance there is philosophy, the search for wisdom that 
begins in the ignited eros for what is beautiful because it is good, but also of what is sensibly 
beautiful because it leads, like in Diotima’s ladder, to the understanding of more complete 
accounts of beauty. Diotima’s ladder is therefore where “the reader finds the union of the divine 
and the mortal through the daimonic power of Love” (Cobb 76). The gods do not require this 
ignition because they are ontologically complete: the gods do not require eros because they do 
not require logos, their state is one of sempiternal completion. Logos becomes a purely human 
phenomenon, “somehow a function of our morality, the incompleteness of our noetic visions - 
or, one might say in anticipation, of our eros” (Hyland 77). Love, then, is “not perfection, it is 
the energy toward perfection, not divinity but our longing for it” (Gould 45); therefore, because 
we cannot have it, we cannot be truly beautiful, we not only desire beauty but want to create in 
beauty in lieu of possessing it. Thus, “the ascent of the staircase does not lead one out of this 
world” (Cobb 79) as many believe Diotima argues and Plato is criticized for; on the contrary, the 
top is reached through dialectic and once reached the end is action, since once one reaches 
understanding one is able to come back to the practical realm of society and human relations 
with the correct approach. 
As such, eros transcends the definition given to it in the Republic that mainly refers to 
appetitive and ‘unphilosophical’ desires; now, eros is what gives motion to the entire soul: 
thumos (spiritedness), logos (reason) and epithumia (desire) in unison, the combination of 
elements that drive the soul towards action. To understand better the role of eros, it is useful to 
examine briefly its description in the Phaedrus, wherein eros is depicted as the principle for 
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action for the entire soul. The discussion about the nature of the soul in the Phaedrus reveals an 
all-encompassing aspect of eros that is missing from other Platonic accounts. The image that 
Socrates uses for the soul, that of the charioteer and the two horses, explains the intricate but 
necessary reciprocity between our rational and erotic faculties.  
In the image of the charioteer, the individual is in charge of leading two horses with 
opposite behaviours; the black horse represents those appetitive desires that seek purely physical 
gratification, whereas the white horse represents rational activity that stands above the 
phenomenal (Phaedrus 253e-254d). These two elements represent epithumia (desire, passionate 
longing) and nous (mind, reason) respectively. Epithumia takes over the concept of eros as 
appetite in order to mark a fundamental distinction between both: eros is what drives the soul, 
the motion of nous, thumos, and epithumia in its entirety and in harmony, “the very self-motion 
of the soul… the being and logos of the soul” (Hyland 81). The negative aspects traditionally 
associated with desire that make it incompatible with philosophical endeavours – as physical 
contingencies can sometimes disrupt rational activity - will no longer be present, since now eros 
is what drives the entire soul towards its object, and epithumia is relegated to “one constituent of 
the soul” (Hyland 75). Eros is thus represented as more than an isolated activity of the soul, but 
as an activity of the soul that is in fact necessary for philosophy, as it drives the white horse, pure 
kalos te kai agathos through philosophical inquiry.   
In this manner, both aspects of the soul can work in unison, complementing each other in 
a way that suits our dual human nature more appropriately. The white horse, embodying pure 
rationality, balances the passionate appetitive desires of the black horse, whose desire must be 
reined in for philosophy to occur; for example, Alcibiades’ reaction to Socrates, as described by 
Alcibiades, is similar to the reaction of the charioteer at the sight of the beautiful boy in the 
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chariot analogy. Alcibiades lusts after Socrates in a purely physical manner, although desiring 
his soul, and Socrates does not give in to his desires. The black horse in this account is “not 
inherently evil, but can be a force for good if he is properly trained” (Belfiore 253), that is, with 
the restriction provided by reason, the most dangerous aspects of those desires can be curbed, 
and that energy towards action can be used for good. Simultaneously, the black horse humanizes 
the purely rational aspect of the soul, and since it is the one initiating movement, it is 
fundamental for any kind of philosophical inquiry; as Belfiore explains, both the charioteer myth 
and Diotima’s ladder of love convey “the general principle that desire, eran or philein, is a 
necessary condition for seeking wisdom” (201). Working in unison, both are capable of leading 
the soul in a harmonious manner. However, it is the job of the charioteer to ensure that this 
harmony prevails, using will and spirit to guide each aspect of the soul towards its proper end. If 
this harmony prevails, the soul can entirely desire the Good and successfully embark on this 
progression; as Alessandra Fussi states: “in Plato’s Symposium, eros unifies the multiplicity of 
human goals by drawing the entire soul towards the desire for the good” (237). 
The desire for beauty that the lover experiences is thus brought together in a definite 
manner with the philosophical endeavor of the lover of wisdom. The philosopher, like eros, 
longs for what is beautiful because of an awareness of her own lack of beauty. Plato’s portrayal 
of the philosopher in dialogues such as the Republic and the Phaedrus, Diotima’s account of eros 
as desirous of abstract and physical kalos, and Alcibiades’ description of Socrates all suggest the 
idea that the philosopher is the true erotician - the most capable master of ta erotika and 
possessor of the noblest form of love, eros for the unchanging, permanent, being qua being. This 
image of the erotic lover of sofia is juxtaposed with the traditional portrayal of the philosopher: 
the individual who rejects eros in favor of rationality, and who is, unlike the poets, deeply un-
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erotic. The claim about the philosopher’s vast erotic ability is twofold: on one side, it refers to 
the direction of the philosopher and the lover’s eros, that is, that both lover and philosopher have 
ultimately the same object of love. On the other hand, this claim refers to the analogous 
epistemological movement of the philosopher – as outlined in the Republic – and that of the 
lover, as described in the ladder of love. 
2.6 The lover qua philosopher: the Beautiful and the Good as objects of Love 
Now that we have come to the point where the lover is seen as embarking on the same 
progression as is the philosopher, both moving from the sensible towards the metaphysical, we 
can compare Socrates’ account of philosophical progression via beauty in the Symposium with 
his account of philosophical progression in the Republic. Diotima’s ‘ladder of love’ and the line 
& cave analogies in the Republic share an analogous movement. The line traces, ontologically 
and epistemologically, the movement from a lesser object of being and therefore knowledge, to 
the highest form of understanding and ontological status. This movement parallels the 
evolvement of eros in the ladder from the particular beauty of bodies to the form of the Beautiful 
itself. This similar progression will demonstrate the foundational role of beauty in the movement 
of love and of philosophical education, as both journeys trace the movement of philosophy, 
“appearing in the Symposium as Eros ascending various stages of insight to the vision of the 
Beautiful, in the Republic as mind ascending the stages of the Divided Line” (Notopoulos 58). In 
this manner, we will examine how the lover in Diotima’s account transforms into a philoso-lover 
of sorts; that is, how the account present in the Symposium is a philosophical progression like the 
one present in the Republic, only the former is more accessible, as it deals with the experience of 
beauty and love that all human beings, regardless of rational inclinations, partake in. 
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Both journeys begin in the plane of images; the ladder in the appreciation of the beauty of 
a particular body, and the line analogy in the plane of eikasia, the realm of imagination and 
images in the visible section of the line. Both the ladder and the line begin in a stage where the 
individual can only come in contact with reproductions or emptier images of what truly is. In the 
ladder section, the beauty of a particular body partakes in the Beautiful itself but does not 
encompass it entirely, as it is not only the beauty of the corporeal that makes up what is 
beautiful. In the line, eikasia marks the foundational step towards understanding, whereby the 
individual can only come in contact with images of what truly is. As much as both of these 
stages stand at the lowest ontological and epistemological levels, that does not mean that they are 
despised by Plato or considered to be inadequate for the philosophical movement. On the 
contrary, without these stages there would be no movement at all, since it is through this very 
particular stage that human beings become engaged in the journey to begin with. It is at this stage 
of particularity that eros acts and drives the individual forward; otherwise, the individuals would 
not require the ladder at all, as they would just comprehend the Forms in an immediate manner. 
However, it is precisely our dichotomous nature, our dualism of body and soul that requires this 
beginning stage which is thus entirely fundamental. 
From this foundational stage both the lover and the philosopher move to a plane of pistis 
(belief), which still refers to the physical, but just a step above eikasia. From the appreciation of 
the beauty in a particular body the lover is able to acknowledge that all bodies share beauty, 
having found one aspect of beauty that becomes apparent in all things. Similarly, the philosopher 
uses her perception of things in the material world to form her belief and from one thing finds 
connection to the other, which in the allegory of the line necessarily arises from imagination as a 
first step. Thus, in both the ladder and the line the lover and the philosopher move from a lower 
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object of knowledge towards a ‘higher’ or more complete object and belief; more complete 
because, according to Plato’s epistemological movement, the higher up the line we go the more 
the particular things that we attempt to understand partake in universality. Thus, higher up the 
line we come closer to the absolute definition that is unaffected by flux, and consequently, 
possesses more stability. Stability is key for Plato’s epistemological understanding, as the quality 
of thought will always depend on the quality of the object; hence, an object with greater stability 
allows the observer to have stable perception and more comprehension of the object he follows.  
These lower stages, although lower, are by no means despicable or unnecessary, as they 
were the tool that provided both philosopher and lover with the belief that from a particular stage 
more complete understanding arises. According to this movement, when individuals begin their 
philosophical inquiry at the level of eikasia, they are “forced to investigate from hypotheses” 
(Republic 510b), as opposed to beginning their inquiries from pre-determined principles, since 
images are in the realm of imagination and not complete reality. However, once the individual 
moves towards the intelligible section of the line, she is able to understand the previous images 
“truly as hypotheses” (Republic 511b) as opposed to first principles, whereas before the images 
were taken to be the things in themselves. The same movement occurs in the lover who starts 
from appreciating the beauty of a particular individual as the manifestation of all beauty, to 
understanding that that particular manifestation of beauty follows from a more universal and 
comprehensive idea of the Beautiful. This foundational stage is thus able to work as “stepping 
stones to take off from, enabling [the individual] to reach the unhypothetical first principle of 
everything” (Republic 511b). At this stage both the lover and the philosopher cross into the 
intelligible realm: an appreciation of the beauty of souls and logos for the lover, and a state of 
dianoia (capacity for discursive thinking) for the philosopher. The lover is now able to 
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appreciate discarnate beauty through a process of discursive thinking; whereas at the beginning 
the contact with beauty is immediate and requires no rationalization, at this stage the lover 
produces an appreciation for abstract beauty through her rational capacity. Similarly, the 
philosopher in the line analogy uses discursive thinking to arrive at abstract mathematical 
concepts and theoretical subjects that, although they may appear as not immediately ‘beautiful,’ 
are beautiful in their proximity to the Form of the Good, which is entirely beautiful in nature 
because it is entirely true.  
This stage of discursive reasoning is juxtaposed to the next stage where understanding, as 
action, comes without process. At the stage of noesis in the line there is immediate apprehension: 
the philosopher does not need a process of discursive thought as she can now understand what is 
real, being qua being or the Good. The lover, in the same manner, reaches the stage of immediate 
apprehension of the Beautiful that requires no thinking. Not surprisingly, both the lover and the 
philosopher have reached the same stage, for one it is called apprehension of the form of the 
Beautiful, and for the other it is called apprehension of the form of the Good; for both, this final 
apprehension comes as a leap, “a flash of revelation” (Notopoulos 74). As A.E Taylor explains, 
“the place assigned to both (καλoν and αγαθoν) in the ascent to ‘being and reality’ is identical, 
and in both cases the stress is laid on the point that when the supreme ‘form’ is decried, its 
apprehension comes as a sudden “revelation”” (231). In both cases, what truly is will necessarily 
be beautiful in its complete state, and what is truly beautiful will necessarily be good.  
Thus, there is a fundamental relation between the Beautiful and the Good. Both forms 
will be entirely beautiful and good in nature due to their wholeness and stable state, and 
consequently both will partake in aletheia in equal amounts. The ladder, in a way, can be seen as 
the line particularized in terms of beauty; that is, particularized in terms of what is the most 
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accessible form for human beings. Whereas not all individuals engage in the epistemological 
progression of the line, most human beings engage in the experience of the love of the beautiful. 
Thus, beauty is a more accessible form for individuals and a form that can lead even non-
philosophers to philosophical understanding and bring them closer to the Good. 9 
However, this is not the end of the journey for either the philosopher or the lover, as in 
both cases the individual is required to go back down the line or the ladder, as we can see in 
Diotima’s encomium with the lover going back to give birth in beauty. In the case of the lover 
and as stated previously in the examination of Diotima’s encomium, the lover is now able to give 
birth in beauty, that is, to produce and create with her newfound noesis offspring that partake 
truly in the Beautiful, whether physically or intellectually. The philosopher also returns; as 
delineated in the allegory of the cave once the philosopher understands, it is her turn to go back 
to the cave, to use eikasia now to teach philosophy properly. The Platonic account, which can be 
seen as leaving the end ‘up in the clouds’ or the metaphysical, takes a turn here, as in both 
progressions the individual must return to the physical in order to continue the journey. Both the 
lover and the philosopher are prompted to go back and through the various steps in their 
epistemological journeys reach an appreciation of the Beautiful and the Good in order to act 
from the perspective of this newfound understanding. The end of the line is thus not a resting 
place for contemplation, but the trigger for philosophical action in the Republic: the philosopher 
goes back to the cave out of duty, the lover goes back to give birth in beauty, to create with the 
understanding of what is truly beautiful. The philosopher and the lover are thereby demonstrated 
to partake in an analogous journey; as Belfiore explains, “the ladder of love is there the path that 
leads from the Socratic elenchus to the doctrine of Forms” (142).  
                                                          
9. The full examination of the relationship between the Beautiful and the Good is conducted in the following 
chapter. 
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However, how similar are the Beautiful and the Good as objects of desire in these 
journeys? Both eros and the philosopher possess, ontologically, the same object of love. For the 
former, it is Beauty in Itself, auto to kalos, that is desired, a beauty that partakes only in 
absolutes as a form. For the latter, the goal is apprehension of agathos, the good in itself, the 
quintessential form. In both cases, the state of being qua being is desired, an intellectual state 
wherein there is only noesis and immediate – and complete – apprehension. Since the 
philosopher’s object of love is noesis of the Good, the philosopher is the individual who is truly 
erotic, as he longs after that which is the most beautiful of all being: “by his nature then, love is a 
philosopher, a lover of wisdom, because love is always drawn to beauty, and wisdom is among 
the class of beautiful things” (Cooksey 73). In fact both the Beautiful and the Good are spoken of 
in ways that are sometimes interchangeable, as it follows that in the Platonic doctrine what is 
truly good is indeed the most beautiful object of desire because of its goodness. Conversely, 
what is truly kalos will be so because of its goodness, not merely due to tangible attractiveness, 
as shown through the juxtaposition of Agathon, the kalos physique, versus Socrates, the kalos 
soul. As Gary Alan Scott & William A. Welton argue, not only is eros depicted as a daimonic 
messenger to the realm of being qua being, i.e. the Forms, but “philosophy itself is shown to be a 
form of eros” (18), and this form of eros would be the desire for what is truly beautiful and good.  
The desire for what is truly beautiful is juxtaposed with the desire for images of the 
Beautiful, i.e. representations that partake in the beautiful but that are in still in a stage of 
becoming and consequently partake of what is non-kalos as well. The realm of eikasia has been 
usually attributed to poetry, and the medium of poetry is traditionally viewed as possessing a 
greater appeal than philosophy, moving “men most deeply” (Strauss 6) and thereby upholding 
itself as a formidable competitor in matters of authority for wisdom. In fact, the Symposium is the 
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dialogue in which the poets are actually present to compete actively against philosophy, and 
where philosophy seems to win in endurance (as shown at the end of the dialogue in the 
conversation between Socrates, Agathon, and Aristophanes), but not in immediate attraction; for 
example, Agathon’s beauty overshadows Socrates’ virtue, as shown with Alcibiades’ initial 
immediate attraction to Agathon. The problem is that “poetic wisdom is in the first place, 
splendid; philosophical wisdom is not” (Strauss 33), that is, poetry’s beauty shines brighter than 
the beauty of philosophy. Since Diotima’s ladder ends in action, the production of beauty, poets 
are in fact elevated and praised for their beautiful creations, and in a way, philosophers are 
commended to do the same, to combine truth with the medium of poetry to produce beautiful 
philosophy. The main difference, however, is that the philosopher strives after that which 
surpasses the realm of eikasia, seeking what is beautiful and good in a complementing manner. 
In the realm of becoming physical beauty can come without internal goodness, characterized by 
Alcibiades, and internal goodness and beauty can come without physical beauty, as seen in 
Socrates, but in the noumenal world of the Forms what is truly beautiful will be good and vice 
versa. 
Thus, the natural intuition that beauty does not imply goodness is correct; however, this is 
an intuition that is only correct when applied to the world of becoming, not to the world of being 
in itself. Consequently, the Beautiful and the Good both stand at the same level ontologically and 
epistemologically for the lover and the philosopher, who share the same object of love. As it is, 
then, eros is capable of leading the individual, through its more common love of the beautiful, 
towards the same object of love desired by the philosopher, towards noesis of the Forms.  
Eros, existing in the stage between the sensible and the intelligible, the world of 
phenomena and the noumenal, thus exists in a sort of becoming stage that allows it to partake of 
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both extremes; as a sort of Hermes, eros travels back and forth from the world of forms to the 
human world, binding both together. As Hyland explains, “eros’ ontological condition is not 
quite one of simple lacking, but rather that of the metaxu (in-between; middle ground): eros is 
the in-between” (46). Eros’ capacity to exist ‘in-between’ is precisely what makes it foundational 
for philosophical inquiry, and what makes the philosopher the quintessential erotician. For Scott 
& Welton the two pillar features of philosophy in the Symposium are that “philosophy is 
fundamentally erotic” and that “as erotic, philosophy lies between ignorance and wisdom and 
also between the human and the divine” (3). Accordingly, both eros and the philosopher exist in 
the stage of metaxu, following the erotic endeavor grounded on Socratic ignorance and human 
lack. In this manner, the daimonic messenger becomes the principle for action for both physical 
and psychological experiences, and not just for corporeal desires. Eros dwells on both the 
physical and psychological in equal measure, as shown in the encomiums that fluctuate between 
the desire for bodies to the desire for logos. These examples demonstrate the strong pull that eros 
has on individuals. Since eros works in a dual manner, objects of love that only encompass one 
aspect seem to have a weaker grasp as they fail to appeal to both our psyche and our physical 
nature. Diotima’s ladder starts in the physical and transcends to the purely rational to then return 
to a combination of both through creation in beauty. Even though the culmination of the ladder is 
to apprehend the Form of Beauty, the ladder does not reject one aspect of human nature in favour 
of the other, which would make one account incompatible for our corporeal nature and the other 
incompatible for philosophy, but rather elevates both as important for the stage of metaxu in 
which the individual operates; after coming in contact with true beauty it is valid to seek 
immortality via procreation or via kalos rational activity.  
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Love, then, stands as the self-motion of the soul in all of its aspects, longing to fix the 
wound of human nature by desiring what it does not possess, beauty. In the Aristophanean 
account this implies a movement back to the self, an appropriation of the other; for Socrates, 
erotic desire will seek what is truly beautiful, starting from particular beauty and moving to 
beautiful logoi. The highest object of love is thereby beauty, and creation in beauty is a search 
for happiness accessible to all: “somehow beauty is, as it were, a sudden vision of what would 
really make us happy” (Gould 46). This happiness, accessed through the beautiful and in an 
emotion as accessible as love keeps us in this world, and “the beautiful itself is found and studied 
in the production of its wordly manifestations” (Cobb 83). In the next chapter we will examine 
in-depth how beauty becomes the tool that we need to get out of an aporetic state and into 
philosophy. Something must occur for philosophical discourse to begin, and this something is the 
experience of the beautiful. As we will examine in the following section, beauty has an 
advantage to it that other Forms do not, a tangible presence in the world that makes it shine 
brighter and attract our eros like no other object of desire. Beauty is the sight that brings logos to 
life in a non-discursive way, awakening dianoia and the eros to achieve understanding. 
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Chapter 3 Beauty 
3.1 Beauty and the ladder to the Forms 
 It is now clear that eros, our daimonic intermediary between the world of opinion and 
that of noesis, is the human capacity by which we can move up the epistemological ladder 
towards transcendence. Eros allows us to heal the wound of human nature, which is our 
irrefutable ignorance of true knowledge, by inciting in us the motivation to go forward, to leap 
into action, whether physically or intellectually. This inherent erotic desire within our beings has 
been portrayed as a more powerful ally for the philosophical endeavour than is rationality itself, 
since it burns in us more intensely than any other of our faculties. When eros calls, we listen. In 
fact, we do more than just listen, we act. This powerful trigger is what allows Diotima’s lover to 
become engaged in the progression of the ladder in the first place, as soon as eros is ignited at 
the sight of beauty. However, thanks to the speeches we know the various dangerous side effects 
of eros – Phaedrus’ excessive courageous behaviours, Aristophanes’ creatures fixated on each 
other rather than on philosophy, Alcibiades’ blind devotion to Socrates. It is evident that eros is 
as powerful as it is dangerous, especially when our goal is philosophical education. Why, then, is 
the Beautiful, the ultimate object of love, given as our greatest motivation to begin the 
philosophical journey to the Forms? Why is it that what is kalos is presented as the most potent 
pharmakon against aporia, as well as what is capable of leading individuals from negative to 
positive Socratic ignorance, i.e., towards a desire to fix their ignorance due to their awareness of 
their condition? We have already been witnesses to how dangerous the seduction of sensible 
beauty can be, capable of straying would-be philosophical souls away from the pursuit of 
aletheia (truth) and presenting carnal obstacles to the individual who should be, at least, devoted 
to learning. 
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 The Platonic problem for our embodied nature is the movement up the ladder; the line 
deems this world, the physical world, as less real, and thus, the sensible and immediate is 
shunned, to some extent, as an inadequate recipient and provider of philosophical truth, as shown 
in the Phaedo. The Forms, on the other hand, in all their abstract and distant gloriousness, are the 
ultimate epistemological rewards that we should be seeking, even when we are doomed to fail in 
this quest from the onset, as they are “glimmering desiderata, the objects of a quest, objects that 
can inspire us, but which continually elude us in some way” (Scott & Welton 23). The problem 
is that the quest for the Good lacks sufficient sensible manifestation to act as the carrot dangling 
in front of our deeply erotic natures. However, in order for eros to be activated for this sensibly 
unsecure goal, the Forms must be present to us in one way or another in order to inspire the quest 
in the first place. It is here where the Beautiful becomes more advantageous than the other 
Forms, as it is the most available Form for human beings to come into contact with, since it 
exists in the sensible in a more tangible manner than do the more abstract Forms. 
 By bringing the quest back to the physical plane Plato unites the highest goal of the lover 
and the philosopher as one – the Beautiful. The physical, which appears to be disdained in other 
accounts, such as the Phaedo shows, is vindicated in the Symposium via Diotima’s exposition. At 
first glance, the physical is catalogued as incongruent with philosophical endeavours. This idea is 
present in Heraclitus’ flux that inspires the Platonic cosmology. Heraclitus’ concept of flux, 
described after his death as the principle of Πάντα ῥεῖ (panta rhei: ‘everything flows’), referred 
to the idea that in this world everything flowed from one state to another, constantly coming 
together and falling apart, so that nothing was ever one thing at any point, to the extent that 
nothing can be known. According to this theory there is no stability in sensation, as it is in a 
permanent state of change, and this is a concept that inspires the Platonic doctrine of Forms and 
85 
 
its apparent ‘disdain’ of the physical world. Yet, as demonstrated in the dialogues devoted to 
eros, philia, and auto to kalos, the remedy for human nature is in human nature itself; it is part of 
the sensible world in its constant state of change. Beauty, the form that shines the brightest in the 
sensible realm is the most powerful incentive for eros, our daimonic messenger between 
ignorance and truth, between flux and stability. With beauty as the key for philosophical 
investigation, Plato brings the point of reference to this world, stating that the beginning of the 
answer is in fact at our reach, since our eros is not only naturally attracted to beauty but beauty is 
a Form that shines sensibly for individuals. 
Thus, the tyrant of the Republic becomes the Socratic iconophile and devourer of images; 
the lover of beautiful boys becomes a lover of a more complete kalos kagathos (ideal personal 
conduct, ‘beautiful and good’). As both journeys lead these individuals back to the world of 
shadows and beautiful bodies, both are prompted to create a kind of beauty that will allow the 
Beautiful to be manifested brightly in the world of becoming. For such a goal, we need the 
biggest incentive, one that will initially appeal to both our rational and erotic natures, our white 
horse and black horse in equal measurement, and this incentive will be beauty, not wisdom in 
itself, at least not in the sensible realm. I will now explain what makes the Beautiful a more 
powerful contender and incentive for human beings to engage in philosophy than is the Good. I 
will carry out this examination by first focusing on the beauty of individuals and that of poetry in 
juxtaposition to philosophy, to explain why beauty shines brighter than any other Form in the 
sensible realm, thus making it an essential element of philosophical education. This examination 
will shed light on why sensible beauty need not be devoid of truth and disdained, but in fact must 
be used by philosophy due to beauty’s accessibility. Next, I will explore beauty’s cognitive 
priority, that is, its ability to be cognized immediately and non-discursively to understand further 
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its advantage over other Forms and why it is such an appropriate trigger for human eros. Finally, 
I will examine the way in which beauty is capable of provoking critical inquiry to shed light on 
the epistemological progression of the lover in the Symposium as a philosophical advancement in 
its core. This examination will show how important beauty is, specifically the experience of 
sensible beauty, for Platonic philosophical education, by showing how the journey to knowledge 
begins in the particular experience of beauty due to beauty’s accessibility and connection to our 
eros. This connection, the natural longing of eros for what is beautiful, when properly channeled, 
can become a powerful ally for philosophical inquiry. From here, we will conclude the 
examination of beauty as the pedagogical tool needed for philosophical education that thrives on 
the natural association between eros and that which is beautiful. 
3.2 Beauty’s star: what makes the Beautiful different from the other Platonic Forms and what 
this means for Platonic philosophy 
To understand beauty’s power we must examine what makes the Beautiful different from 
other Platonic forms, in order to understand why it is a more effective recruiter for philosophy 
than is the Good itself. To do this, I will examine the way in which the form of the Beautiful 
manifests in particular representations versus particular representations of other Forms. I will 
first examine beauty as the only form with concrete physical representations to examine then 
how beauty in the particular is used as a starting point for philosophical investigation in the 
Symposium, as well as in the Phaedrus. At this point, we will understand why beauty commands 
so much attention as opposed to other Forms, and how, as a result, beauty stands as the most 
accessible of the Forms and the ideal starting point for philosophy due to the way it manifests to 
our eros. It is important to remember throughout that in Chapter 2 we examined fully how eros is 
defined in the dialogue not only as that which loves beauty the most, but as the element in our 
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soul that makes us act and that allows us to step onto in the ladder to the Beautiful in the first 
place. 
What differentiates beauty from other Platonic forms, primarily, is its tangible brightness 
or what I term its ‘obviousness’ in the sensible realm; as Hyland explains: “beauty is perhaps the 
paradigm case of a phenomenon that has both physical and psychological manifestations; we can 
speak of beautiful bodies, and we can speak of beautiful souls” (42). Whereas the Good exists in 
an incorporeal manner, able to be described in language, yet too abstract to grasp materially or to 
come in contact with, the Beautiful has a manifold of instances that are available to human 
experience in a less esoteric fashion than the Good has. The Forms can feel too abstract and 
disconnected from the general human experience. The level of abstractness of Plato’s 
transcendent goal makes it hard for individuals to relate to these archetypes, especially such 
abstract notions as virtue, as they do not have tangible, clear, particular representations, as do 
beautiful objects or people. 
Although we find wise or courageous individuals, for example, these are categories in 
which consensus is more difficult to be attained than in examples of the Beautiful, for several 
reasons. For example, debates about the actions of a man going inside a burning building to 
rescue his dog are prone to be colourful and antagonistic; some will argue that his courage is 
nothing but stupidity and disregard for his own life, others will ask how courageous would he 
have been to rescue a human being or someone else’s dog. And yet, some will fervently argue 
that his actions are indeed heroic and truly courageous. Consensus over braveness and whether 
or not this man fits the description of ‘courage’ would be attained with difficulty, as in Phaedrus’ 
example of the bravery of the lover in his encomium which proved to be problematic. In fact, 
early Socratic dialogues such as the Charmides or Lysis all end in aporia, since consensus over 
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abstract concepts, such as what defines sophrosune, or what constitutes friendship, could not be 
achieved. An example of this lack of consensus is produced as a result of philosophical debate 
over Plato’s Crito and Socrates’ own definition of justice. For example, when reading first year 
Philosophy papers about Socrates’ refusal to escape and his own definition of what justice is – 
submitting to the law of the city one agrees to when agreeing to be its citizen, whether this law, 
enabled by men, sends you to your death or not – the main thread seems to be outrage at 
Socrates’ refusal to escape. The most common question is: is it not obvious that Socrates is not 
guilty of corrupting the youth and thus, it would be just for him to escape? Some people argue 
that the just and virtuous thing to do is to escape from an unjust death, calling Socrates a coward 
for his blind acceptance, whereas others would call him a coward precisely for escaping, and 
would deem unjust not to follow the rules of the city once the city goes against a particular 
person. Furthermore, even Plato produces different accounts of this act, since the Apology seems 
to oppose the Crito in its portrayal of Socrates and how he accepts his sentence. The difficulty to 
achieve consensus over abstract concepts that do not have defined representations is clear, as it is 
hard to match an entirely abstract Form to a particular context. 
 A discussion of beauty is more likely to produce less heterogeneous results, since, unlike 
the Good or justice for example, beauty can have concrete physical manifestations; for example, 
we can point to a beautiful person or to a beautiful painting. People tend to have an easier time 
agreeing on the beauty of beaches or mountain ranges, as well as the beauty of art and people 
because the physical representations of beauty can be seen concretely; they lack the abstract 
quality that concepts such as the Good or virtue possess inherently. It is important to emphasize 
that it is not that the paradigms of beauty are agreed to unanimously by all individuals, but rather 
that if people do not agree on the beauty of a particular painting or individual, it is easier for 
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them to shrug it off to the idea of beauty’s subjective appreciation. In other words, that ‘beauty is 
in the eye of the beholder,’ whereas the same level of flexibility does not occur for justice or 
virtue. Arguably, disagreement over what is beautiful does exist, but this disagreement does not 
lead individuals to vicious arguments in the same way as a similar discussion on what is good 
does; we just need to look at all the wars waged in the name of what is just to a group of people 
or what is the ultimate goodness for another in contrast to all the wars fought in the name of 
beauty – none - to understand that disagreements over what is beautiful do not lead people to 
attacks of that magnitude. On the contrary, individuals are more likely to leave others to 
experience beauty in their own subjective way, and are more likely to agree that the experience is 
unique to each individual.  
Moreover, beauty has an inherent quality that commands attention, especially because of 
the way it speaks directly to the most appetitive part of our nature. When Agathon describes the 
beauty of eros in his eulogy the crowd bursts into applause because it is so obvious to them that 
Agathon just gave a fitting description of love’s beauty, delivered in a truly kalos package. 
Whereas we can discuss the courageous actions of an individual and we are able to observe 
courage in other people, such as Rosa Parks or the Tiananmen square man, we cannot grasp 
courage in itself; yet, we can both rationalize and experience beauty, as it has both a 
psychological and physical perception that the Good or courage, for example, possess in a lesser 
extent. For example, we can experience beauty physically in our appreciation of art or another 
human being, and intellectually in our admiration of literary prowess or our understanding of 
abstract feelings such as love or kindness. Conversely, we do not experience the Good in the 
same manner. There is no physical representation of the Good that we can point to with certainty 
and say: “There! That is a physical manifestation of the Good;” at least not with the same 
90 
 
determination and confidence as we would have with a representation of beauty. We are more 
likely to experience the appreciation of courage intellectually, and even then, it acquires this 
esoteric quality proper to the divine that makes its validation harder. What is an example of the 
Good? How do we categorize manifestations of justice in this realm without disagreement? 
There is a lot to be said about beauty’s sensible obviousness that separates it from other Forms.  
 For example, beauty’s physical manifestations are evident, since its “pre-eminent 
visibility is due to its incandescence” (Reeve 146, own emphasis); it shines sensibly in a way 
that other forms cannot. The Symposium begins with the beauty of a particular person, 
foreshadowing what Socrates will later describe as the starting point of all investigations into 
philosophy. Apollodorus begins the dialogue by stating that he is already prepared to discuss 
Socrates’ involvement in Agathon’s banquet (Symposium 172a) – as becomes clear, Apollodorus 
is obsessed with Socrates as much as the latter claims to Glaucon to be obsessed with 
philosophy. Our narrator explains that he derives his biggest satisfactions from conversation 
(Symposium 173c), and also confesses that he goes to great lengths to know everything Socrates 
does and says on a daily basis (Symposium 172c). Thus, for Apollodorus, his devotion to 
Socrates is connected to his devotion to philosophy and acts as the starting point for him to 
engage in dialectic in addition to keeping his interest in philosophy alive. In Apollodorus’ case, it 
is his devotion to a particular individual that immerses him into philosophy; his addiction to 
Socrates is what precedes his dialogical obsession. This same movement is present in a more 
explicit manner through Aristodemus’ relationship to Socrates, and Alcibiades’ friendship with 
the latter. Aristodemus’ relationship with Socrates is like that of Apollodorus. It is through his 
devotion to Socrates that Aristodemus goes to a banquet where philosophy is discussed that he 
would otherwise not have attended. Apollodorus himself calls him “obsessed with Socrates” 
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(Symposium 173a). In fact, Aristodemus’ quick submission to Socrates (“I’ll do whatever you 
say” (Symposium 174b) in response to Socrates’ invitation) suggests the extent to which 
Socrates’ individual beauty, in both soul and body, affects Aristodemus and lures him into 
philosophy and the subjects in which Socrates himself is interested. It is through their love of 
Socrates’ particular beauty that both Aristodemus and Apollodorus love philosophy.  
For Alcibiades, on the other hand, it is Socrates’ inner beauty that is obvious to him, but 
he requires Socrates’ physical presence on a daily basis if he is to stay on a good path; as he 
explains, “the moment I leave his side, I go back to my old ways” (Symposium 216b). Alcibiades 
requires this particular presence to continue his philosophical immersion since it is the tangible 
reminder of Socrates’ beauty that he needs. In this manner, even though Alcibiades recognizes 
Socrates’ inner beauty, he still needs the physical vessel of this beauty – Socrates – in order to be 
reminded. This reaction is not unusual as we have seen that Alcibiades and many of the 
interlocutors in the dialogue view the attainment of wisdom as something that can be transferred 
physically from one individual to another. Even though he already has knowledge of what he 
needs to do, he requires the presence of beauty to act, as “knowing is not the same as doing” 
(Cooksey 110). In Alcibiades’ case, this knowledge is the realization that Socrates has provoked 
in him, the knowledge he now has that he must change his ways if he is to be virtuous. Without 
the physical reminder of the beauty he desires, i.e. Socrates himself, the desire for physical 
pleasure overwhelms Alcibiades and keeps him away from his nobler goals. In this manner, even 
from a general overview of Socrates’ three followers, it is evident that in the Symposium the 
individual and the beauty that he or she emanates already precede the interest in philosophy.  
 In fact, beauty shines so brightly in this world that it sometimes overshadows 
manifestations of wisdom, whose brightness pales in comparison, as wisdom is not as tangible 
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and visible. Once again, wisdom cannot be reached for and grabbed like beauty can; one cannot 
touch wisdom, it is not tangible in that sense. Moreover, its star does not shine as bright as that of 
beauty; in other words, wisdom is not as compelling to our eros as is the sight of the beautiful. 
Wisdom does not initially send our eros in the frenzy for action that beauty provokes. Agathon, 
for example, is a more powerful magnet of gazes than is Socrates, not only through his looks but 
through the empty kalos of his poetry. When Alcibiades comes into the room, Agathon’s beauty 
permeates the scene to the extent that Alcibiades focuses only on him. Alcibiades comes in 
announcing that he wants to crown “the cleverest and best looking man” (Symposium 212e). Not 
only is Alcibiades deeming himself as both outstandingly kalos and smart, as the crown is meant 
to move directly from his head to that of the chosen one, but Alcibiades once again highlights the 
erroneous association between physical beauty and wisdom that we have seen throughout the 
dialogue – the most physically beautiful man in the room must clearly be the cleverest too. 
Alcibiades actively seeks first an image of goodness and beauty that is embodied in Agathon and 
characteristic of both the first stage of the line and the foundational step of Diotima’s ladder. 
However, this image possesses superficial beauty but not necessarily goodness, as we examined 
in the comparison between the Republic’s line allegory and Diotima’s ladder of love in section 
2.6 of this thesis. 
 Furthermore, Agathon’s beauty is so captivating that Alcibiades walks past Socrates and 
sits down without even noticing Socrates making room for him at his side (Symposium 213b). 
Alcibiades’ crowning of transient beauty consumes his attention entirely, to the point that it 
literally covers his eyes to his philosophical friend: 
“He kept trying to take his ribbons off so that he could crown Agathon 
with them, but all he succeeded in doing was to push them further down 
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his head until they finally slipped over his eyes. What with the ivy and all, 
he didn’t see Socrates, who had made room for him on the couch as soon 
as he saw him” (Symposium 213b). 
This blindness leads Alcibiades to crown poetry over philosophy at first glance: to celebrate and 
choose physical beauty over beauty of the soul, the shiny beauty of poetry over the less 
immediately obvious, non-corporeal beauty of philosophy. Alcibiades’ momentary blindness can 
be juxtaposed to the enlightened blindness associated with Tyresias and Homer, a blindness seen 
as a necessary condition for wisdom. This blindness is presented as a sort of aporetic starting 
point for metaphysical investigation which is possible once visual sensibility fades to cave way 
for acuteness of intellectual perception. In Alcibiades’ case, sensible beauty shines so brightly it 
blinds him to Socrates, representing the path of philosophy and virtue, and this action 
emphasizes the tangible kalos quality of sensible beauty versus that of wisdom or the Good in the 
phenomenal realm. 
 Moreover, Agathon’s beauty extends far beyond his extraordinary looks: the beauty of 
his words have equally powerful effects, conveying the obviousness of poetry’s beauty versus 
that of philosophy, a recurrent theme that Plato also explores in the Phaedrus and the Republic. 
By ‘obviousness,’ once again, I am referring to beauty’s ability to appear clearly and visibly to 
us in such a way that it engages immediately our perception and our eros, which, as explained in 
Chapter 2, naturally longs after beauty more than any other object of desire. I have already 
mentioned that the room bursting into applause at the end of Agathon’s encomium is indicative 
of the influence of beauty even when it is devoid of truth; Aristodemus even explains that the 
room agreed that the speech matched not only Agathon’s physical beauty, but the beauty of the 
god of love himself (Symposium 198a). Socrates emphasizes this influence when he asks, “who 
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would not be struck dumb on hearing the beauty of the words and phrases?” (Symposium 198b), 
cleverly emphasizing the kalos nature of the form of Agathon’s speech, but not of the eulogy’s 
content or meaning. Socrates suggests that this vacuous beauty, to some extent, can leave its 
audience momentarily dumb, which seems to be an effect of all particular beauty, witnessed in 
the blind devotion of Socrates’ followers and the blind celebration of Agathon’s guests. In 
addition, this is a temporary dumbness that leaves the audience in a stupor rather than in the 
realization of aporia, which as we examined in Chapter 2 is a necessary recognition for the 
individual to pursue knowledge. In the Meno, Socrates moves Meno to this realization through 
dialectic, a process that leaves the interlocutor acknowledging her errors of judgment and 
prepared to fix them, whereas Agathon’s speech leaves the individual satisfied with her 
ignorance, since there is no recognition of this ignorance in the first place. 
 In the dialogue there appears to be an association between the beauty of form and the 
beauty of poetry: empty shadows that sound lovely and are capable of commanding the soul’s 
undivided attention. In the Phaedrus, Socrates is aware of his interlocutor’s predilection for 
beautiful form over beautiful content, and knows this tendency must be fixed in order to move 
Phaedrus to desire a beauty whose kalos quality derives from its participation in what is good 
and true. In the Symposium, after Agathon’s speech, he is very clear about this division: “You 
will hear the truth about Love, and the words and phrasing will take care of themselves” (199b). 
Socrates does not want to deny that the obviousness of sensible beauty is compatible with 
philosophy, but he merely seems to be suggesting that for less tangible things, such as the Forms 
themselves, beauty is derived from the Forms participating in truth and what is good. In fact, 
Socrates, and on a larger scale Plato, incorporate this quality so that both form and content 
inform each other dialogically. As a result, Socrates caters to Phaedrus’ predilection for beauty in 
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the Phaedrus, crafting a powerful image of the soul that is meant to deliver truth in a beautiful, 
allegorical image typical of the plane of eikasia. In this manner, Socrates is able to trigger 
Phaedrus’ eros for beauty with the form of the myth, while at the same time trying to deliver a 
lesson on the nature of the soul. Socrates is guilty of this greediness for images in the Republic as 
well, as he tries to educate his interlocutors through the overarching allegorical investigation of 
justice in the city in lieu of the soul through the use of powerful allegories (Line, Cave, Sun) and 
myths (Myth of the Metals, Er). These poetic representations are employed for effectiveness in 
engaging the interlocutors within the dialogue and the readers of the text in dialectic, targeting 
both the rational capacity and the eros for beauty within each individual in a way that does not 
look down on desire, but rather incorporates it in Socrates’ dialectic. 
 The antagonism between philosophy and poetry is clearly delineated in the Symposium 
itself, where the philosopher contends against the master tragedian, Agathon, and the 
quintessential comedian, Aristophanes, for the attention of their audience. However, this 
‘competition’ is more than just vying for the most passionate applause and standing ovation, but 
rather, it deals with a theme that affects all human beings: love, and the way we think about it 
and approach it. Plato crafts three beautiful speeches with various degrees of truth and sensible 
‘brightness.’ Aristophanes has, arguably, the most memorable encomium of the entire dialogue, 
replicated to this date in art and even rock musicals.10 The tragic flaw of humanity, as described 
in Aristophanes’ story as our splitting in half and subsequent deprivation, speaks to the human 
longing for completeness and union with another, yet possessing a beautiful and appealing twist, 
since the ‘other’ we search for ends up ultimately being the self. Agathon’s speech speaks less to 
                                                          
10. Such as the 2001 musical Hedwig and the Angry Inch, based on the off-Broadway production by the same 
name.  
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human nature and more to the power of beauty to persuade, as evident in the effect it produces 
on the audience. The speech is so powerful in its presentation that its superficiality is quickly 
ignored. Clearly, Plato understands the importance of the brightness of beauty and its consequent 
persuasiveness, as he gives Agathon and Aristophanes speeches that are not only kalos, but 
contain some portion of aletheia.11  
In doing this, Plato conveys that the beauty of this world is not always devoid of truth, 
and most importantly, need not be devoid of it, as it is powerfully attractive, whereas truth is not 
regarded to have the same degree of beauty in this world. In other words, in the empirical realm, 
truth sometimes is incompatible with our desires, which leads us to reject it, to state that truth is 
sometimes ugly, and go to the extent of upholding that ‘ignorance is bliss.’ These ideas would be 
illogical in a metaphysical context where Truth, because of its nature, would not only equal 
happiness, but also what is truly Beautiful. Everything would be whole and thus the sight of 
Truth alone would make the individual desire it. In the empirical realm there is no instantaneous 
alignment between what is true and what is considered to be beautiful. As a result, Plato makes 
Socrates incorporate the true aspects of his predecessors’ speeches –with an emphasis on 
Agathon’s insistence on beauty and using Aristophanes’ account of human ontology – into a 
speech that not only conveys truth, but does so in a kalos manner through images of what love is, 
such as Diotima’s ladder of love, which represents the smooth journey that the soul can take via 
eros to be in communion with transcendence. Thus, Plato is aware of the brightness of beauty 
and incorporates it into Socrates’ philosophical discourse, beautifying his words to appeal to the 
                                                          
11. As I discussed in section 2.3 this aletheia is present in both Aristophanes and Agathon’s eulogies. From 
Aristophanes’ ontological account Diotima takes up the inherent lack in human nature that powers our eros. 
In addition she incorporates Agathon’s fixation on beauty and beauty’s connection to our erotic activity. 
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eros of his audience,12 just like Socrates makes himself kalos to go to talk about philosophy 
(Symposium 174a). 
 Yet, beautiful people and words are not the only vessels in which beauty’s brightness 
manifests more tangibly than do other Forms; it is the scenery itself in which beauty shines. This 
aspect is present in the structure of the banquet itself, in which the beautiful setting proves 
conducive to rational discussion. In ancient Greece, symposiums were celebratory banquets 
characterized for the beauty in their décor and the heavy drinking that took place in them. In fact, 
the word symposion itself means ‘to drink together.’ These banquets were characterized by 
constant entertainment in the form of flute girls, music, and sexual encounters. This Symposium, 
however, is one where Dionysus is replaced by conversation, and where the traditionally 
beautiful elements are replaced by the beauty of logos. In this case, the traditionally beautiful 
scenery is used to encourage philosophical dialogue, just like many times universities and 
libraries, places devoted to learning, are examples of beautiful architectural prowess. The beauty 
that surrounds the entire banquet in itself is representative of the power that sensible beauty can 
have to encourage learning.  
 The accessibility of the Beautiful over other Forms suggests that through the medium of 
love – that is, our eros that longs for beauty as its object - and particularly, love of the beautiful 
in all of its manifestations, philosophical learning is available to more than just the philosopher, 
but to all individuals. For some individuals, love is as philosophical as they will get, and love 
                                                          
12. Plato seems to suggest that this combination is the most effective one, and he symbolizes this victory over 
poetry by making Socrates outlast both Aristophanes and Agathon in conversation, since they both fall 
asleep before Socrates leaves to have a regular day at the Lyceum (Symposium 223d). It is important to note 
that only these three men stay awake and drink from the same cup while Socrates discusses how “authors 
should be able to write both comedy and tragedy” (Symposium 223d). Is Plato suggesting that this 
incorporation of form and content is what the philosopher must achieve, and that in fact, Socrates has 
achieved it? This analysis will take place in the next chapter. 
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seems to be the most definite thing that unites human beings. By this I mean that, according to 
Diotima’s account, through the love of beauty individuals are able to access the Forms in the 
same way as the individual is able to go up the Line and out of the cave (as we examined fully in 
section 2.6). Not all individuals will embark on this philosophical journey by their eros to know; 
however, more individuals could, even unknowingly, move up the ladder via their eros for 
beauty, embarking on an epistemological progression to knowledge because of the fact that they 
are lovers. As Reale puts it, for Plato: “that which men commonly call love is only a small part 
of true love: love is a desire for beauty, for the good, for wisdom, for happiness, for immortality, 
for the absolute” (171, emphasis in original). Even if the movement up the ladder is not 
completed by the lover, love has already given him access to this philosophical progression. 
This account thereby not only includes the human end but also includes our ontological 
status as described by Aristophanes and taken up in Diotima, wherein the inherent lack in human 
nature propels us outside our nature and into the search of an ‘other.’ Although ideally this 
‘other’ should be what is unmediated, in reality it is more immediate to us in the form of another 
human being. As Socrates explains to Phaedrus in the Phaedrus, human beings are the only 
sources of knowledge he possesses: “I am devoted to learning; landscapes and trees have nothing 
to teach me – only the people in the city can do that” (230c). An example of this point is the 
Socratic method of elenchus itself which requires a dialectical relationship between two 
individuals in order to engage in philosophy. A specific example of a relationship of this kind 
leading the individual forward is Diotima’s relationship with Socrates in the Symposium, which 
proves that the journey to knowledge does not begin in abstract universality. So far, we have 
seen how beauty acts as the perfect trigger for our eros. In Chapter 2 we examined how eros, 
naturally attracted to beauty, is motivated to act at the sight of what it loves the most. Beauty is 
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not just the Form with the clearest physical manifestations, but it is initially more demanding of 
attention, since beauty tends to overshadow anything that it is compared to, as we saw with the 
example of Agathon’s external beauty. Thus, in a particular context, beauty is powerful enough 
to lead us into action, and for Diotima, into philosophy. 
Diotima is an unusual character in the dialogue for many reasons. First of all, she is a 
woman, and not only were women traditionally excluded from symposions – the only females 
were the flute girls – but in Ancient Greece the reciprocal relationship of learning was 
characterized in the ‘beautiful young boy – wise older man’ relationship. Secondly, Diotima 
speaks not from a place of philosophy, but of religion: she is a priestess. Diotima’s name itself 
means ‘honoured by Zeus,’ and her place of origin, Mantinea, is reminiscent of the word mantic, 
meaning that which relates to prophecy (Evans 8).
13
 Thus, in a very real way Diotima is a 
representation of the divine introduced by Socrates to the conversation, via his eros for learning 
which leads him to submit to her as a student: “she is the one who taught me the art of love” 
(Symposium 201d). Finally, Diotima’s status as a foreigner emphasizes her abstract role as a 
source of knowledge that is completely alien to the individuals gathered at Agathon’s house; in 
fact, Diotima not only represents the divine knowledge that love should eventually lead us 
towards, but she represents the beginning of the journey to the Good in the particular teacher, in 
a specific and temporal other. Socrates learns what he knows about love from Diotima because 
the journey must begin in the particular, in the other. In fact, it is our human nature, our eros that 
goes crazy at the sight of beauty, precisely what makes love and beauty as accessible and as 
crucial for philosophy as Plato delineates. Thus, what some individuals see as Socrates’ disdain 
                                                          
13. Nancy Evans explains that Mantinike, the Greek word for Diotima’s place of origin, “notably appears to 
contain the root mantis, which means ‘prophet, seer,’ and strongly suggests that Diotima is herself a 
prophetess, or at least is somehow associated with prophecy” (8). 
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for the physical, an eros that is purely directed to metaphysics, as shown in the Phaedo – what 
Taylor terms Socrates’ “amor mysticus” (209) – is a limited analysis of Plato’s account, as it 
actually disregards the insistence on the individual as the stepping stone for philosophy present 
in the Phaedrus and the Symposium, as well as the Republic. 
 Now, what this theory suggests is that when an individual comes into contact with a 
particular manifestation of beauty, this example evokes in her the knowledge of a higher and 
more absolute form of beauty in which this example partakes. According to Plato’s theory of 
recollection this is true of all knowledge: human beings have already been in contact with the 
Forms prior to birth and education here is a collection of knowledge previously gained. Since we 
have already explained that beauty is the form that shines the brightest in the sensible realm, it is 
logical to think that through beauty most individuals are more capable of recollection than they 
would be through any other kind of learning. In this sense both love and philosophy are united, 
since they both partake in desiring a higher object, whether it is the beautiful or the Good: “it 
seems also that love is already bound up with ideas, with logos; we have desires for something or 
other, our desires have objects […] But whatever we desire has an ideational content, a Form, a 
whatness that makes what it is” (Scott & Welton 95). 
 This connection is made explicit in the Phaedrus, a dialogue that sheds light on many of 
the topics touched upon in the Symposium. Throughout the dialogue, there is the reminder that 
knowledge begins with the particular, even if the object of our knowledge must lead us into 
universality. Reale argues that in the Phaedrus Plato “sheds further light on the problem of the 
synthetic and mediating nature of love, by linking it with the doctrine of recollection” (173, 
emphasis in original); that is, the Phaedrus helps elucidate how eros acts as a mediatory element 
between human beings and knowledge. From Socrates’ first statement, “if I don’t know my 
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Phaedrus I must be forgetting who I am myself” (Phaedrus 228a), we can deduce that self-
knowledge, and ultimately all knowledge, begins in the exploration of a particular other that will 
aid in the process of recollection.14 Socrates touches more explicitly upon recollection in the 
chariot allegory (Phaedrus 246a), where he explains the movement of the soul from before it 
comes into contact with the body. According to the myth, the charioteer follows the same 
journey that the gods follow to come into contact with the Forms. Whereas for the gods this 
contact is immediate and the journey is a smooth one – as they are only in possession of the 
tamed, well-trained white horse – for human beings this ride has obstacles, primarily the reigning 
in of the wild nature of the black horse. If a soul cannot control the black horse enough it will 
lose its wings and materialize in human form, given an existence that fits the journey it took part 
in prior to incarnation. In this manner, souls go after the gods they followed even prior to 
embodiment, which means that they will be naturally desirous of those Forms that they came into 
contact with the most.  
Up to this point, the hypothesis of the theory of recollection is set out quite clearly: souls 
did as much as possible to see the Forms and achieve enlightenment prior to their incarnation, 
and their embodied desires are a direct result of their possession of the Forms that they saw 
before coming to earth. But how does this recollection take place once the soul is stuck in the 
phenomenal world? Socrates himself states the difficulty of attaining recollection once the body 
is present, and he makes clear that “not every soul is easily reminded of the reality there by what 
it finds here” (Phaedrus 250a); that is, most souls will not be able to achieve recollection via 
sensible reminders, since the body now acts as an impediment to true vision. However, the way 
                                                          
14. For another Platonic dialogue that deals with self-examination and critical inquiry via the relationship with 
another person see Alcibides I and Meno. 
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around this impediment seems to be, once again, contact with sensible beauty. As Socrates states, 
vision is the “sharpest of our bodily senses, although it does not see wisdom” (Phaedrus 250d), 
since as stated before, the brightness of beauty in this world is more powerful than that of any 
other Form. Beauty is what is “most loved” (Phaedrus 250e) and is the most accessible Form for 
human beings. Thus, it is through the longing for beauty in the other that the soul is able to 
recollect its previous journey and what allows it to long for that ethereal, immaterial nature and 
the Forms of universality that go along with it: “the stream of beauty that pours into him through 
his eyes warms him up and waters the growth of his wings” (Phaedrus 251b). In the myth, love 
of beauty, quite literally, lifts the individual higher, allowing him to regain the ability he once 
had to come into contact with the Forms, or at least to long for them, as represented by the new 
re-growth of his wings, which he lost upon coming to the world. Thus, in the Phaedrus, 
“reminding is virtually tantamount to recollection itself” (Hyland 120), and most significantly, 
love of the beautiful becomes the key by which human beings are able to recollect, and thus, to 
learn. This ability to recollect is closely linked to our nature as erotic individuals. As explained 
in Aristophanes’ story, we become erotic the second that we are no longer whole and we become 
aware of our division. From that moment on we long not only for our original nature, but for the 
state that allowed us to be somewhat closer to the divine, to transcendence. Our love of the 
Beautiful, especially our love of the temporal ‘other,’ is what prompts this act of recollection, as 
it reminds us of our original nature. 
Whereas the white horse of the charioteer is “guided by verbal commands alone” 
(Phaedrus 253e), the more rebellious black horse is driven by its longing for beauty, and it is 
precisely the relentless nature of the black horse which allows the charioteer to see the Beautiful 
and to pursue it, which would not happen if the white horse had full command. In other words, 
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our eros for beauty and for wisdom is triggered by our appetite for what is beautiful, not just the 
immaterial, absolute beauty of truth, but the very real, immediate beauty that coexists with us 
and that reminds us of the universal kalos of the former. Although this movement might seem to 
be opposite to the movement described by Diotima in the Symposium, wherein seeing the Form 
of beauty gives us understanding of particulars, the movement is in fact cyclical in both. In the 
Phaedrus “seeing – and hence recognizing – beauty ‘here’ reminds us of beauty itself” (Hyland 
82, emphasis in original), but it is also the initial noesis of beauty that allows us to partake in this 
recollection. The Symposium works in a similar manner; its process is cyclical yet explained 
temporally and learned one step at a time. It is through particular beauty that the journey begins 
at all, and once noesis of the Beautiful is achieved there is a return to this world in order to give 
birth in beauty, that is, to create beautiful particulars that will allow other individuals to embark 
on the same journey. Beauty thus “has the power to kindle in humans the divine madness that is 
eros” and it is this divine inspiration that “leads human beings to ‘recollect’ the forms […] 
Beauty speaks to the human mind of a higher realm” (Scott & Welton 142).  
 However, in the Phaedrus, this desire is referred to as madness: divine madness. This 
enthusiasm for the Beautiful, experienced in a physical manner, is what allows the lover to 
become “devoted to ta erotika; [to realize] that he has lost the beautiful and other good things 
that he had once glimpsed” (Belfiore 222). It is in this madness that the search for truth and 
philosophy merge with the desire for beauty, “the mad love of sensed beauty” (Tejera 44) that 
acts as the most important trigger for action. Like eros in the Symposium, which longs to fix the 
flaw of human nature, in the Phaedrus this is where the movement begins. Thus, erotic madness 
stands as the pre-linguistic root of our ability to express anything, and this ability comes from the 
search for beauty and wisdom. This ‘divine madness’ has a twofold component that other forms 
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of eros do not possess. Yes, it is regarded as madness: it is, to some extent, dangerous, relentless, 
wild, the personification of the black horse who goes crazy at the sight of the beautiful boy. But 
in another sense, it is divine, it allows us to transcend into the universal realm that is not human. 
The eros for beauty contains both elements and this dichotomy is precisely what grants eros its 
special quality as a daimonic messenger, which according to the Symposium leads us “in the 
direction of the true good, away from those pseudo-goods that merely appear good from a 
limited perspective” (Scott & Welton 142). All beauty in this world is bound to incite madness, 
as it is the most powerful reminder of something that does not make sense in this world. Erotic 
madness is thus both rational and entirely empirical, since it is necessary for philosophy, 
learning, to begin at all. For this reason Socrates states that “the best things we have come from 
madness, when it is given as a gift of the gods” (Phaedrus 244a). 
Beauty’s star is thus demonstrated to shine brightly in the sensible realm, a place where 
forms of truth and the Good have a hard time not only being beautiful, but being as noticeable or 
concretely manifested, whereas beauty reigns because of its obvious sensible manifestation: 
“justice and self-control do not shine out through their images here, and neither do the other 
objects of the soul’s admiration” (Phaedrus 250b). As Socrates tells Phaedrus in the Phaedrus, 
the vision of wisdom would evoke the most intense kind of love in the soul, but it is unable to do 
so because of our incarnate state and the fact that wisdom does not translate into tangible 
manifestations in the sensible domain. On the contrary, in the sensible realm that we exist in, 
“now beauty alone has this privilege, to be the most clearly visible and the most loved” 
(Phaedrus 250d) of all the Forms, thus igniting eros in a way that no other Form is able to do. 
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3.3 Beauty’s cognitive priority 
Beauty is thus shown to have an innate ability to capture perception in such a way that it 
moves the soul and body together toward action; for example, as explained in the Phaedrus, it is 
the black horse of eros that moves the soul towards the beautiful boy that eventually triggers in 
the individual recollection of the Forms (254b), or for instance, it is Alcibiades’ attraction to 
Socrates’ beauty that causes him to examine his own life in a critical manner (Symposium 215e-
216d). As Socrates states in his encomium, the insight into the Form of the Beautiful is both 
noetic and non-epistemic; that is, once the lover reaches the final step of her journey, the 
Beautiful is revealed in a purely immediate intellectual way, almost as if understanding were 
instantly absorbed by the lover via intuition alone. The lover thus far has undergone a process 
that moved her from one particular manifestation of beauty to another, thereby making the 
progression up to this point a process of epistemological advancement. This advancement is 
characterized by the lover’s initial appreciation and attraction to a particular manifestation of the 
beautiful, therefore engaging with this instance and acquiring knowledge through her interaction. 
Simultaneously, the lover recognizes the initial lack, even as lesser manifestations of beauty are 
possessed. Ludwig Chen explains that this interval in each step of the ladder is required for the 
lover to become strong enough to withstand the revelation of the form of the Beautiful at the end 
of the ladder. He explains that the lover “must wait until he has been strengthened and grows by 
contemplating the vast sea of beautiful instances” (Chen 68), thus describing Diotima’s ladder as 
an exercise not only in epistemology but in patience, as the lover must learn from each step 
before being able to receive the final divine revelation.  
Beauty’s ability to be recognized immediately by our perception is what gives it its 
cognitive priority. Since the appreciation of beauty is largely non-discursive and instantaneous, 
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we immediately assess something to be beautiful without much rationalization, whereas the 
assessment of wisdom, for example, is a longer process without the same degree of immediacy. 
Arguably, if we were able to experience wisdom in the same manner that we experience beauty, 
“it would awaken a terribly powerful love” (Phaedrus 250d), an eros that would be more 
powerful than that towards beauty, but that is unavailable to us because of our embodied nature. 
Since all human beings experience beauty in the particular, beauty is a form whose accessibility 
propels it to brighter status, especially as it includes and necessitates human particularity. Human 
beings, and human beauty, are taken up as part of the philosophical process, as this type of 
beauty speaks directly to our eros, bypassing our rational capacity and going straight to that 
which is the most primal for human beings: our desire to possess that which is beautiful. 
Noticeably, Alcibiades does not understand that the process of acquiring wisdom takes 
time and effort, and thus he remains fixated in the first step of the journey, that is, in the 
attraction to a beautiful individual who in this case is Socrates. Instead of being strengthened by 
contemplation of “the vast sea of deindividualized instances which are all akin in being 
beautiful” (Chen 69), Alcibiades is weakened by his particular obsession, which provokes his 
further confusion. Furthermore, perhaps this is the reason why the Aristophanean mythical 
humans failed in their first attempt to acquire divine knowledge, as the transition they desired 
was violent and immediate in nature, and thus, not fit for their capacity. Diotima, in this case, 
expounds an epistemological movement that is both fit for human consumption and 
philosophical goals, as it involves the human fixation on beauty in its particular manifestations, 
as well as providing time to groom slowly the lover-philosopher towards the final metaphysical 
lesson. Consequently, every stage up to this point has required engagement and time. However, 
once the individual arrives to the culmination of her labours comprehension is acquired 
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instantaneously, as the nature of the Beautiful leaves no room for doubt or analysis; its nature 
commands noesis and exists purely at that level of direct knowledge. Moreover, it is here when 
the mind is able “to cross the ontic gap cognitively” (Chen 69) in an instant leap of perception, as 
a result of the slow and arguably nurturing process the lover takes up to this point.  
Furthermore, even though the suddenness of the last jump to the Beautiful is described as 
non-discursive, what makes beauty so appropriate an engager of our eros is the fact that the 
initial attraction is also non-discursive and purely immediate. The description of the black horse 
going crazy at the sight of the beautiful boy in the Phaedrus conveys this concept conclusively. 
The white horse, logos, does not partake in this attraction whatsoever; in fact, the individual need 
not converse with the beautiful boy or know anything about his nature in order for the black 
horse to desire him purely based on perception. As Socrates states, vision is “the sharpest of our 
bodily senses,” and it categorically “does not see wisdom” (Phaedrus 250d). It is eros that is 
ignited at the sight of the beautiful boy, preceding any discourse with him or any rationalization 
of desire within the soul of the observer. The vision of beauty alone is sufficient to cause this 
frenzy in the spectator. It is merely the fact that the boy participates in a Form that the horse 
recognizes from his pre-incarnation, i.e. the form of the Beautiful, what grabs the attention of the 
horse and ignites his desire. The white horse is not equipped to advance or to desire, but rather to 
try to moderate the desires of the black horse.  
On its own, the white horse, pure rationality, will not lead the soul towards beauty, even 
if this beauty is meant to start the process of recollection in the soul. The white horse does not 
follow the beautiful because beauty works in an immediate non-discursive manner, and the white 
horse is “guided by verbal commands alone,” in addition to being “a lover of honor with 
modesty and self-control” (Phaedrus 253e). When the soul sees beauty, even though “the entire 
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soul is suffused with a sense of warmth and starts to fill with tingles and the goading of desire,” 
the white horse remains poised, preventing itself from acting (Phaedrus 253e). The black horse, 
on the other hand, becomes savage in his desire, jumping “violently forward and [doing] 
everything to aggravate its yokemate and its charioteer, trying to make them go up to the boy” 
(Phaedrus 254b). It is the black horse that drives the soul forward to the encounter with the boy, 
so that the soul is reminded of the form of the Beautiful it once gazed at prior to incarnation, at 
the same time that it is reminded of self-control (Phaedrus 254b), so that the black horse stops 
his advances. However, he quickly desires to advance one more time, repeatedly, until the vision 
of beauty causes him to perish due to fright, and now the soul is able to follow the boy “in 
reverence and awe” (Phaedrus 254e), as opposed to purely longing for a physical encounter. 
In other words, the purely rational element of the soul responds to pure logos, and as 
Socrates previously stated, vision does not recognize wisdom as it recognizes beauty, and thus, 
the sight of wisdom does not elicit the frantic response to beauty that the erotic element of the 
soul does. This frantic response is necessary in order to move the entire soul towards the 
experience of beauty so that the epistemological progression towards greater understanding, as 
seen in Diotima’s ladder, for example, can begin. It is eros that allows the soul to come in 
contact with beauty in the first place, so that eventually the experience of the beautiful is no 
longer solely erotic and non-discursive, but an experience of rationalization and discourse as 
well, which allows the soul to progress epistemologically like the lover does in Diotima’s ladder 
of love. Eros is the element of the soul required to process this vision of beauty, and once it does, 
the entire soul benefits, as the cognition of beauty nourishes the soul and “the whole soul seethes 
and throbs in this condition” (Phaedrus 251b). 
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The uniqueness of the movement into the appreciation of the Beautiful, starting non-
discursively and moving into apprehension and understanding in every single step until it is 
revealed once again in a non-discursive and absolute manner, is what makes it stand out, as 
opposed to, for example, forms such as wisdom, that require the individual to approach them 
discursively and through an intellectual process. In this manner, the lover goes from the 
immediate attraction to a beautiful individual, to an understanding that this particular beauty 
exists in other bodies as well and then in laws and institutions, and then realizing this beauty 
once again in a non-discursive way, repeating the cycle in each step. The individual requires no 
understanding of beauty to want it, whereas in the case of goodness or justice, for example, 
understanding precedes desire
15
, in addition to the fact that their sensible manifestations do not 
command attention in the way that particular beauty does. In fact, it is the non-discursive 
experience of beauty itself that leads to discursiveness, to the acquaintance with logos, which 
means rationality needs the experience of beauty to precede rational activity.  
Ultimately, and most importantly for philosophical education, this non-discursive 
experience is capable of leading the individual to higher rational activity, and finally into noesis 
of the true form, which in turn encourages creation of sensible beauty that partakes in truth. This 
self-regenerating aspect of the beautiful makes the cycle start again, as the individual will now 
produce beauty that encompasses both truth and beauty, and which will engage more individuals 
to begin the journey, thus prompting philosophical discourse. In other words, beauty calls the 
soul into the philosophical journey, creating not merely philosophers, but lover-philosophers that 
not only desire the Beautiful, but love it, and in turn, love the Good and what is true as well, as 
we will examine in the next section. 
                                                          
15. Though for Socrates this is not the case, as he believes individuals by nature desire the Good, even without 
knowledge of it.  
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3.4 Beauty’s call to transcendence: how does beauty provoke critical inquiry? 
 Diotima’s encomium can thus be seen as a new account of philosophical education - 
philosophical because the ultimate goal is knowledge - an education that is as beautiful and as 
appealing as the journey of the lover toward his beloved, in addition to being one that works 
adequately to address the nature of human beings and their erotic aspirations. Moreover, this 
philosophical education uses the Beautiful to lure the individual into the good life, and into 
acquaintance with less tangible forms such as goodness and truth. However, how does beauty do 
this? It seems that the thing with beauty is that it is always pointing beyond itself: from the 
perception of beautiful particulars, which point to a beauty that is more universal, to the 
cognition of the Beautiful Itself, which leads to creation of more beauty. Not only is beauty in a 
constant cycle of regeneration but it is persistently pointing the spectator beyond its own truth. 
For example, in his description, Alcibiades insists that he recognizes a beauty in Socrates that is 
out of this world, described with the metaphysical terminology proper to the Forms, so that it is 
clear that Alcibiades recognizes the beauty that he sees as surpassing the limitations of this 
world. Alcibiades himself recognizes that Socrates’ beauty and what he offers is unparalleled in 
this world; he knows that this vision is encouraging him to move further, to leave his own 
shameful ways and rehabilitate his soul towards a path of virtue. It is in part Alcibiades’ own 
fixation and miscommunication with Socrates that does not allow him to move further, but the 
flashing lights that stand high up on the ladder of love are flashing equally as bright for him as 
they do for anyone else.16 The call of beauty to move beyond cannot be denied. Arguably, a 
mostly rational philosophical education, that is, one that elevates the intellectual entirely over the 
sensible, points beyond itself as well and perhaps with fewer of the dangers than beauty poses to 
                                                          
16. This aspect of Alcibiades’ relationship with Socrates is examined fully in the next chapter. 
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our erotic, and sometimes addictive nature. This occurs because philosophy engages mainly with 
the rational element of our soul that is associated with moderation and self-control. However, 
beauty points beyond itself in an almost unperceivable way, which can make the movement 
towards understanding an enjoyable one, albeit not entirely without pains, as Plato’s portrayal of 
Alcibiades shows. The call of beauty is more present than is philosophy’s call because it targets 
our entire nature, both embodied and spiritual, and that is why it is can be more powerful than a 
mostly rational education in this world, as it is capable of provoking the critical inquiry 
necessary to begin any epistemological advancement. Beauty can thus act as a paradigm for truth 
and the good in a manner that philosophy cannot. 
To understand more explicitly the connection between beauty and critical inquiry it might 
be useful to examine some of the arguments that Elaine Scarry uses to connect the presence of 
beauty in this world to truth and justice in On Beauty and Being Just. In her book Scarry argues 
in favour of beauty’s power not only to point beyond itself, but to aid in the bringing forth of 
justice in this world in a way that deeply echoes Plato. Scarry argues that when “something 
beautiful fills the mind [it] invites the search for something beyond itself, something larger or 
something of the same scale with which it needs to be brought into relation” (21). This means 
that in the face of beauty, the mind is not only reminded of something bigger in which this 
particular manifestation of beauty partakes – much like Socrates’ explanation in the Phaedrus – 
but in addition it is encouraged to search, to begin an investigation into matters that surpass the 
object of cognition and the spectator themselves. In this manner beauty acts to remind and to 
incite wonder in the spectator, forcing her to “search for precedents and parallels, to move 
forward into new acts of creation, to move conceptually over, to bring things into relation, and 
[beauty] does all this with a kind of urgency as though one’s life depended on it” (Scarry 21).  
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This urgency has been seen in the black horse of the Phaedrus and his manic desire to 
possess the object of his perception; it has been clear in Alcibiades’ admiration for Socrates and 
his insistence to understand him under all means possible because he feels beside himself in his 
presence, as though his life has no meaning anymore and he was in the presence of something 
much bigger than himself. It is also seen in Aristodemus and Apollodorus, whose obsession with 
Socrates bring them in touch with philosophy in a way that would not be possible without him. 
In fact, Alcibiades’ confession that he feels “beside himself” (Symposium 215e) when in the 
presence of Socrates is a perfect example of what Scarry means when she states that beauty 
prompts the mind to bring into relation all things, what is temporal to what is absolute, what is 
particular to what is universal. Alcibiades understands, for the first time in his life, that there is 
not only something beyond himself but something much bigger, and that if he embarks on the 
journey he can partake of this transcendence and it will make his life better and worth living.  
Here the connection between beauty and truth arises more explicitly. When one cognizes 
beauty and searches for a precedent, for a connection to the particular beautiful object, such as 
Alcibiades trying to investigate and understand Socrates’ beauty, one is at a loss, since there is 
no precedent or explanation for the beautiful object, only an endless search. Scarry explains that 
this occurs because “what is beautiful is in league with what is true because truth abides in the 
immortal sphere” (22); that is, a search for the precedence of beauty will take us to the same 
sphere as truth and the Good, the sphere that Platonically is referred to as the realm of the Forms, 
thus bringing the spectator of beauty from the sensible to the noumenal through the empirical 
experience of the beautiful. An example is Alcibiades statement that Socrates’ beauty goes 
beyond the surface, that when he sees him ‘open’ he sees little statues of the gods, immortal 
beings residing within him (Symposium 217a), not a beauty that properly belongs in this world.  
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However, what is interesting is that in our search for precedence we cannot find it; beauty 
and its clarity “[do] not itself satiate our desire for certainty since beauty, sooner or later, brings 
us into contact with our own capacity for making errors” (Scarry 22). That is, with beauty, we 
struggle to understand what is true, to identify what we are cognizing, as made obvious in 
Alcibiades’ reaction to Socrates, his inability to understand exactly what Socrates is trying to tell 
him, and the constant errors of judgment that he makes in regards to him, such as seducing him 
in an attempt to obtain his wisdom. Scarry explains that this reaction of the spectator in the face 
of a beautiful person, or object, explains why “beauty is a starting place for education” (22), as it 
makes the individual actively search for truth while understanding that he is very liable to error; 
that is, the individual begins to inquire about beauty critically, then to expand this critical inquiry 
into other aspects of his life.  
It is important to note that this does not mean that beauty and truth are interchangeable, at 
least not in the phenomenal world, as I have previously mentioned. On the contrary, beauty is an 
ally to truth and aids in its attainment, commanding attention in a way that truth does not: “it is 
not that a poem or a painting or a palm tree or a person is ‘true,’ but rather that it ignites the 
desire for truth by giving us, with an electric brightness shared by almost no other uninvited, 
freely arriving perceptual event, the experience of conviction and the experience, as well, of 
error” (Scarry 38). What Scarry means is that in the particular experience of beauty our powers 
of inquiry are ignited; the incandescence of the manifestation of beauty, the magnitude of which 
is shared by no other form in the sensible realm, propels the individual into an investigation for 
its origin, for truth, so that it allows the individual to encounter error in this self-examination and 
analysis of the world. This movement is analogous to the actions of the soul in the presence of 
beauty as expounded in the Phaedrus, wherein the black horse is prompted to act and recollect 
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previously gained knowledge because of his attraction to the beautiful boy. Furthermore, this 
provocation to go beyond, to move into transcendence and greater understanding is the goal of 
the progression of the lover in the Symposium. The lover moves from the particular experience of 
beauty into each step because in each experience of beauty she expands her understanding of 
what is beautiful, and her inquiry develops until she comes in contact with the source of true 
beauty. Like Alessandra Fussi states, the lover in Diotima’s account “is possessed by the desire 
to transcend opinion and appearance and reach beyond them to truth” (245), moving from a 
purely aesthetic experience to a philosophical understanding of truth. 
In addition, beauty has the capacity to remove us from the center of our own world, 
which aids in the inducement of aporia, a key element for Socratic and Platonic methodology. 
Scarry mentions this theory in her explanation that beauty commands perceptual acuity in an 
unparalleled manner, as it requires from the spectator her complete attention. As Scarry explains, 
“it is as though beautiful things have been placed here and there throughout the world to serve as 
small-wake up calls to perception, spurring lapsed alertness back to its most acute level” (55). In 
the context of the Symposium, for example, Alcibiades sees Socrates and is alerted back to his 
own life, the perception of his beloved compels him to examine his life in ways that produce an 
increased perception of why he is living in a way that is far from desirable. This awakening not 
only occurs for Alcibiades, but is present in Phaedrus and Pausanias’ account whereby lovers 
desire to be virtuous, and in Apollodorus and Aristodemus’ devotion to Socrates as an 
intellectual sage. Furthermore, Scarry explains that when one sees beauty, one undergoes a 
“radical decentering” (77) that forces the individual no longer to regard himself as the centre of 
his world. This decentering occurs, again, due to beauty’s ability to point beyond the individual, 
to lift him from the immediate into the universal. Beauty, as explained in the Phaedrus, makes 
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the individual grow wings, wings that figuratively stand for our newfound perception of 
something broader than ourselves. Scarry refers to this experience also as “opiated adjacency” 
(78), in other words, the act of experiencing beauty removes us from the center of our world, 
while simultaneously making us feel pleasure, since now we gain an appreciation of the world in 
relationship to the beautiful object; for example, Alcibiades examines his own life because of his 
experiences with Socrates. This sense of adjacency is what brings forth notions of one’s 
symmetrical relationship to the whole and to others, which aids in bringing about concepts such 
as justice and ethical fairness, for example. In addition to the connection to justice that Scarry 
examines, this sense of adjacency also induces aporia, as the individual is forced, like 
Alcibiades, to re-examine his own position in his life and in the world. This experience prompts 
the individual to admit no longer the self as the gravitational center and consequently, judge of 
truth. The self is thus compelled to understand and admit his own ignorance, his own particular 
instance in regards to the universality of what goes beyond; aporia is in fact induced.  
Beauty is conclusively seen as a key element of the philosophical endeavor, leading the 
individual not only to a greater regard for the world, but for her place in the world, igniting a 
sense of wonder and eros for what is beyond which is the foundational step for philosophy. As 
Aristotle states in the Metaphysics, the search for philosophical explanation for what is beyond 
this world begins in the truth that “all men desire to know” (980a). This desire to know arises 
from the fact that as creatures of sensation the pleasure we take in our senses, particularly sight, 
“makes us know and brings to light many differences between things” (Metaphysics 980a). But 
perhaps all individuals are not aware of their desire to know, and it is through this exercise in 
sensible beauty, through the use of what Aristotle terms as our dearest and keenest sense, that 
they are capable of achieving this philosophical momentum. However, perhaps not all 
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individuals are capable of ascending up the ladder on their own; thus, even though the initial 
attraction to beauty is immediate, a training in beauty, such as the one that the lover undertakes 
when going up the ladder,  might be possible and even necessary for some individuals. In the 
next chapter we will examine how beauty and philosophical education are combined so as to 
trigger this epistemological journey in the individual. 
Chapter 4 Philosophy made kalos 
4.1 Introduction: eros, beauty, and philosophical education 
The connection between sensible beauty and our eros that we have analyzed in the 
previous chapter is shown to be more immediately powerful than any other kind of desire. The 
ability of sensible beauty to trigger eros towards it, combined with beauty’s compelling power to 
evoke in the observer thoughts of what lies beyond, thereby leading the mind to thoughts of 
transcendence, instills in the individual a sense of belief in something other than what is 
perceptually immediate, thus eliciting philosophical inquiry. Sensible beauty’s ability to act as a 
gateway toward a more complete account of beauty, as delineated in the previous chapters, 
makes beauty a powerful epistemological tool unlike no other. Beauty is what prompts the mind 
to go into action most effectively; it is what makes the lover of beauty – arguably, all lovers are 
lovers of beauty – want to move up the ladder of love that is also the ladder of knowledge and 
being. Beauty is also what makes this individual, whose eros is engaged in this journey, to want 
to give birth in beauty, Diotima’s final step, wanting to create stimulating kalos offspring after 
contemplating the source of the beauty the individual first saw in the beginning steps. As 
delineated in the chariot myth of the Phaedrus, the black horse, epithumia itself, is the one 
element of the soul that initiates action time and time again, when it is reminded of the 
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transcendent beauty it once saw. This aspect of the individual that is frenzied about sensible 
beauty, the part that sees the beautiful boy and desires to know him and to possess him, the part 
of the soul that moves Alcibiades towards Socrates although the former does not recognize why, 
is the element that moves the soul and body forwards and towards more complete accounts of 
beauty and possession of this beauty, helping the white horse, pure logos, to discover this beauty 
as well.  
This need for action is central for Plato’s epistemological progression from lesser objects 
of knowledge to stable knowledge: if the philosopher is meant to move up the line, or ladder, 
from unstable objects of knowledge and thus, fluctuating beliefs, towards a stable object of 
knowledge that allows for noesis, then her eros must be properly engaged to begin this ascent in 
the first place. As stated in the Symposium and supported in the Phaedrus, eros is more properly 
attracted to beauty than to any other object of desire. The white horse in the Phaedrus, 
symbolizing our rational nature, does not act, but rather depends on desire to be moved towards 
action.  
For the philosopher to be engaged in this epistemological movement, philosophy must 
seduce the senses in the same way that other disciplines do, which takes us back to the poetry 
versus philosophy quarrel, wherein poetry antagonizes philosophy because of its greater sensible 
appeal. According to Strauss, Socrates’ encomium in the Symposium points towards the idea that 
to engage in philosophical activity is to “surrender to the truth without concern for one’s dignity 
and without concern for even the noble, since the truth is not simply noble or beautiful but in a 
certain sense ugly” (Strauss 93). This statement can be broken down into two things: for one, 
philosophical beauty does not translate into the sensible as it might exist in the metaphysical; that 
is, truth for us is not necessarily beautiful, and it can even be ugly. As explained previously, the 
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undisputable beauty of the Good as a Form does not translate as beauty in the sensible, where 
good things are not necessarily striking or appealing as a result of their goodness. For example, 
donating money to charity instead of buying things one wants, most times, does not strike us as 
seductive an idea as investing in things for our own interest, as much as the goodness of the 
former is greater than the goodness of the latter; arguably, that action, if properly understood as 
the Good, would strike the individual as even more beautiful, but that rationalization does not 
occur easily. Consequently, philosophical endeavours, if one wants to equate them with the 
search for truth, will not appear as beautiful and appealing to an individual who is highly 
influenced by perception, as they would to a person if witnessed in their metaphysical glory, i.e. 
at the end of Diotima’s ladder. It is only once the journey begins that the individual increasingly 
sees beauty in more than what is perceptible to the eye, achieving a greater understanding of 
beauty that encompasses the other Forms. 
Secondly, and following from this first point, Strauss is referring to the very real burden 
of the philosophical journey on the individual, as it is indeed a journey and not an instant 
acquisition that is also pleasurable and thus attractive. As we see in Alcibiades’ speech, he is 
burdened by his love for Socrates: the desire to examine his own life and the realization that his 
own life is indeed not worth living weigh on him, as he does not know how to proceed, nor has 
he the willpower to do so. On the contrary, Alcibiades would just like to acquire this virtue 
through his physical relationship with Socrates, in an immediate manner, even though what he is 
attracted to is Socrates’ inner beauty, further showing how confused he is as to how to attain the 
virtue he sees in Socrates. The fact that the philosophical novice has to work hard to elucidate 
philosophical concepts and through intense intellectual engagement reach some sort of noesis is 
not as appealing to all kinds of individuals. In fact, the stark search for metaphysical truth with 
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no tangible incentive would only seem to be appealing to a sort of Kantian creature who is purely 
driven by deontological motivations. As a result of the lack of tangible incentives, many 
individuals do not embark on this journey at all. In turn, this means that there is a lack of creation 
and reproduction in what is truly beautiful according to Diotima’s ladder, whereby the individual 
must achieve a greater understanding of beauty before going back down the ladder to give birth 
in beauty, i.e. create beauty with proper understanding. Conversely, there is a plethora of creative 
birth of beauty in the lower and sometimes misleading levels of eikasia, which although vacuous, 
are, not surprisingly, much more engaging. 
 Thus, to bring beauty into philosophy is to increase the appeal of philosophy to the 
masses, to the majority of souls who are lovers of beauty and lovers of the beauty in others, and 
who, through their search for what is beautiful, are unsuspectingly moving up the ladder of 
philosophical truth and desiring what is good. In this manner, the lover in Diotima’s ladder 
image becomes a rare hybrid, a philosopher-lover who through eros of a beautiful other, or a 
beautiful thing, is led towards intellectual enlightenment. The connection between love and 
beauty, which is natural, is used by Diotima as an incentive for epistemological progression and 
as another way that individuals can achieve philosophical understanding. Without this 
phenomenal incentive, there would be no desire to engage in the ladder, unless the individual 
were supra human and less ruled by its dichotomous rational-erotic nature, such as the Platonic 
depiction of Socrates, or unless her soul were predominantly philosophical and the duty to truth 
and goodness were the sole incentive it needed.17 Philosophy is thereby called to strike a balance 
between sensible beauty and truth, so that it can engage its students and move them towards the 
Beautiful in the same manner that the love for particular beauty provokes a greater understanding 
                                                          
17. Even in this case, it seems almost ludicrous to envision a sort of Kantian individual embarking on the 
learning of philosophy from a purely deontological perspective, devoid of any pleasure or desire to do so. 
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in Diotima’s account. If this is accomplished, the cycle of birth in beauty can flow infinitely and 
be accessible to more than to an intellectual elite.  
In this chapter I will examine first the dangers inherent in the attraction to beauty to 
understand how it can pose limitations for philosophical inquiry before examining how it acts as 
a pedagogical tool for philosophy. In the first section I will examine the inherent danger within 
the attraction to sensible beauty by focusing on Alcibiades’ relationship to Socrates and his failed 
philosophical conversion. Through this examination I wish to shed light not only on how beauty 
can work against any epistemological advancement, but most importantly on the Platonic 
criticism of Socrates’ pedagogy, in addition to the overall Platonic criticism of philosophy. Next, 
I will examine the very real experience of beauty of Plato and Dante, to demonstrate how beauty 
need not be detrimental to philosophy but in fact can shape philosophical understanding in the 
way that Diotima delineates, by looking at works of beauty that follow the guidelines of 
Diotima’s encomium of love. From this, I will examine Plato’s discussion on what constitutes 
proper writing in order to find the place for beauty in philosophy, whereby beauty in the 
philosophical text should elicit the act of falling in love so that the lover begins the 
epistemological journey towards truth motivated by the incentive of beauty.  
4.2 The dangerous side of sensible beauty: Alcibiades’ failed philosophical conversion 
So far, we have examined the qualities of beauty that make it so perfect a tool for 
intellectual progression; the lover, through the particular experience of beauty is able to progress 
ontologically and epistemologically until he reaches the kind of knowledge that enables him to 
produce beauty that also contains truth. However, in order to comprehend fully how beauty can 
work as a pedagogical tool for philosophical inquiry, it is necessary to understand its limitations 
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and the inherent danger present within the desire for beauty. From Phaedrus’ speech it was clear 
that love poses certain dangers: individuals can become immersed in their particular desire and 
disregard themselves and their community, or as the reaction of the guests to Agathon shows, 
people are quick to be fooled by outer beauty. In fact, it is precisely beauty’s cognitive priority 
and its sensible accessibility that make it both useful and dangerous for critical inquiry. The 
problem of accepting particular beauty as a means to the universal form is that because of its 
cognitive priority it can sometimes command the individual’s attention to the point that the 
movement up the ladder does not occur. As Socrates explains, and as I explained in section 3.2, 
as much as this eros is described as divine, it is also mad, which means that there can be 
dangerous implications when the means are taken to be the end; that is, when the particular 
medium is mistaken as the telos of love. In other words, the problem arises when eros seeks for a 
purely empirical teleology. Eros, the principle of harmony between the divine and the mortal 
realm is also the harmonizing activity within the city and between individuals; it is what keeps 
the whole together, driving potential into actuality. As such, it drives human beings from their 
state of potentiality, and ideally leads them towards an absolute actualization which for Plato 
could only exist in the noumenal, or at least in a more rational and less incarnate goal. In other 
words, as described in Diotima’s ladder, eros has the ability to move us to a noesis of the Forms, 
or at the very least, it allows us to go past eikasia. The conflict arises when this goal is lost or 
blurred out and taken over by a particular affection, turning this telos away from the noumenal 
and into the physical. 
 As we have already seen, beauty has cognitive priority in the sensible over the perception 
of wisdom or justice, for example. It is precisely its luminosity in its corporeal form that attracts 
eros in such a compelling manner, and which can – and should – work for philosophical 
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purposes. Inherent in what makes it essential for philosophy lays its danger: a command of the 
senses so strong that it can take over the individual entirely. If this occurs, the ultimate goal of 
Platonic philosophy, achieving knowledge of the Good and the Beautiful, can be substituted by a 
finite other, which as shown in the Symposium, effectively prevents any enlightenment from 
occurring.  
 The most poignant example of this substitution is seen in the relationship between 
Alcibiades and Socrates, wherein Alcibiades’ desire for personal and intellectual growth is 
hindered by his insistence on viewing Socrates as the sole medium and end of his intellectual and 
erotic activity. As Scott & Welton state, “rather than simply having Socrates tell us about eros, 
Plato shows us a certain kind of eros in its embodied form, in the dramatic depiction of 
Alcibiades’ frustrated love for Socrates” (163). Although this dynamic is also present in the 
relationship between Apollodorus and Socrates, and between Aristodemus and the latter, the 
most obvious failure is present in the relationship of Alcibiades, an individual whose erotic and 
intellectual potential surpassed that of his contemporaries, and who ultimately becomes one of 
the biggest disappointments to Athens.18 
 From Alcibiades’ speech about Socrates we can deduce that their relationship is plagued 
by misunderstanding. On the one hand, Alcibiades sees great beauty in Socrates, a beauty that 
transcends the corporeal and that requires greater perceptual acuteness, and which he seeks to 
possess for himself even when he is confused as to how to attain it. On the other hand, Socrates 
                                                          
18. Alcibiades’ many talents were common knowledge in Greece; in Life of Alcibiades Plutarch writes both 
about his beauty, that “flowered out with each successive season of his bodily growth,” (5) and his “love of 
rivalry and the love of preeminence” (6) as the most prevailing of his many strong passions. Accordingly, 
Alcibiades’ career was marred by his personal ambition and inconsistencies: he betrays Athens during the 
Peloponnesian War after being accused of mutilating the statues to Hermes and profaning the Eleusian 
mysteries, to then betray Sparta and flee to Persia, to then betray Persia and return to Athens. Ultimately, he 
dies devoid of the glory his potential and political ambition could have given him.  
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fails to communicate to Alcibiades how to obtain this virtuous nature that he sees in Socrates and 
desires to imitate, and merely resorts to ignoring his seductions without further explanation. The 
problem as manifested in this relationship is thus twofold: on one side, we have Alcibiades’ error 
in taking Socrates to be the end of his philosophical journey, and on the other side we have 
Socrates’ pedagogical failure with one of his brightest and most promising students. As Cooksey 
puts it, Alcibiades “comprehends snatches of the Socratic music, but is tone deaf, unable to 
harmonize his soul with that of Socrates” (109). The student needs Socrates to show him the 
way, but it seems both are tone deaf to each other. I will first examine Alcibiades’ manner of 
approaching Socrates to understand why he views Socrates as the end of his philosophical 
pursuit, and then I will inspect Socrates’ attitude to Alcibiades to understand why he fails in his 
pedagogical role. This examination will shed light on the effect that sensible beauty can have on 
human beings in order to understand how it can work for any philosophical or pedagogical 
purpose. 
For the first time in his life it seems, Alcibiades, the most beautiful man in Athens and 
the individual who is used to getting what he wants, is at a loss. Not only is he in the unusual role 
of the erastes who chases the beautiful youth, a role he would not have taken up seeing as he was 
usually the one chased, but his eromenos, a man older and less physically attractive than he, 
refuses him without explanation! This odd repartition of roles makes no sense in the ancient 
Greek convention; according to this layout, the utilitarian aspect of this traditionally pedagogical 
‘pederasty’ – the exchange of beauty for wisdom represented in the affiliation between a 
beautiful youth and an older wise man – is lost. The erastes is supposed to lack beauty, not to 
possess it! This overturn of the Greek values of kaloskagathia (‘goodness’ derived from the 
words  καλός,  και and ἀγαθός: beautiful and good) is intended to serve as a critique of the 
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widespread notion of external beauty equating to a kalos nature, a problem seen in Agathon’s 
speech as I have delineated, which both Plato and Socrates see as misleading. Through 
Alcibiades’ recognition of the kalos soul of Socrates a new liaison is introduced: one where the 
erastes, lacking beauty of the soul, recognizes this beauty in another, and actively seeks the 
virtue and the person as his eromenos. Socrates is thus described as Silenic in appearance and 
resembling the satyr Marsyas, yet possessing the most temperate and virtuous interior, an image 
that opposes the Greek values of kaloskagathia. Alcibiades, conversely, acts as eros, the 
daimonic entity who lacking beauty strives for it as resourcefully as possible. As we can see, this 
is the proper relationship to the Beautiful as described by Diotima; in fact, Alcibiades foregoes 
the initial steps of desiring the beauty of the body and jumps straight into loving the beauty of 
Socrates’ soul, his virtuous nature. Cooksey thus argues that “the idealized erotic of Diotima is 
mapped onto the actual erotic of Alcibiades” (117), referring to Alcibiades’ bypassing of 
Socrates’ body to go straight to what matters most in Diotima’s scheme, his soul.  
Even if Alcibiades does not fulfill this ideal to the fullest, i.e., he fails to be moved to the 
next steps up the ladder, the creation of beautiful logos, he stands as an example of how the 
particular individual participates in the form of the Beautiful in order to move individuals 
through beauty. A testament to Alcibiades’ confusion – and erotic potential – is the fact that, 
although aware that he is in love with Socrates’ virtue, he seeks it in a purely physical and erotic 
manner. As we have explained before, the false conception of wisdom or virtue being 
transferable via physical means is recurrent, and it seems that not even Alcibiades can escape it. 
Upon being charmed by Socrates he decides to seduce him, explaining that he: “slipped 
underneath the cloak and put [his] arms around this man – this utterly unnatural, this truly 
extraordinary man – and spent the whole night next to him” (Symposium 219c). Like Agathon, 
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Alcibiades assumes “that knowledge flows by contact, like some kind of fluid, [and he] hopes 
that through intimate contact with Socrates the contagion of wisdom will infect him” (Scott & 
Welton 171). Moreover, a man as beautiful as Alcibiades knows no other way to approach 
another in this kind of relationship: as a highly covetable eromenos this procedure of physical 
interaction is the only one to which he has been accustomed. As such, he explains: “all I had to 
do was to let him have his way with me, and he would teach me everything he knew – believe 
me, I had a lot of confidence in my looks” (Symposium 217a). 
However, to his surprise, all Alcibiades receives in return is rejection: “But in spite of all 
my efforts, this hopelessly arrogant, this unbelievably insolent man – he turned me down!” 
(Symposium 219c). The problem with this exchange is that it is unequal in its terms. Alcibiades’ 
recognition of his own beauty leads him to value it highly, and thus he sees it in equal standing to 
the beauty he aims to obtain from Socrates. Kofman describes this recognition as Alcibiades’ 
“presumptuousness” (21) in his attempt to exchange both as equal commodities, to offer 
superficial and decaying physical beauty for the most lasting and stable beauty of the soul; this is 
an exchange that Socrates cannot grant. 
Understandably, Alcibiades feels outraged that his physical beauty has been denied – 
arguably, for the first time: “He spurned my beauty, of which I was so proud, members of the 
jury” (Symposium 219c). Because of this rejection Alcibiades labels Socrates as arrogant and 
proud (Symposium 219d) and yet cannot help but admire Socrates’ extraordinary self-control: 
“here was a man whose strength and wisdom went beyond my wildest dreams!” (Symposium 
219d). Alcibiades is at a loss, and he does not know where to proceed from here, mainly because 
he sees Socrates not only as the source of virtue, but the end of it; Alcibiades takes up Socrates 
as his own good, and this becomes problematic for his learning process. As he explains, the 
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moment that Socrates leaves him he forgets his desire to be good, and the shame over his habits 
that Socrates inflicts on him and that motivates him to change is no longer as pressing 
(Symposium 216b). Alcibiades’ love for Socrates makes him feel shame, and he experiences 
“disharmony between his nature and experience” (Cooksey 103), an occurrence so unusual for 
him that he is quick to view Socrates as an individual whose powers surpass human limitation.  
Both Berg and Kofman accuse Apollodorus and Aristodemus of doing what Alcibiades 
does: glorifying Socrates to a super human level. Apollodorus is criticized for believing that 
Socrates and his philosophy are the only things worth following, for making Socrates into “a new 
god: a god made man” (Berg 5). In this case, Apollodorus would be doing exactly what 
Alcibiades is doing, but with different consequences, perhaps due to the different level of erotic 
potential, ambition, and confidence in both individuals. Similarly, Kofman states that both 
Apollodorus and Aristodemus are better narrators than philosophers, as they are mainly focused 
on Socrates himself: “they are more in love with Socrates, whom they idolize, than they are with 
sophia” (16). It seems that these three individuals fail to move to the stage of creation in 
beautiful ideas, as they either do not move at all, or merely replicate Socrates: “[they] imitate 
Socrates’ words and deeds but are not able to acquire the erotic art that is essential to his practice 
of philosophy” (Belfiore 116). That is, they engage in the initial progression of the ladder but are 
unable to move forward, which is not bad, just not ideal for philosophy as there is no critical 
inquiry. Thus, the three are unable to move properly into philosophy, but Alcibiades’ focus on 
Socrates as the end of his pursuit prevents him in a much more intense way than that of 
Aristodemus and Apollodorus who are at least somewhat engaging in philosophical activity.  
The language that Alcibiades uses to describe Socrates almost depicts him as a 
transcendent creature, more apt to participate in the divine realm and closer to a Form than to a 
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human being. For instance, Alcibiades mentions Socrates’ incredible demonstrations of super 
human qualities and delineates Socrates’ atypical sophrosune in relation to food, sleep, and 
sexual activity, describing him as a borderline transcendent entity not subject to time or space. 
According to his description, Socrates is capable of withstanding hunger better than anyone else 
in the army when Athens invaded Potidaea (Symposium 220a), yet he enjoys a banquet like no 
other, drinking and feasting without ever incurring in rapaciousness or inebriation, demonstrating 
a superhuman quality of self-control and resistance. In addition, Socrates is described as 
borderline immune to the elements, walking barefoot in the snow better than others who did not 
even dare to “[stick their] nose outside” (Symposium 220b). Socrates seems to resist everything 
that would normally inflict some emotion or pain, and unlike the majority of individuals he can 
be engaged in contemplation for hours without distraction: “he stood on the very same spot [all 
night contemplating] until dawn!”(Symposium 220d). The language that Alcibiades chooses to 
describe his eromenos points to his substitution of the form of the Beautiful with Socrates, as he 
borderline attributes qualities of the Forms, such as being unaffected by sensible contingencies, 
to a temporal individual immersed in flux. Alcibiades also explains that Socrates saved his life, 
and not only rescued him but made sure to bring his armor as well: “he just refused to leave me 
behind when I was wounded, and he rescued not only me but my armor as well” (Symposium 
220e). This is an interesting detail as it conveys Socrates’ interest in not just the individual, but 
in physical objects and the honour that the armor represents.  
Moreover, Alcibiades describes the hypnotic power of Socrates’ words and their ability 
to possess individuals (Symposium 215d) who feel enraptured by his words as if he was some 
sort of hypnotizing pied piper. Alcibiades goes to the extent to argue that Socrates’ words make 
him feel inebriated (Symposium 215e), and he explains that Socrates’ oratory produces a shift in 
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his nature that makes him feel beside himself in a state that resembles religious frenzy. In this 
manner he compares himself to the followers of Cybele, who would partake in orgiastic rituals 
when they felt overcome by the goddess through music and dance. For Alcibiades, this frenzy 
occurs through Socrates’ words alone, and the comparison conveys Alcibiades’ view of himself 
as a disciple of Socrates, who resembles a god in his hypnotizing power over mortals. 
Furthermore, Alcibiades tells his audience that he once managed to glimpse inside Socrates and 
saw the godlike figures he hides inside himself, a sight that made him follow him without 
hesitation (Symposium 217a). Through Socrates Alcibiades claims to have been “struck and 
bitten by philosophy” (Symposium 218a), yet he fails to realize he has really been struck and 
bitten by Socrates, who he sees as a Form in himself. As Alcibiades states, Socrates is “unique; 
he is like no one else in the past and no one in the present” (Symposium 221c), he has no human 
parallel (Symposium 221d) and is almost, for him, a Form in himself, an individual so utterly 
unique and suprahuman he seems to exist in a different world altogether.  
In this manner, Socrates is able to overturn the classical erastes-eromenos specifications, 
seducing individuals like Alcibiades with a beauty that transcends his physical nature: “he has 
deceived us all: he presents himself as your lover, and, before you know it, you’re in love with 
him yourself!” (Symposium 222b). Steven Berg argues that Alcibiades believes “that Socrates 
alone embodied the truth of the beautiful that he understands to be identical with the truth of the 
divine: according to Alcibiades’ drunken praise, Socrates is the one true, if hidden, god” (133). 
Therefore, Alcibiades’ appreciation of Socrates’ spiritual beauty is what leads him to mistake 
this particular manifestation with the whole, and what prompts him to seek Socrates in the same 
frenzied and fervently religious manner as he should be pursuing philosophy. As Scott & Welton 
point out, Alcibiades is the perfect example of why it takes more than “manic enthusiasm” (29), 
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such as that exhibited by Apollodorus, to become a philosopher, since manic enthusiasm many 
times can lead to blind adherence. Moreover, Fussi argues that Alcibiades’ response of instant 
submission to Socrates reveals that he remains “entrapped in his own main obsession, the 
struggle between master and slave” (253) as opposed to embracing the position of student so that 
he can acquire the knowledge for which he longs. 
Through this eulogy to the semi-divine qualities of Socrates, Alcibiades separates the 
philosopher from the rest of the individuals present – and even ones not in attendance, such as 
Pericles (Symposium 215e) - identifying his otherworldliness and juxtaposing it with the 
worldliness of everyone else. It is, in fact, this otherworldly quality that Alcibiades detects and 
longs to imitate, yet his worldliness is too engrossing and prevents him from recognizing that this 
quality cannot be achieved corporeally, or merely as knowledge poured from one vessel to 
another. No, the Socratic virtue that this inconceivable erastes longs for is attained through a 
process, and failing to realize this is Alcibiades’ greatest frustration. As Cobb explains, much of 
the misunderstanding between these two individuals arises from the fact that they operate in 
different epistemological and ontological levels, thus failing to see eye to eye: “Alcibiades is still 
operating on the lowest level of Diotima’s staircase, while Socrates is at the highest level, 
engaging in the creation of beautiful conversations” (83). In other words, while Alcibiades is 
fixated on the beautiful individual as the object of his eros, Socrates is at the stage where he 
engages with beautiful logos and conversation, effectively placing them at two different 
extremes of the epistemological route that eros takes. Due to this inability to communicate, 
Alcibiades is at a loss when Socrates is not around, as he loses cognitive and physical sight of the 
end, of the goal that Socrates would lead him towards.  
The danger of fixation is thus inherent in all particular manifestations of the Beautiful. In 
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a way, this can be compared to admiring a painting for nothing more than the technical skill, yet 
entirely missing the symbolism the painter was trying to convey. Alcibiades fails to recognize 
that Socrates is not the end of his philosophical education, but simply the way to what he wants 
to achieve. Cooksey explains that Alcibiades lacks the “patience and persistence” (122) required 
for the ascent to the Beautiful, in a movement that is comparable to that of the less-able 
charioteer in the Phaedrus. Socratic wisdom is far from a process but rather a movement; 
Socrates can only guide but not physically move Alcibiades. Not even his inner beauty is enough 
enchantment or motivation for his student. Not obtaining immediate pleasure, Alcibiades 
abandons “the struggle and return[s] to the cave” (Cooksey 122-3), accepting a particular 
representation of beauty as the Form in itself. 
However, as much as Alcibiades fails as a student, Socrates fails as a teacher; it is 
precisely his otherworldliness that simultaneously attracts and alienates Alcibiades, who does not 
know how to communicate with an individual who does not clearly convey the reasons why he is 
rejecting him. According to William Cobb, Socrates tries to “assist in the beautification of 
Alcibiades’ soul” (83) by rejecting his physical advances and trying to engage him in 
conversation. This is true. However, a point that Cobb misses is that Socrates’ attempt at 
beautifying Alcibiades’ soul is doomed from the beginning, as it does not properly address 
Alcibiades’ primarily thumoeidetic personality. As a keen observer of human nature and as a 
lover of Alcibiades – as stated before, Socrates clearly cared for Alcibiades’ body and soul – 
Socrates recognizes that his student is primarily affected by a strong thumos, one that manifested 
itself in political ambition and the strong nature of his physical desires. In this case, Socrates’ 
otherworldliness distances him from engaging Alcibiades with philosophy, as he fails to reroute 
the object of his eros in an effective manner. It is from the greatest potential for philosophy that 
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Alcibiades falls into the greatest betrayal; he is a man so equipped with “all the gifts required for 
“philosophy”” (Taylor 233) who is also extremely susceptible to cognitive and sensible 
temptations. Taylor describes Alcibiades as “the man who might have ‘seen’ if he would” (233), 
the individual who, although attracted to Socrates’ virtue, chooses worldliness. Moreover, 
Martha Nussbaum argues that Alcibiades’ speech is meant to correct the “one-sided 
otherworldliness of Socrates’ speech” (Cobb 64) so that both speeches act to balance each other 
out. She believes that Alcibiades’ function in the dialogue is to serve as a Platonic criticism of 
the potential danger of Socrates’ nature, a nature that alienated the city and failed to move one of 
the students with the highest erotic potential. Alcibiades’ potential was so high, in fact, that a 
lack of proper direction of his thumos could result in disastrous consequences, something that 
happened when his eros become solely directed to political ambition. Ideally, Alcibiades’ 
worldliness would harmonize with Socratic otherworldliness to strike the balance needed for 
dialectic and philosophical inquiry, in addition to the proper relation between them, but both 
individuals fail to achieve this equilibrium.  
C.D.C Reeve refers to the juxtaposition of Alcibiades with Socrates as upward versus 
horizontal blindness. He argues that Socrates, as a philosopher, is horizontally blind; that is, he 
fails to recognize his interlocutor because his eros is exclusively directed upwards, towards what 
is universal: “his rational desires, his self-defining love for the truth, pull his soul up towards the 
forms” (Reeve 157). As Cobb will argue, Socrates’ way of life “is inappropriate as a human 
ideal” (Cobb 63), as it makes him stand out and fail to communicate with others in an explicit 
manner; i.e. sometimes his actions are misunderstood (see Apology) and sometimes his lack of 
actions are (see Alcibiades’ confusion about how to seduce him in the Symposium). Other 
examples of this behaviour are his catatonic practice of contemplation that arouse the curiosity of 
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his comrades in battle (Symposium 220d), or the fact that his constant abstraction makes him 
forego social custom, such as when he gets lost in thought and does not accompany Aristodemus 
to see Agathon19, which puts both in an embarrassing scenario as Aristodemus was not invited to 
the banquet (Symposium 174e). On a more serious side, Socrates’ actions alienate a city with the 
qualities that make him stand out from the rest of mortals, which ultimately results in his death.  
Conversely, at the other end of the spectrum, Alcibiades’ upward blindness fixates him 
on the corporeal, a sight so powerful that blinds him, in an allegorical manner, to every step up 
the line and into stages of higher ontological and epistemological status. Individuals like 
Alcibiades “see sharply the beauty of bodies, but their sexual appetites, which cause upward 
blindness, prevent them from moving on from there to any other kind of beauty” (Reeve 159). 
Thus, Alcibiades remains fixated on what is temporal and fluctuating, and as a result, any 
knowledge that he obtains is marred by this lack of stability: the quality of his thought is directly 
affected by the object he desires. For Reeve the cause of this blindness is not “ophthalmic, but 
appetitive” (157), that is, it has less to do with cognition and more to do with where desire is 
being directed. However, I would argue that it is more than just an appetitive tendency that 
makes each individual ‘blind’ to each other, but also a lack of proper re-education of desire. 
Even though I agree with Reeve’s categorization of Alcibiades and Socrates’ ‘blindness,’ when 
                                                          
19. Kofman argues that “when [Socrates] detaches Aristodemus and sends him on ahead, the act symbolizes 
the spiritual detachment that Socrates is trying to achieve, the goal of which is to incite the twin to pull 
away, to cut the umbilical cord, for the greater good of both disciple and master” (14). This analysis is 
interesting in light of Socrates’ pedagogical failures: how clear is this symbolic act for Aristodemus? In 
other words, how much does he learn from it? This symbol sheds light on the apparent lack of clearness of 
Socrates’ teachings, which can translate into misunderstanding with his students, as is the case with 
Alcibiades. Furthermore, how successful would this act be if Agathon were not as gracious a host as he is, 
i.e. jumping to invite Aristodemus to the dinner under the pretext that he ‘forgot’ to invite him (174e). Had 
he not been this well-mannered Socrates’ abstraction would have cost Aristodemus his spot in the banquet, 
thus prompting him to miss out on the philosophical discussion. 
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he attributes this characteristic to the order of their desires he overlooks the fact that Alcibiades’ 
whole encomium focuses on the beauty of Socrates’ soul, and the fact that Socrates is known as a 
lover of beautiful people. As has been stated earlier, Alcibiades sees a beauty in Socrates that 
surpasses Socrates’ physical appearance, and conversely, Socrates enjoys physical beauty and 
acknowledges materiality as important, as demonstrated in the detail of rescuing Alcibiades and 
his armor from war. Thus, I believe it is in great part a pedagogical failure that Alcibiades’ 
upward blindness is not cured, and a criticism that Plato must be imputing to Socrates through 
his writing.  
Hyland argues that Socrates forgets the beginning in the corporeal in his pursuit of 
Forms, and thus does not properly address and redirect the physical advances of Alcibiades, 
prompting Alcibiades to criticize him. This flaw, for Hyland, is a “Platonic criticism of Socrates” 
(62) as a teacher, and I think he is correct in this assessment. At the time when Apollodorus is 
relaying the dialogue, the betrayal of Alcibiades is already well-known; hence, his failure to 
achieve Socratic virtue is already common knowledge to anyone reading the dialogue. Plato, 
through this depiction, is criticizing Socrates’ short-sightedness and inability to re-route 
Alcibiades’ eros from political ambition and towards virtue, criticizing a major flaw in Socrates’ 
pedagogical approach. Socrates’ otherworldly qualities convey that he has already witnessed the 
vision of the Beautiful and is at the stage of creation in true beauty. Taylor argues that for this 
reason he “impresses his fellow-men by his whole bearing as being not of their world though he 
is in it” (232). As such Socrates has achieved the greater mystery as described by Diotima and 
came back to give birth in beauty here, yet sometimes seems to forget that others do not 
understand the Beautiful in the way he does, and as such he needs to guide others as much as he 
can since they are prone to mistake his beauty for the thing in itself. 
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Criticizing Socrates for failing to channel all of Alcibiades’ potential into good is not a 
capricious responsibility we are assigning to him. On the contrary, all throughout Platonic 
literature we are presented with the association between Socrates and midwifery, an image that is 
very much present in the Symposium. In the Theaetetus, one of Plato’s middle dialogues and 
arguably his foundational text on epistemology, Socrates describes himself as an intellectual 
‘midwife’: a person capable of bringing forth the ideas and thoughts of those ‘pregnant’ with 
wisdom but who are unable to give birth to their ideas on their own. Socrates himself is the son 
of Phaenarete20, a midwife, and he explains to Theatetus that he possesses the same ability that 
his mother possessed, only his midwifery is of a different sort. The midwife, by definition, is 
sterile; the idea behind this assumption is that the individual who has the skills to help women 
give birth has learned those skills due to her own inability to get pregnant or because they are 
past child-bearing age. Socrates explains to Theatetus that “women never practice as midwives 
while they are still conceiving and bearing children themselves. It is only those who are past 
child-bearing who take this up” (Theatetus 149b). Under this definition, Socrates likens his own 
skill to that of the midwives. First of all, he is able to recognize when an individual is ‘pregnant’ 
with ideas, just like the midwife recognizes better than anyone else “whether women are 
pregnant or not” (Theatetus 149d). Secondly, Socrates has the ability to “bring on the pains” of 
intellectual childbirth, and also, “to relieve them” (Theatetus 149d) when necessary, like the 
midwives who are able to do the same with the pregnant women they assist. Socrates states that 
the only difference between both arts is that he services men and not women, but most 
importantly, that he takes care “over the labor of their souls, not their bodies” (Theatetus 150b). 
Therefore, while the midwives take care of physical births, Socrates attends those who are 
                                                          
20. Literally, ‘she who brings virtue to light’. 
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pregnant in soul or intellect and require his assistance as a mentor or teacher. Through this 
performance Socrates is able to detect whether the individual is possessed by phantoms or by 
truths, and thus is able to root out ‘evil’ pregnancies of the soul from fertile ones.  
The philosopher, as a midwife to the soul, is able to ‘cure’ the individual of infertile 
offspring and attempt to eliminate those ideas that carry little truth or little potential for virtue. 
This midwifery is what Socrates should have employed to prevent Alcibiades’ fixation or to 
reroute it towards philosophy, as this fixation is an inherent danger of particular beauty that 
prevents philosophical progression. This idea is fully developed in Epicurus, whose 
philosophical model highly resembled medicine; Epicurus’ idea of philosophy as a pharmakon 
used to relieve human suffering appears as a development of the image of the Socratic midwife. 
The philosopher is now a doctor for the soul, which echoes Eryximachus’ allusion to the 
physician as able to achieve this spiritual balance. In this manner, only the philosopher, who 
possesses greater knowledge of the soul, is able to differentiate unstable thoughts from stable 
ideas and through the stable logos move her subject towards a more enlightened state.  
Following this logic Socrates claims that he is “barren of wisdom” (Theatetus 150c), as 
only through his barrenness he would be able to provide this service to those who are not. 
Socrates thus helps individuals to “discover within themselves a multitude of beautiful things” 
(Theatetus 150d) so that they are able to bring them forth; in the terminology of the Symposium, 
Socrates assists individuals to give birth in beauty, to create in truth and beauty within in order to 
turn potentiality into actualization. Socrates’ pedagogical failure with Alcibiades is thus a failure 
that he commits as a midwife to the soul. In failing to assist Alcibiades’ intellectual birth 
Socrates fails as a midwife, as he does not properly guide Alcibiades’ offspring from fertile and 
potential truths into actual beauty. As Socrates explains in the Phaedrus, “not every soul is easily 
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reminded of the reality there by what it finds here” (Phaedrus 250a), since the body acts as an 
impediment to true vision. Yet, beauty can be used in our favour if we have a good midwife to 
help us find the true vision that surpasses mere physical perception.  
4.3 Giving birth in beauty: Plato and Dante 
 Plato’s depiction of the relationship between Alcibiades and Socrates not only 
demonstrates what happens when an individual takes particular beauty to be the end goal, or 
when the person in the position of teacher fails to move the student forward. On a symbolic and 
more comprehensive level the relationship between Alcibiades and Socrates demonstrates the 
very real limitations of both eros of beauty and philosophy’s ability to capture would-be 
philosophers. In the previous chapter we already examined the limitations of more traditionally 
philosophical forms, such as virtue or justice, when compared to sensible beauty; Scott& Welton 
term this disadvantage the “tragic limits” of wisdom, a Form which ideally should govern, but 
that “is in a very real sense impotent” (176), especially when compared to the appeal of sensible 
and poetic beauty.  
Moreover, the distraction caused by sensible beauty is not just present in the beauty of 
individuals, as examined in the relationship between Alcibiades and Socrates, but it is also 
present in art forms that actively compete with philosophy, such as poetry and literature. As we 
have seen, philosophy’s ability to move its audience is limited, while poetry possesses these tools 
in abundance. The poet, through his ability to beautify speech, has the power not only to make 
logos appealing, but to “make himself the beautiful god Eros” (Berg 88); that is, the poet is 
skilled enough to make himself and his poetry appear to be divinely beautiful, and thus he 
commands the attention and dedication of his devotees. The philosopher, lacking this ‘rock star’ 
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quality that the poet emanates through his words, is left in a less glamorous role, relegated to a 
supporting part in the poet’s show. Part of the poet’s ‘trick’ is his ability to beautify what might 
not be beautiful – which is reminiscent of the sophist Lysias’ speech in the Phaedrus - and to 
deliver a convincing image of what is kalos to his audience, which the philosopher has trouble 
doing, as wisdom is arguably a harder thing to beautify. For example, through his poetic 
expertise, Agathon fashions a god after his own image and craft, one that is as beautiful as he 
himself and as deep as his poetry. However, the problem is not the fact that he is equating the 
Beautiful with the Good, but rather that he brings an eidetic condition to the realm of becoming, 
where the Beautiful does not equate to the Good. Consequently, he forges an association of 
beauty and goodness that is not applicable to this world and that is much more convincing than 
the idea of virtue that philosophy might present. 
 Perhaps this hierarchy is what prompts Socrates to make himself beautiful to be in the 
presence of a beautiful man (Symposium 174a); not only is the philosopher going to be 
competing against the poet in looks – a competition that Agathon has already won by a landslide 
- but he is going to try to steal the spotlight away from images of beauty and good to the 
Beautiful and Good in themselves. This task is difficult if not nearly impossible, since we know 
that the poets employ all means to make the beauty of their words shine as radiantly as possible, 
whereas philosophy must rely on the truth of its words to portray beauty.  
 However, Socrates manages to achieve exactly this; his speech shines brightly in sensible 
beauty just as much as in the beauty of its truth. In fact, his speech and Agathon’s are the only 
ones that generate the same results: spontaneous and fervent applause. Yet, Plato does not make 
his victory clear; although he appears to win against Aristophanes and Agathon in endurance at 
the end of the celebration, Alcibiades’ impromptu appearance and subsequent criticism point to a 
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larger and more complex Platonic critique of philosophy. Not only is beauty more appealing, but 
philosophy, like Socrates, can be too otherworldly. The problems seen in the relationship 
between Alcibiades and Socrates are present in the relationship between the individual and 
philosophy, such as the individual finding the philosophical endeavour too unearthly and devoid 
of the necessary tangible rewards to maintain the interest of his eros. In the competition between 
beauty and philosophy, the latter wins epistemologically, yes, but this victory is not enough: 
philosophy must win over the senses as well, in order to correct the one-sided, otherworldly 
approach it takes and to trigger the eros for beauty that is inherent in all human beings. 
Philosophy, like Socrates, must not be too otherworldly, but rather a balance must be struck so 
that the endeavour appeals both to the rational and erotic aspects of the individual so as to not 
incur the same pedagogical problem that Socrates faces with Alcibiades. Philosophy, then, must 
make itself kalos. Not merely beautiful to attract individuals, but its beauty must be a synthesis 
of the sensible beauty and the beauty of aletheia in such a way as to lead human beings into 
virtue. Philosophy’s beauty must become the gateway to the Beautiful so as to be able to 
compete with the beauty that shines brightly but that might not work for the betterment of the 
soul and that might not be true. In this manner, the innate love for the beautiful present in human 
beings must become the way by which individuals access philosophy. 
Ideally, then, philosophy must be beautiful in order to replicate in a way the process of 
falling in love, or the experience of recognizing beauty in an ‘other,’ which marks the beginning 
steps of Diotima’s epistemological movement. So far, we have only seen this movement in 
action in fictional depictions that although accurate in what they symbolize, are not real life 
examples, in addition to being incomplete – neither Alcibiades, nor Aristodemus, nor 
Apollodorus move towards the final step of creation. In the previous section we examined in-
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depth a famous account of a love of beauty gone wrong – the unusual erastes-eromenos story of 
Alcibiades’ love for Socrates, a love that in spite of its intensity and of being focused on 
something that surpassed corporeal attraction, failed to move the erastes into intellectual or 
spiritual improvement.  We also saw that in fact, Alcibiades seems to be the exception to the 
rule: not only is he in an exceptional position to be anyone’s erastes, but in most cases, love or 
experience of beauty does lead people towards some good – or just better – life, as is the case of 
Aristodemus and Apollodorus who engage in philosophical activity thanks to Socrates. 
Arguably, one could say that even though Alcibiades failed to move towards the kind of creation 
that marks the culmination of the ladder of love, he in fact did move up the ladder. This 
movement is due to the fact that he recognizes a beauty in Socrates that exceeded the latter’s 
physical limitations and that moved Alcibiades towards self-analysis, an activity that evokes the 
value that Socrates places on inquiry as the basis for a worthy life.21 Through the experience of 
particular love, Socrates’ three ‘disciples,’ Alcibiades, Aristodemus, and Apollodorus, do go past 
the initial stage of recognizing the beauty of bodies in order to appreciate the beauty of the soul, 
and – some - are led into philosophical activity as a result.  
Perhaps the major criticism that might be made of them is that they all fail to move into 
the stage of creation, and they are all somewhat obsessed with Socrates; maybe this is due to a 
failure of Socrates’ midwifery, or maybe these individuals are not ‘pregnant in soul.’ The truth is 
that their fixation on Socrates makes them develop an upward blindness that stagnates their 
intellectual movement. Consequently, we can learn from these examples that the key is to begin 
the journey in the particular experience, but not to confuse it with the end. Since we have already 
examined accounts of philoso-lovers who do not reach the end even though they are moved 
                                                          
21. See Plato’s Apology.  
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higher, I want to provide two real-life examples of authors whose journeys resemble and 
actualize Diotima’s theory of eros and beauty. Through an examination of Plato, Socrates’ other 
famous student, and Dante Alighieri I want to show how the love of particular beauty can move 
the individual not only towards a life of philosophical examination, but perhaps most 
importantly, to a regeneration of beauty through artistic and philosophical creation, without 
leaving the particular behind, but incorporating it in the process. 
 In examining Plato and Dante as authors I want to move the discussion from the 
theoretical to the practical. I could borrow from literature persuasive examples of individuals 
whose love of beauty moves them towards good, towards heroism, towards justice; but, in order 
truly to appreciate the pedagogical role of beauty and the way it moves our eros we must be able 
to examine it in the context of real life. Plato and Dante are suitable examples because they are 
successful authors who have managed to achieve immortality through their creations, an idea that 
is referred to in the Symposium when Diotima talks about the desire to possess the object of love 
infinitely. Both Plato and Dante, as separated as they are by time, have similarities in regards to 
their source of inspiration and the intellectual movement that they follow that precedes their 
intellectual creations; these similarities attest to the movement of eros in the doctrine of love 
delineated in Diotima’s encomium, and shed light on the actual role of love and beauty for the 
betterment of the individual. Consequently, the movement of eros as described in Diotima’s 
eulogy, and seen in an incomplete form in Alcibiades’ love for Socrates, can be appreciated fully 
in the lives and artistic progressions of the aforementioned writers. These authors go through a 
movement similar to what occurs to the erastes in the ladder of love, who from a particular 
experience of love and beauty is inspired and led into a transcendent cognition and noesis of the 
Forms, and ultimately to produce in beauty. 
141 
 
 Starting in the love experienced in the particular, both authors focus their creations on a 
specific individual who serves not only as a source of inspiration, but as the gateway to a greater 
understanding of the possibility of transcendence. For example, Plato’s philosophical activity is 
triggered by his personal connection to his mentor, Socrates, who acts as the sage for his 
movement to a life of philosophical examination. Plato does not need to be in love with Socrates 
to experience this influence; in fact, perhaps this is precisely what confuses Alcibiades when he 
is with Socrates, as he does not know how to proceed in a way that is not erotic. In Plato’s case, 
Socrates acts as a philosophical beloved who becomes the incentive towards philosophy. Dante, 
centuries later, experiences the same intellectual awakening through the particular experience of 
beauty, as he is moved to artistic creation via the sight of Beatrice, a beauty that for him remains 
almost as unreachable as a transcendent Form, as they do not even engage in conversation.  
Beatrice Portinari, a woman whom Dante only saw twice in his life, once when he was eight and 
the second time nine years later, had such an impact in his life that even though Dante never got 
to establish a relationship with her, he would use her as the source of inspiration for his work and 
his spiritual development. In fact, in La Vita Nuova, Dante states that when he saw her his heart 
instantly told him “Ecce deus fortior me, qui veniens dominabitur mihi: Behold a god more 
powerful than I, who, coming, will rule over me” (8). This experience of particular love is what 
grounds both Plato and Dante as individuals and as thinkers, as this recognition of beauty in the 
phenomenal world is the origin of their understanding of beauty in a transcendent sense – for 
Plato, prompting him towards philosophy, and for Dante, towards God.  
Coincidentally, both muses, different as they are in the nature of their beauty and their 
relationship to each author, are suddenly removed from sight as they both die, in similarly tragic 
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ways.22  These deaths, however, do not produce intellectual or artistic stagnation, as could be 
expected; on the contrary, they fuel creation. Unlike Alcibiades, who needed the permanent 
physical reminder of Socrates in order to stay on the track to a virtuous life, both Plato and Dante 
are driven into intellectual and artistic production. Plato spends his entire life as a student of 
Socrates, and after his mentor’s death, devotes his entire life to the writing of philosophical texts, 
most of which have his former mentor as the main character and philosophical voice. In this 
manner, Plato focuses on the generation of philosophical texts that have his mentor as the focal 
point and develops his philosophical ideas in a manner that combines the desire for truth in 
philosophy with the aesthetic sensibility of the poetic medium.  
Equivalently, Beatrice’s death, which occurs when she is just 24, sends Dante into a 
contemplative state that fuels his creative energy, as he is now focused on honouring her memory 
through artistic creation. Even though Beatrice’s death at first halts the production of La Vita 
Nuova, ultimately her existence is what drives Dante two produce his major works, La Vita 
Nuova, Convivio, and La Divina Commedia, which use his beloved as the major inspiration. 
Before Beatrice’s death Dante states that he “decided to write verse in which [he] would reveal 
her miraculous and excellent effect, so that not only those who could physically see her, but 
others might know of her what words can show” (La Vita Nuova 89). In other words, the vision 
of Beatrice’s particular beauty drives Dante not only into intellectual production via writing, but 
into artistic creation of more beauty, as he writes sonettos and canzones that try to emulate and 
recreate the experience of watching Beatrice. Furthermore, Beatrice’s beauty moves Dante into 
self-analysis and inquiry into transcendence. When he sees Beatrice for the second time he 
states: “she greeted me so virtuously, so much so that I saw then to the very end of grace” (La 
                                                          
22. Plato witnesses his mentor condemned as a corrupting influence to the youth of Athens, whereas Beatrice 
dies young and suddenly, and married to another man.  
143 
 
Vita Nuova 10), implying that the sight of Beatrice itself moves him into a vision of the divine, 
the ultimate ‘end’ of grace. The vision of Beatrice is what drives Dante towards a complete state 
of goodness and kindness towards people; he is driven to a state of caritas via his experience of 
love: “for me no enemy remained, in fact I shone with a flame of charity that made me grant 
pardon to whoever had offended me” (La Vita Nuova 27). In addition, after Beatrice’s death 
Dante decides to stop writing and to “study as much as [he] can” so that he can truly do her 
justice through his writing: “I hope to write of her what has never been written of any woman” 
(La Vita Nuova 129). In his case, his experience of particular beauty prompts him to become not 
only better at his craft, but incites him towards the spiritual betterment of his life. 
In fact, Joseph Anthony Mazzeo believes that Dante’s inspiration in love and the way he 
is led to God through the beauty of Beatrice, as described in the Commedia and his other works, 
are highly evocative of Plato, especially the idea of beauty acting as the medium by which we 
attain knowledge of the divine as described in the Phaedrus and the Symposium. Mazzeo 
explains that Dante’s love for Beatrice acts as the infrastructure of his move towards God, as he 
delineates in the Commedia. Love and beauty, for Dante, “are not merely architectural elements, 
but the basic concepts in terms of which the poem is articulated and through which it conveys 
meaning. They make the journey possible and determine its nature” (Mazzeo 133). For Dante, 
the beauty of Beatrice allows him to embark on the journey to paradiso in the first place, both 
metaphorically, as a character of the Commedia, and literally as a human being led to a 
realization of God, in a similar manner to the lover who is able to bridge the gap between the 
sensible and the Forms in Diotima’s ladder. In the Convivio, Dante explains that through his 
experience of love with Beatrice, he is led to the love of another lady: lady Philosophy. After 
Beatrice’s death Dante is driven to study in order to become better at writing, and he starts 
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reading Boethius and Cicero, who help him find solace in philosophy. Philosophy becomes his 
second love after Beatrice and what allows him to return to his craft: “feeling myself elevated 
from thoughts of the former love to recognition of the virtues of this one, I opened my mouth to 
utter the words of the canzone before us” (Convivio 60). The fact that Beatrice acts as Dante’s 
inspiration for this realization, both in life and in his work, attests to the revelatory nature of 
particular beauty to point towards transcendence: “beauty, [Dante] says, is an external light that 
makes manifest an internal splendor” (Mazzeo 142).  
In addition, this experience of beauty in the particular produces the divine madness that 
engulfs the lover as result of the sight of beauty, a divine madness which is associated with 
creation in the beautiful. The pedagogical goal of beauty as described in the Symposium and 
further elucidated by the arguments present in the Phaedrus is to obtain the ability to create, to 
beget in the beautiful, through an inspiration like that of the poets, whose skill is described by the 
idea of techne within the over-arching structure of understanding; that is, to create beauty not for 
beauty’s sake, but to convey a meaning that is also true. At the end of the ladder, after the vision 
of the Beautiful is obtained, and as I explained in Chapter 2, the philoso-lover is prompted into 
action: after obtaining the revelation of the form of the Beautiful, the lover is now able to create 
beauty that can lead others to this same sight. An example of this type of creation is present in 
Dante’s Convivio, wherein Dante explains that Boethius and Cicero led him towards his love of 
Philosophy via “the sweetness of their discourse” (69).  
This concept of giving birth in beauty is somewhat decoded when examined next to the 
notion of divine madness present in the Phaedrus. The final jump into action has a twofold 
requirement; first, it necessitates inspiration, typically associated with poetic production, so as to 
create kalos offspring, both intellectual and physical although in this case I am focusing on the 
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intellectual products. Secondly, the jump into action requires noesis of truth and what transcends 
the phenomenal so as to create offspring that are both beautiful and true, to use the language of 
philosophical midwifery. In this manner, the individual is able to create in truth in accordance 
with the Beautiful and not with an image of what beauty is supposed to be; this is similar to the 
contrast between Agathon’s adorned yet vacuous eulogy and Socrates’ initially unappealing, yet 
content-filled, encomium. The divine madness produced in the Phaedrus at the sight of beauty 
sheds new light onto this process of inspiration, whereby madness occurs as a result of the soul 
recognizing the divine transcendence within the particular manifestation it observes. Thereby, 
this creation is meant to produce beauty that captures the ability of the particular experience of 
beauty to point towards the transcendent; the lover should now be able to produce inspired works 
that encompass understanding and that are kalos enough to trigger the erotic frenzy for beauty in 
which our journey to understanding the metaphysical begins. 
Both Plato and Dante are led to the point where they can participate in this type of 
creation, where they can be as divinely inspired as the poets while still delivering truth presented 
in a kalos package: “the larger claim [in Diotima’s speech] is that the sign or criterion of wisdom 
is creativity” (Hyland 42). This move from the exposure to particular beauty to the necessity of 
creation inspired by that experience - the necessity to express in language this phenomenal 
interaction - is what first allows Plato and Dante, and countless others, not only to immortalize 
their source of inspiration, but to achieve immortality themselves, producing an art form that 
accomplishes both to inspire and to deliver content: a form that is not beauty devoid of content, 
but content made kalos. Consequently, both Plato and Dante go on to create but retain the 
essence of their beloveds in the process, using them not only as inspiration but as an integral part 
of their works, yet not confusing them to be the end. In this manner both Socrates and Beatrice 
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are elevated from their mortal status and immortalized as somewhat super-human creatures. 
Socrates is often times depicted as having transcendent wisdom and sophrosune, leading a life 
many would deem to be virtuous and capable of commanding the utmost fascination and fear 
from his peers. Similarly, Beatrice is elevated to the status of a saint, a being whose memory 
alone is capable of guiding Dante from the inferno and eventually of leading him towards God.  
Whether Plato’s Socrates resembles the historical individual, or whether his depiction is 
purely a creation of Plato’s mind is not relevant for this examination – what is relevant is that 
Plato immortalizes his mentor throughout his dialogues, creating works in such a way as to be 
able to preserve Socrates’ persona infinitely.  The same is true of Beatrice, who, regardless of her 
actual identity, was able to move the Florentine author into poetic greatness. What is important is 
that for both authors their experience of particular beauty, both in body and in soul, and the love 
derived from this experience, are what prompts them to create beautiful logos. Beatrice becomes 
the inspirational light in Dante’s philosophy and subsequent movement to God, in addition to 
becoming the muse for all of his poetic creations. Socrates, on the other hand, serves as Plato’s 
source of intellectual awakening from the moment that he becomes his mentor, and the fact that 
Plato uses Socrates as a character over and over again in his work testifies to the inspirational 
role of Socrates as a teacher, even if he loses this position in the later dialogues. Like the lover, 
who goes from loving the beauty of the person to then being led to a vision of Beauty that drives 
her to create in beauty, both for herself and for her object of love, Plato and Dante created 
canonical works of philosophy and literature that not only immortalized themselves, but also 
their source of inspiration in the process. It is the beauty of their beloveds, both romantic and 
philosophical eromenoi that inspired in them kalos creations while moving them towards higher 
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understanding, the understanding that their beauty is evocative of an absolute beauty that 
transcends them. 
In this manner, the experience of loving Beatrice moves Dante to an understanding that 
his love for her is the medium by which he becomes close to the absolute love of God and his 
own philosophical journey. Plato experiences the same movement, but unlike Dante he moves 
from Socrates to his own philosophical doctrines, to a life devoted to philosophical inquiry, but 
most importantly, to philosophical creation. These authors thus incorporate in their works the 
experience of particular beauty without making Alcibiades’ mistake of elevating this temporal 
beauty into universality. The creations of these authors, combining the experience of beauty with 
content are meant to replicate the experience of falling in love, to allow the reader to go through 
the progression of the philosopher-lover in Diotima’s story, even when they lack their personal 
Socrates or Beatrice. Through their beautiful intellectual offspring readers are thus able to ‘fall in 
love’ with the words in themselves and begin their own movement up the ladder. 
4.4 Proper philosophical writing according to Plato: beauty and truth combined 
Perhaps the ability of particular beauty to trigger thoughts beyond itself is why 
philosophy is called to embellish itself, so that through beauty individuals can access truth. 
Through the experience of particular beauty, the search for aletheia is made accessible: the 
metaphysical goal is humanized, and the bridge between the physical and what lies beyond is 
temporarily able to be bridged. In this manner, the violent upheaval required by Aristophanes’ 
humans that we saw in the Symposium and that delineates the tragic ontological status of 
humanity, is no longer a necessity, since thanks to the love of beauty, replicated in these works, 
the lover is able to become a philosopher of sorts. As Strauss states, it is the “right kind of 
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philosophy [that is] truly poetic” (7), as it welcomes the individual completely, embracing both 
reason and eros as equal components of his being and equal participants of his intellectual 
quests. This combination of muthos and logos, the merging of literary form with philosophical 
content, is already at the foundation of all of Plato’s works, which are dialogues that are equal 
parts literary and philosophical texts, operating on both levels to engage eros in all of its forms. 
For the more traditionally philosophical souls, the philosophical content of the text stands out 
amidst the poetry of the words, whereas for the lovers of more sensible beauty, who are guided 
less by rationality, the beauty of the text and the literary prowess of the dialogues engage them in 
equal manner, and through symbolism guide them to the philosophical structure underneath.  
 It is not that truth is not beautiful in and of itself, but rather that it does not shine as 
brightly as sensible beauty does for us. Our eros for the Beautiful is ignited in our experiences 
with beauty, whether the beautiful is manifested in people, art, or even nature. This fundamental 
first ignition is at its strongest when beauty is the source of desire, as most individuals are lovers 
of beauty in one way or another. Through beauty, we can move and become engaged in 
philosophical conversation, like Aristodemus and the rest of the guests at the banquet who come 
in for a celebratory feast in the name of poetry, or for their own fixation on a beautiful soul, and 
are eventually led into philosophical debate. Even Apollodorus, without attending the banquet, is 
able to receive this information due to his love for Socrates. Plato’s works are a testament to the 
value that he assigns to both form and content, not leaving behind one for the sake of the other, 
but rather incorporating both for maximum effectiveness. In this manner, Plato carefully tailors 
both form and content to inform each other dialogically, to exert the same effect that Socrates’ 
inner Silenic statues have on the unsuspecting Alcibiades. 
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 For the pedagogical role of beauty to work within philosophy, writing should take care of 
both form and content in such a way as to attract the attention of the reader and to deliver 
knowledge. Socrates never writes, but Plato has him deliver a criticism of writing in the 
Phaedrus that is useful to understanding what proper writing looks like to Plato. In the first part 
of the Phaedrus Socrates talks about the importance of beauty within philosophical education, as 
well as the proper education of the soul. As we have explored in both Chapters 2 and 3, beauty is 
presented as the gateway Form to the realm of Platonic metaphysics, an idea that is also 
developed in the Symposium through a look at the relationship between individuals. The second 
part of the Phaedrus somewhat changes the tone of the dialogue, as it suddenly delves into a 
criticism of writing, not only unexpected within a written work, but that seems out of place after 
the discussion of beauty. However, the purpose of this criticism of writing is to further 
contextualize the discussion on beauty and its association with philosophical writing, such as we 
have examined at the beginning of this section. 
 First, Plato has Socrates explain what constitutes a good speech in order then to have him 
criticize writing for failing to acquire the good elements of oral communication. In order for 
speeches to be suitable for learning, and not merely sophistic devices like Lysias’ speech that has 
Phaedrus in a frenzy, Socrates states that the speech-maker must know what he writes about in 
addition to knowing his audience. Socrates states that “as the Spartan said, there is no genuine art 
of speaking without a grasp of truth” (Phaedrus 260e); in order to create a good speech or a good 
piece of writing, one must know the topic to be examined in addition to understanding the soul of 
one’s interlocutor or reader, so that the speech ends up persuading the audience and appealing to 
his or her nature. This aspect of good oratory, knowing your audience, is a concept that sophists 
such as Lysias have mastered already; the emphasis on appealing form over content is an 
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example of their understanding that audiences are more likely to be moved by embellished form 
than true content. Thus, as opposed to Lysias’ speech that has persuaded Phaedrus due to a form 
that is shiny in appearance yet contradictory in content, Socrates argues that the main point of 
persuasion in a speech should come from the truth of the words themselves. This point is 
especially significant after Phaedrus’ suggestion that persuasion proceeds from what will move 
the audience rather than from what is true: “what I have actually heard about this, Socrates, my 
friend, is that it is not necessary for the intending orator to learn what is really just, but only what 
will seem just to the crowd who will act as judges” (Phaedrus 260a).  
The problem with Phaedrus’ understanding is that orators and writers end up producing 
works that look like they are true, when in fact they are not.23 The nature of speech should be “to 
direct the soul” (Phaedrus 271d) and consequently, both oratory and writing should encapsulate 
in equal measurements truth and the human component, that is, what our eros will find 
appealing. The emphasis on the speech-maker knowing the soul and being able to lead it to truth 
reminds us of the idea of the philosopher as the midwife of the soul, present in the Theatetus and 
presented in action in the Symposium. Socrates quotes Acumenus as claiming that to be a 
physician one must know how to find the proper balance in the body of patients (Phaedrus 
268b). This example is part of Socrates’ greater admonition that a good speech maker will know 
how to balance the parts with the whole so as to create harmony, much like the way a physician 
finds the proper harmony in the body through knowledge and practice. He states that the 
similarity is that in both cases “we need to determine the nature of something – of the body in 
medicine, of the soul in rhetoric” (Phaedrus 270b). Thus, the speech-maker must know how to 
                                                          
23. This is the reason why, as we have seen, Socrates tells Agathon, somewhat ironically: “In my foolishness, I 
thought you should tell the truth about whatever you praise, that this should be your basis, and that from 
this a speaker should select the most beautiful truths and arrange them most suitably” (Symposium 198d). 
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find proper balance in the individual who will listen to his speech in order to persuade, and this is 
something that writing must emulate. In addition, like the speech-writer, the writer must know 
his subject, which emphasizes the idea that proper philosophical writing must deliver both truth 
and beauty, as knowledge of one’s audience would require the writer to recognize what human 
eros is attracted to, and how it works. 
Furthermore, Socrates’ critique of writing dwells on the fact that, as a piece of non-
performance art, it remains “silent” (Phaedrus 275d). Since a piece of writing cannot interact 
with its audience, it does not know the proper way of speaking to each soul, as it is incapable of 
controlling or recognizing the person who will read it. In this manner, if there is any level of 
symbolism in the text it may escape the reader, who might just take the text literally and miss the 
meaning of what she is reading; for example, this would be the case if Phaedrus took Socrates’ 
chariot myth for the truth and not symbolism, or if a reader read the dialogue and took the myth 
to be true. The biggest problem with writing is that it remains static, but also, and very 
importantly, that it does not speak directly to the soul of each reader. Socrates is able to tailor his 
speeches to suit the nature and interests of his interlocutors, whereas a piece of writing cannot do 
so. According to Socrates’ guidelines, writing must resemble an actual conversation and speak to 
a plethora of readers regardless of time. The reader’s role must resemble that of an interlocutor 
or a participant in the Socratic elenchus in order for the reader to go through the dialogical 
movement that the interlocutors go through in each dialogue. 
Plato was clearly aware of these limitations, and using Socrates as a mouthpiece he 
delivers the guidelines of what proper writing, proper philosophy, should do in order to persuade: 
to engage the soul, recognizing the dichotomy between our rational and erotic capacities, in order 
to address the eros of each reader, and thus deliver knowledge in the most effective manner. 
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Plato’s own philosophical enterprise uses a medium known for its beauty, a more poetic literary 
style of writing, with his philosophical ideas. Scholars such as Strauss and Leon Harold Craig 
believe Plato crafted this form to “fully exploit the [strengths of writing] while greatly 
attenuating [its weaknesses]” (Craig xxvi), thus creating a form that possesses flexibility, and 
ideally is able to move readers through dialectic. Consequently, the Platonic dialogue becomes a 
medium of writing where form and content are intrinsically connected and inform each other 
dialogically, with the goal of engaging the reader through beauty into philosophy. Craig thereby 
describes the dialogues as “a wonderful synthesis of reverent memorial, dramatic poetry, 
philosophic argument, Aesopian fable, and God only knows what else” (xxvi) that embody a 
concise and carefully tailored writing style. However, this style is not unique to Plato and can be 
seen in Dante’s own writing and the writings of authors who combine content with a beautiful 
form. 
The love of beautiful logos present in the dialogue can thus replace the love of the 
beautiful person which is not present in writing, in order to provide a foundational step on the 
ladder. Plato, like Dante, thus writes in a kalos manner that also portrays truth. As a student who 
is moved beyond admiration, Plato understands that his mentor is a vessel for higher knowledge 
and not the end of his intellectual journey, like Dante understands Beatrice’s role as a medium to 
philosophy and theology. Plato, through his work, is able to use Socrates symbolically to elicit in 
others the same movement forward, or at least the stepping stones towards understanding. The 
experience of beauty is thus what “at least for certain types of human beings, generates 
philosophy” (Hyland 87), and this movement, most effectively caused by the love of a particular 
human being, is what is intended to be replicated in proper writing. Only through the 
beautification of philosophy can this development be possible. As Tejera explains, “knowledge 
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of the truth does not guarantee its persuasiveness” (47), and this is where beauty comes in, 
revealing an aesthetic persuasion like no other. 
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Chapter 5 Conclusion 
 Socrates’ account of ta erotika in the Symposium, as relayed by his teacher Diotima, 
describes philosophical education as grounded on the sensible experience as the means to any 
cognition of the transcendent. The journey of the lover from the empirical to the transcendental 
and back to the empirical provides an epistemological account that does not denigrate the 
knowledge that the sensible provides, but rather uses it as a gateway to greater understanding. 
The lover, like the philosopher in the Republic, undergoes a movement that is philosophical at its 
core: from the particularized experience of beauty the lover is able to expand his knowledge and 
move up the ladder epistemologically and ontologically towards greater objects of knowledge 
and thus, towards a more comprehensive understanding. In doing so, the lover incorporates the 
sensible experience as a foundational aspect of how one acquires knowledge, so that at the end of 
the journey he is able to return to the sensible to create with his newfound knowledge. This idea 
of the lover giving ‘birth’ in beauty is the step that brings the lover back to the cave, to the 
sensible realm, so that the end of the journey is in fact very much in the physical. In addition, this 
return highly resembles the image of the philosopher in the Republic, who ‘begets’ wisdom once 
he has come into noesis of the Forms. The language used to explain the relationship between the 
philosopher and knowledge in the Republic, as in the Symposium, is erotic; Socrates depicts the 
philosopher as an individual who has an erotic relationship with wisdom: 
“as [the real lover of learning] moves on, he neither loses nor lessens 
his erotic love until he grasps the being of each nature itself with the 
part of his soul that is fitted to grasp it, because of its kinship with it, 
and that, once getting near what really is and having intercourse with 
it and having begotten understanding and truth, he knows, truly lives, 
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is nourished, and- at that point, but not before- is relieved from the 
pains of giving birth” (Republic 490a-c). 
 As Socrates states, the real lover of learning has an erotic relationship with wisdom, very 
similar to the relationship that the lover has with the Beautiful in Diotima’s encomium in the 
Symposium. Both lover and philosopher are moved towards an understanding of the Forms, in 
this case beauty and wisdom respectively, so that they become pregnant with knowledge and are 
able to ‘beget’ knowledge in one case and give ‘birth’ in beauty in the other. In both cases, their 
relationships to the Forms are of an erotic nature so that at the end of the journey both 
individuals are able to produce knowledge and beauty based on their relationship with the Forms; 
that is, both are able to recreate wisdom and beauty properly in the sensible so that other 
individuals can embark on the same journey.  
Diotima’s exposition provides not merely an account of eros, but rather an account of the 
way that human beings can access the same philosophical goals as do the ‘lovers’ of learning in 
the Republic via particular manifestations of beauty. In this manner, her description provides not 
just a theoretical discipline of how one might acquire knowledge, or how a few ‘real’ lovers of 
wisdom might go about pursuing it, but rather a philosophical approach to living and learning 
grounded in the practical and in an experience that is accessible to all: the experience of eros for 
what is beautiful and immediate. Whereas the purely rational approach to philosophy can cut out 
a great part of our dichotomous nature and can thus be seen as not practical, this account, 
centered on aesthetic persuasion, provides a means by which all individuals can become a 
philosopher of sorts. The aesthetic experience of the lover in his particular relationship to the 
object of love provides an accessible praxis that targets our corporeal nature in addition to our 
rationality, as we are primarily embodied souls. 
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Eros, and its ability to move the soul to action at the sight of beauty allows individuals to 
philosophize via the most accessible human activity: love for the beauty of another individual. 
Through the understanding of how eros operates we are able to bridge the gap between the 
purely physical and the transcendent in an attempt to heal our ignorance and to do so without 
leaving behind the sensible motivations that allow us to embark on this journey in the first place. 
Eros, common to all human beings, is what allows us to move from ignorance and into 
philosophical inquiry, and it is able to do so via love, through the experience of beauty in the 
particular, which at first sight seems to be a highly unphilosophical activity, as it does not 
directly engage rationality. Eros thus gives motion to the entire soul because it longs after beauty 
more than it longs after anything else, and is able to create an alliance between reason and desire 
whereby desire moves the soul towards action, and reason regulates desire so as to not stray into 
excess and lose sight of the ultimate end. Both aspects working together suit our dual nature and 
create the harmony necessary to move the entire soul towards philosophical education.  
In this fashion, beauty can be regarded as a powerful pedagogical tool for philosophical 
inquiry. The main advantage that beauty has is that eros for beauty precedes understanding, so 
that the spectator does not require a rationalization of the experience of beauty to long for it; 
observation alone is more than enough. Beauty’s non-discursive nature works as an 
epistemological advantage: Diotima’s philoso-lovers are not even aware of their journey because 
they required no rational persuasion to embark on it in the first place. And, once they reach the 
end of the ladder and experience the revelation of transcendence, there is nothing else to figure 
out since what is Good and Beautiful instantly becomes part of their understanding. 
Beauty’s power to ignite our eros is unparalleled. The very real rewards of beauty stand 
in stark juxtaposition to the abstract rewards of the metaphysical, concepts so alien to us that 
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most times they fail to provide sufficient encouragement. As creatures of the senses this physical 
acknowledgment is imperative, especially when the key to transcendence is contained within it. 
This statement plays out in two important ways. First, beauty is the form that most adequately 
suits our dichotomous nature as creatures affected by both our rational and erotic capacities. 
Second, the appreciation of beauty has the power to evoke transcendence in the mind of the 
observer. Our phenomenal existence is traditionally seen as a burden for our highly valued 
rationality; the hierarchical relationship between the physical and metaphysical plays out in all 
aspects of our lives, as the material is often seen as vulgar and superficial in comparison to what 
is incorporeal. This hierarchy is also present in Plato, who theorizes that the metaphysical is able 
to provide the stable objects of knowledge that we are unable to obtain in our fluctuating world, 
where objects that are in constant flux provide the spectator with belief or opinion, yet no noesis. 
Consequently, the immediate sensible world has long been seen as preventing the mind from 
seeing what it is supposed to see, if the mind did not have the body as an obstacle for this vision. 
This perspective assumes that within us lies the capacity for greater knowledge, for absolute 
vision, yet simultaneously places within ourselves the burden for not being able to attain this 
visualization. The corporeal is important as it is what we actually have, and this is a fact that 
Plato emphasizes when he depicts earthly beauty as a medium to understanding the Forms, as 
much as for him real knowledge in fact lies away from the physical. No philosophical doctrine 
will be good enough if our erotic capacity is not integrated and given a place alongside reason, 
and in both the Symposium and the Phaedrus Plato emphasizes the ways in which our eros works 
for the attainment of the transcendent goal. Thus, the incorporation of both body and mind as the 
key elements by which the person knows is imperative; one cannot know solely through reason, 
as we are embodied souls for as long as we are alive.  
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The burden of the physical is an important aspect of our ontological status, with eros 
constantly interfering with our rational capacity. We have witnessed this collusion in the frenzied 
reaction to beauty of the black horse in the Phaedrus; we have seen it in Alcibiades’ frantic 
desire to share in Socrates’ inner beauty so as to acquire his wisdom. Beauty has the power to 
command these reactions, as it is part of our nature to lack beauty and thus to desire it. It is the 
tragic flaw of human nature as expounded by Aristophanes: our constant state of incompleteness 
and the awareness of this loss is elevates eros as our most commanding capacity, as our soul 
longs to fill the void. Precisely at this point the second aspect of the earlier statement about 
beauty suiting our dichotomous nature comes in. Beauty has the power to evoke transcendence, 
and as Scarry phrases it: “beautiful things […] always carry greetings from other worlds within 
them” (33). This is the meeting point where both eros and beauty unite most explicitly. Within 
particular experiences of beauty the Beautiful is contained; the metaphysical is enclosed within 
the physical in an instantaneous manner that jumps out to the eye but not to the mind. This 
capacity makes the perceiver acknowledge that there is transcendence within the particular 
without understanding what this transcendence is. This relation is seen in Dante’s reaction to 
Beatrice, whereby he is able to view divine grace even for a moment merely because of the sight 
of his beloved. The perceiver is then led to think of what lies beyond, to investigate these abstract 
worlds contained within the particular and concrete manifestation. 
Similarly, eros is our intermediary capacity, the element in us that allows us ever so 
slightly to bridge the gap between the empirical and what lies beyond, allowing us to move 
forward and up in a way that maintains harmony, unlike the violent upheaval described in 
Aristophanes’ speech. We are incarnate creatures first and foremost; we know via what is 
sensible, especially what we see. Beauty gives us this glimpse of transcendence that eros longs 
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for more than any other worldly incentive. Love thus works to move us forward. The experience 
of beauty is the most powerful medium by which to transcend, especially when it leads to 
creation in beauty, providing the only way in which human beings can access any sort of 
transcendence: immortality through fame or the extension of the self via procreation. Through 
the action of creation in beauty we deny the ephemeral nature of the moment of love, or of the 
moment of cognition of the beautiful object or person, a sight so striking to our senses that we 
wish to maintain it forever, even with the knowledge that unlike the thing that it moves us 
towards, this moment is immersed in temporality. Like Dante upon seeing Beatrice, so 
mesmerized by that experience of beauty that he wishes to immortalize it forever in writing, not 
just for his own pleasure but so that others can experience his vision. Through creation in beauty 
we are thus able to escape the curse of temporality, the inadequacy of our finite natures to 
possess the beloved and prevent the feeling of happiness from decaying, by extending our lives 
in creations that beauty will keep alive regardless of time. 
Beauty’s non-discursive beginning and the slow and pleasant process by which our eros 
works at the sight of beauty aids reason. It allows the polarizing aspects of our nature to find 
harmony, as beauty moves eros into action, pushing it towards movement and inquiry, while 
simultaneously allowing rationality to be exercised, as reason must reign in desire, figure out 
how to proceed, all the while being awakened. Beauty thus has a unique way to combine both of 
our capacities and use both for understanding, not merely one over the other. 
In this manner, beauty can lead us to examine questions of ethics and truth. Our aesthetic 
sensibility makes us more aware of these questions. We are made aware of the way form and 
content inform each other, giving us a more complete cognition of the world and ourselves, as it 
decenters us and places us in relationship to the world, making us think critically, prompting us 
160 
 
to examine our lives, as does Alcibiades. All of a sudden we see the world in a greater capacity; 
beauty allows our senses to expand. It makes us think of temporality. This critical thinking is 
what allows for creation in beauty, and beauty in action produces the creation of more beauty. 
The individuals inspired by the particular experience of eros and the Beautiful, like Diotima’s 
philoso-lovers, are many; these are individuals that give birth in beauty physically and authors 
whose offspring are of an intellectual nature. In these accounts the particular is not only not left 
behind, but it is incorporated and assigned a place in relation to the whole. It is the particular 
experience of love that paves the way for creation; Dante would have no Commedia without 
Beatrice, and his metaphorical and actual journey to God would have played out much 
differently. The particular experience, although foundational, is not left behind, as it is necessary 
to incorporate it in order to understand transcendence itself. In addition, the return to particularity 
is present in both Diotima’s ladder, with the lover returning to give birth in beauty, and the Cave 
analogy, with the philosopher king returning to the cave. We are still corporeal beings, and this 
return to particularity is necessary for creation. As long as we are human, the end of the journey 
is here in this world.  
Philosophy is thus called to beautify itself, to multiply its accessibility as our eros is 
naturally suited to desire what is beautiful, and beauty can act as this key towards higher 
knowledge. Beauty as a whole is a powerful incentive, not only through fine art, literature, or the 
beauty of others, but truth in itself can be made accessible, without stripping it of its veracity, as 
shown in Plato’s philosophical-literary texts, or Dante’s poetry, and countless other works of 
philosophy and beauty combined. That is what eros amounts to, to that experience that some call 
love and other calls philosophy, and for both it requires a stepping out of what is immediate and 
a movement towards what lies beyond. The philosopher is the ideal lover, loving what is 
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unchanging. But we are all lovers of particular beauty, and through this experience, we have the 
same access to knowledge.  
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